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The Civilian War Memorial located in Singapore is dedicated to people who lost their 
lives during the Japanese Occupation, especially during an event known as the Sook 
Ching or “purification through purge”.1  The Sook Ching was a mass screening 
exercise carried out by the Japanese after the fall of Singapore to eliminate anti-
Japanese elements, and it lasted from 15 February to 20 March 1942.2  It is difficult 
to say how many Chinese died as a result of the brutal and inhumane operation.  The 
initial figure given by the Japanese after the war ended stood at 5,000.  This was 
contradicted by Chinese sources, who reported the figure to be around 50,000.3  After 
the end of the operation, the Japanese continued to harass the Chinese community by 
ordering it to make a $50 million ‘donation’ for the efforts of the Japanese in 
“liberating” them from the British and to atone for the Chinese past hostilities against 
the Japanese.  The $50 million ‘donation’ was handed to the Japanese on 25 June 
1942.4
The Occupation created two types of victims, however, namely victims of 
extermination and victims of extortion.  After the Occupation, there were attempts by 
a number of constituencies in the Chinese community to find a resolution for the two 
set of victims.  They wanted to build a memorial to commemorate the dead Chinese 
                                                 
1 The term Sook Ching will be discussed in the first chapter. 
2 Kevin Blackburn, “The Collective Memory of the Sook Ching Massacre and the Creation of the 
Civilian War Memorial of Singapore”, Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 
vol.73 part 2, no.279 (December 2000), p.73. 
3 Blackburn, p.73. 
4 Ralph Modder, The Singapore Chinese Massacre, 18 February to 4 March 1942 (Singapore: Horizon 
Books, 2004), pp.76-77. 
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and reclaim the $50 million extortion from the Japanese.  However, little was 
achieved and the tasks were abandoned.   
In early 1962, after a number of mass graves related to the Sook Ching massacre 
were discovered near Siglap, the two discussions were rekindled.  Initially, the task of 
searching for a resolution for the two sets of Chinese victims was headed by the 
Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce (SCCC).  The Chamber continued to 
stress the importance of constructing the memorial and reclaiming the $50 million 
extortion.  In early 1963, the SCCC received the cooperation of the Singapore 
government.  It was also during this time that the memorial was changed from a 
Chinese to a multi-ethnic commemoration.  By the end the year, the SCCC and the 
Singapore government had started building the memorial on a piece of land located in 
downtown Singapore.  The memorial was completed and unveiled on 15 February 
1967. 
However, the reclamation of the $50 million remained unsettled due to the lack of 
response from the Japanese.  This eventually led to a 100,000 strong mass rally in 
August 1963 that demanded the Japanese re-pay the $50 million ‘blood-debt’.  The 
rally was also attended by government officials, including Singapore Prime Minister 
Lee, members of the SCCC, and representation from other ethnic communities.5  The 
rally did not solve the problem however.  In fact, the $50 million was only reclaimed 
in 1967 after the Singapore and Japanese governments agreed without the 
consultation of the SCCC that the latter would make a payment in the form of a $25 
million grant and $25 million loan.6
                                                 
5 The Straits Times, 26 August 1963.  Sin Chew Jit Poh, 26 August 1963. 
6 The Straits Times, 26 and 27 October 1966. 
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Monuments, according to art historian Donald Martin Reynolds should not be seen 
“as another form of public sculpture”.  He explains that monuments are constructed 
and dedicated to people or events because we want to “come to terms with the 
unknown, the unexplained, and the mysteries of life”.  Monuments for Reynolds also 
serve the purpose of “expressing our deepest emotions, both social and personal, such 
as the pain we feel at the death of a loved one”.7  Agreeing that monuments have 
more than just an aesthetic value, Mary Motherstill gives a philosophical perspective 
on their value.  She explains that a structure can only be a monument if it meets two 
independent requirements – it must be “beautiful” and “assertoric”.  By the latter, 
Motherstill means a structure must “convey messages and teach lessons” or “make a 
[verbal] statement”.  To give an example, she notes that a pyramid, an obelisk, or a 
tholos can appear to be beautiful but cannot be “counted” as a monument until a 
“verbal message” is tagged on to it.  Therefore, at bottom, monuments are not just 
beautiful sculptures but convey a message or lesson.8  They might be used to connect 
the present with the past, or as Reynolds put it, become “structure(s) that teach”.  But 
there is no denial that monuments are built by people with the intention to awe, 
inspire, and spur memories of something that might be either a celebration or 
lamentation.  As psychologist Murray Schane explains, “Monuments are built over 
the [cognitive] gulf between the intentional, the collectively cognizing, and the 
                                                 
7 Donald Martin Reynolds (ed.), “The Value of Public Monuments”, Remove Not the Ancient 
Landmark: Public Monuments and Moral Values: Discourses and Comments in Tribute to Rudolf 
Wittkower (Amsterdam: Gordon and Breach, 1996), pp.59-63. 
8 Ibid, pp.53-57. 
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recognizing selves of others”.  In other words, the function of monuments is to “re-
create” and “perpetuate” a moment that is no longer there.  Or simply, monuments are 
built to tell history.9   
The Civilian War Memorial in Singapore is one of the countless monuments all 
over the world that serve the purpose of marking tragic history.  Set in the middle of a 
shallow pool of water in a park situated on the busy junction of Bras Basah and Beach 
Roads in downtown Singapore, the Civilian War Memorial was built in 1967 to 
commemorate the civilians killed by the Japanese military during their occupation of 
the island in 1942-45 (especially those killed in the initial purges known as the Sook 
Ching).  The monument is made up of four identical white 67.4 meters pillars rising 
to a pinnacle.  Each of the columns seems to be freestanding but is actually connected 
at the bottom to form a raised platform that accommodates a pedestal holding a grand 
urn.  But the civilian war memorial was built not with the sole intention of awing its 
visitors’ sensual perceptions through its intriguing beauty.  Firstly, it had an intention 
to connect the present with the past, that is, to help people at that time come to terms 
with the loss of loved ones during the war.  This is demonstrated by the fact that there 
is a chamber beneath the memorial that holds the ashes of Sook Ching victims.  
Secondly, the memorial has a strong “assertoric” value.  As stated in the memorial 
site, every component of the civilian war memorial embodies a “verbal message”.  
The four soaring pillars symbolize the four official ethnic groups of Singapore, 
namely the Chinese, Malays, Indians, and “others”.  By joining up at the bottom, the 
monument conveys the message that the four groups suffered together as one, and 
therefore should be commemorated as one group of victims.  However, beneath such 
                                                 
9 Ibid, pp.47-52. 
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strong “assertoric” value, the Civilian War Memorial raises one very interesting 
question: Why was it built more than 20 years after the end of the Japanese 
occupation?  It seems on the surface that this question could be answered by the 
observation that Singapore did not become a nation-state until 1965, but if we dig 
deeper into the history of the memorial, we will find other reasons. 
 
Objectives of the Thesis 
 
 
The major objective of my thesis is to chronicle how and why the Civilian War 
Memorial required more than twenty years between conception and construction.  My 
thesis describes the events and incidents surrounding the civilian war memorial plan 
and studies them through the prism of local politics, including Singapore’s struggle 
toward nationhood.  The major issues I intend to address are: 
 
1. How differences in the way that the Chinese, Malay, and Indian 
communities were treated by the Japanese during the occupation 
contributed to the changing ideals behind the memorial.  
2. Why the Chinese community failed to construct a Chinese memorial to 
commemorate the massacred Chinese during the first 20 years after the 
Occupation.  The Chinese were badly scarred by the Japanese during the 
Occupation.  After the Japanese surrendered, there were plans to build a 
memorial for the dead Chinese only.  The site for the memorial was even 
planned.  Why then did the Chinese community delay the accomplishment 
of this task? 
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3. What was the ‘blood-debt’?  When was this term coined?  What did it 
signify and how was it related to the Civilian War Memorial?  The term 
‘blood-debt’ is closely related to the Civilian War Memorial.  Previous 
works that studied the history of the memorial have all included discussion 
of the ‘blood-debt’.  However, none of them has explained how the 
‘blood-debt’ issue was related to the construction of the memorial. 
4. Why were the memorial and ‘blood-debt’ issues readdressed during the 
1960s?  The issues were temporarily forgotten by the Chinese community 
after they were abandoned in the late 1940s and early 1950s.  So why did 
the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce (SCCC) revisit the issues 
later?   
5. When the ‘blood-debt’ and memorial issues were readdressed in 1962, the 
Singapore government, which was led by the People’s Action Party (PAP), 
was not very keen to engage in the discussion.  However, in 1963, it 
became an active participant and at one point even supported the SCCC in 
its claim for reparation.  Therefore, why was there friction between the 
PAP government and the SCCC concerning the ‘blood-debt’ and 
memorial issues?  And, what caused the government to change its attitude 
on the discussion of the memorial and ‘blood-debt’ issues? 
6. How did the memorial change from being one dedicated to Chinese 
victims, to a monument that represented the nation’s unity?  When the 
construction of the memorial first proposed in the late 1940s and early 
1950s, and again by the SCCC in 1962, it was meant to be dedicated to the 
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Chinese victims and for the Chinese community.  However, today the 
memorial stands as a structure that is dedicated to victims from all ethnic 
groups in Singapore and for all the ethnic communities.  How did this 
come about? 
7. Did the Civilian War Memorial in some sense bring comfort to the victims 
of the war, especially the Chinese, or was it intended more as a device to 
bring about political closure by the PAP government?  Although the 
Civilian War Memorial continues to stand today in downtown Singapore, 
reflecting a multi-ethnic message to Singaporeans, it seems to have a 
limited local constituency, and cannot be judged a “success” as a site of 
reflection, vistorship, or catharsis. 
 
The time frame in which these questions will be studied is from 1942 to 1967, 
though most attention will be given to the years 1945 – 1951 and 1962 – 1967.  The 
first period was when the memorial and ‘blood-debt’ issues were discussed for the 
first time by a number of constituencies in the Chinese community.  As for the second 
period of 1962 and 1967, this was when the issues were readdressed by both the 
SCCC and the Singapore government.  This later period also witnessed the 






Despite the rich history behind the construction of the Civilian War Memorial, 
there are only a handful of English and Chinese publications which discuss it.  One of 
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the English contributions is an article by Kevin Blackburn in the Journal of the 
Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, (Vol.73 Part 2, No.279: December 
2000), entitled “The Collective Memory of the Sook Ching Massacre and the 
Creation of the Civilian War Memorial”.  Blackburn traces the history of the 
memorial from the Sook Ching massacre to the unveiling of the memorial in 1967.  
He points out that although the memorial is now a symbol of Singapore’s ethnic unity, 
the original idea was to commemorate the dead Chinese, especially the victims from 
the Sook Ching.  Blackburn explains that a change came in the 1960s when the 
Singapore government took over the campaign for the construction of the memorial 
and “molded it to the cause of nation-building”.10  Blackburn’s work provides a very 
good account on the history of the Civilian War Memorial.  However, it also 
demonstrates that there are still many areas to be explored.  For instance, the question 
of why the Chinese failed to construct the memorial in the 1950s and why the SCCC 
decided to readdress the ‘blood-debt’ and memorial issues in the 1960s were left 
unresolved. 
Sikko Visscher’s unpublished Ph. D thesis, Business, Ethnicity, and State: The 
Representational Relationship of the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and 
the Sate, 1945-1997 (Vrijie University, 2002) is another contribution to the history of 
the Civilian War Memorial.  However, the author only dedicates a sub-chapter to the 
topic and discusses the ‘blood-debt’ more than the memorial issue.  Visscher states 
that the discussion of the ‘blood-debt’ as well as the memorial issues between the 
Singapore government and the SCCC could be seen as the latter trying to challenge 
                                                 
10 Blackburn, pp.71-88. 
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the authoritative rule imposed by the former during the turbulent early 1960s.11  
Visscher’s argument is very important, as it questions the real intention behind the 
SCCC when it readdressed the problems.  However, Visscher’s work only covers the 
1960s.  The 1950s, as well as developments in the late 1960s, remain unexplored. 
Another English language contribution is Hara Fujio’s article in the Formation 
and Restructuring of Business Groups in Malaysia (Tokyo: Institute of Developing 
Economies, 1993), entitled “Japan and Malaysian Economy: An Analysis of the 
Relations Started with Reparations after the End of World War II”.  Fujio traces the 
economic relations between Malaya (including Singapore) and Japan during the 
1950s and identifies the ‘blood-debt’ and the memorial issues as major hurdles that 
Japan had to jump before relations between the two states could be re-established 
after the Occupation.  He also suggests that the reason why the Chinese failed to 
construct the memorial during the 1950s was due to the warming of economic ties 
between Japan and Singapore.12  Fujio’s argument is an important one, as it reveals 
an economic perspective on the ‘blood-debt’ and memorial discussion.  Unfortunately, 
Fujio’s work did not extend to the curial period of the 1960s when debate on the 
issues was revived. 
Hiroshi Shimizu and Hirakawa Hitoshi’s Japan and Singapore in the World 
Economy: Japan's Economic Advance into Singapore, 1870-1965 (New York: 
Routledge, 1999) provides important discussion on the ‘blood-debt’ and memorial 
                                                 
11 Sikko Visscher, “Business, Ethniciy, and State: the representational relationship of the Singapore 
Chinese Chamber of Commerce and the Sate 1945-1997”, (Ph.D. diss., Vrijie University, 2002), 
pp.139-188. 
12 Hara Fujio, “Japan and Malaysian Economy: An Analysis of the Relations Started with Reparations 
after the End of World War II”, in Formation and Restructuring of Business Groups in Malaysia 
(Tokyo, Institute of Developing Economies, 1993), pp.119-141. 
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issues during the 1960s.  It reveals how debate over the issue complicated the 
Singapore government’s attempt to lure Japanese investment for its industrialization 
program.  Furthermore, it also chronicles the steady influx of Japanese investment 
into Singapore during that time.13  These studies are very important as they show the 
steady growth of Japanese business in Singapore and help explain why the SCCC 
readdressed the ‘blood-debt’ and memorial issues when they did.  However, the 
authors could have explored these issues in greater detail.   
Junko Tomaru’s The Postwar Rapprochement of Malaya and Japan, 1945-61: 
The Roles of Britain and Japan in South-East Asia (Basingstoke, Hants.: Macmillan; 
New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000) and Lawrence Olsen’s Japan in Postwar Asia 
(New York: Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Praeger Publishers, 
1970) both expand the discussion of the ‘blood-debt’ and memorial issues after it was 
settled by providing a brief study on the relations between Singapore and Japan 
during the late 1960s through the 1980s.  In Olsen’s book, he explains that the 
economic benefits that the Japanese brought Singapore during the period was a major 
factor that ‘erased’ the anti-Japanese sentiment that developed when the memorial 
and ‘blood-debt’ issues were brought up again in the 1960s.14  However, as pointed 
out in Tomaru’s book, this did not necessary eliminate anti-Japanese feelings as 
Singaporeans still remained sensitive to their experiences under the Japanese 
Occupation.15
                                                 
13 Shimizu Hiroshi and Hirakawa Hitoshi, Japan and Singapore in the World Economy: Japan's 
Economic Advance into Singapore, 1870-1965 (New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 180-206. 
14 Lawrence Olson, Japan in Postwar Asia (New York , Published for the Council on Foreign 
Relations by Praeger Publishers, 1970), pp. 197-202. 
15 Junko Tomaru, The Postwar Rapprochement of Malaya and Japan, 1945-61: The Roles of Britain 
and Japan in South-East Asia (Basingstoke, Hants.: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 
pp. 164-212. 
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The main Chinese language publications that have contributed to the history of 
the Civilian War Memorial were those published by the Singapore Chinese Chamber 
of Commerce.  These include Records of Donations to the Civilian War Memorial  
(日本占领时期死难人民纪念碑徵信录) (Singapore: SCCCI, 1969) and Singapore 
Chinese Chamber of Commerce & Industry 80th Anniversary Souvenir (新加坡中华
总商会八十周年纪念特刊) (Singapore: SCCCI, 1986).  These publications are 
particularly good at revealing the process of the construction of the Civilian War 
Memorial.  They also briefly describe some of the SCCC’s difficulties.  However, 
these publications only focus on the 1960s when the SCCC readdressed the memorial 
and blood-debt issues.  Little is mentioned of the earlier years.  Furthermore, the 
information that the books provide is more factual than analytical. 
Another major Chinese language contribution is Malayan Chinese Resistance to 
Japan 1937-1945 (新马华人抗日史料 1937-1945) (Singapore: Cultural & Historical 
Publishing House, 1984) edited by Shu Yun-Tsiao and Chua Ser-Koon.  In this book, 
the history of the memorial is discussed to a certain extent from 1945 until its 
completion in 1967.  A study of the ‘blood-debt’ is also included.  Furthermore, 
important Chinese newspaper or journal articles from the postwar period through the 
1960s that discussed the memorial can also be found reproduced in the book.  
Therefore, this book is one of the most important sources for this thesis.  However, it 
still has to be noted that the authors left many important questions un-addressed.  For 
instance, they did not address why the memorial failed to materialize in the 1950s and 
what the larger motive was behind the SCCC’s new burst of activity.   Neither did 
Shu and Chua really discuss the government’s involvement in settling the issues. 
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These handfuls of English and Chinese publications relating to the memorial give 
some important insights into its history, but, besides synthesis, more detail is needed 
for the history of this significant monument to be thoroughly understood.  For this 
purpose, this thesis uses a great number of primary sources ranging from articles in 
Chinese and English newspapers to government records and speeches given by 
important figures.  I also consulted secondary sources on Singapore’s political, 
economic, and social histories.  This was essential as these works enable an 
understanding of the larger historical landscape of Singapore during that period. 
Among primary sources, the main Chinese newspapers that I used for my research 
were Nanyang Siang Pau and Sin Chew Jit Poh.  These provided a very good 
coverage of events and happenings in Singapore from 1945 through 1967.  To lend a 
perspective on events that is less Chinese oriented, the English language newspaper, 
The Straits Times, was also consulted.  Government records are also drawn on. For 
instance, debates made in the Legislative Assembly offer a political perspective on 
how the government reacted to the discussion of the ‘blood-debt’ and memorial issues.  
Speeches made by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and his memoirs such as The 
Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore: Singapore Press Holdings: 
Times Editions, 1998) and From Third World to First: The Singapore Story: 1965-
2000: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore: Singapore Press Holdings: Times 
Editions, 2000) are also used to provide  insights into political developments.  
Economic reports for the Singapore government such as A Proposed Industrialization 
Program for the State of Singapore submitted by The United Nations Industrial 
Survey Mission in June 1961 were consulted to gain an understanding of the 
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economic situation that the Singapore government was facing during the 1960s.  
These are crucial because they highlight a connection between the readdressment of 
the memorial, the ‘blood-debt’ issues, and the economic policy of Singapore. 
Secondary works on the history of modern Singapore, especially those that 
concentrate on the immediate postwar period and early years of independence, also 
provide crucial to the study of the memorial and ‘blood-debt’ issues.  Books such as 
Ernest Chew’s and Edwin Lee’s A History of Singapore (Singapore: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), John Drysdale’s Singapore, Struggle for Success (Singapore: 
Times Books International, 1984), Constance Mary Turnbull’s A History of 
Singapore, 1819-1975 (Kuala Lumpur: New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 
and Hussin Mutalib’s Parties and Politics: A Study of Opposition Parties and the 
PAP in Singapore (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2004) were consulted 
as background to the history of Singapore from the end of the Occupation through the 
early years of independence.   
 
Structure of the Thesis 
 
 
The main chapters follow the chronological development of the Civilian War 
Memorial.  Chapter 1 is an historical account of the Sook Ching incident.  It also 
relates how the main minority groups, namely the Malays and the Indians, were 
treated by the Japanese during the Occupation.  Chapter 2 examines how the post-war 
Chinese community tried to come to terms with the suffering caused by the 
Occupation.  This chapter tries to identify what the Chinese did and what was the 
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result.  It asks whether they were successful in finding a resolution for their 
desolation, and if not, why? 
Chapters 3 and 4 explore the 1960s, when the memorial and ‘blood-debt’ issues 
were readdressed by the SCCC and the Singapore government.  Chapter 3 chronicles 
the motives behind the revival of the issues, while Chapter 4 explores the alteration.  
These chapters describe the final stage of planning of the Civilian War Memorial and 
ask important questions, such as why it was transformed into a multi-ethnic 




































Although the Civilian War Memorial is a dedication to victims from all ethnic groups 
who lost their lives during the Occupation in Singapore, its origin was actually an 
event that inflicted damage exclusively on the Chinese community.  Known as the 
Sook Ching, the incident saw thousands of Chinese arrested, hauled away, and 
executed by the Japanese.  It was natural that following the war some Chinese groups 
proposed the construction of a memorial to commemorate the victims of the massacre.  
By doing so, they also committed the first of a long series of actions that would 
eventually lead to the unveiling of the Civilian War Memorial.  It is first essential, 
however, to understand the event that started it all – the Sook Ching. 
The primary aim of this chapter is to give an account on the mass screening 
operation so that the reader can develop an insight into the sufferings that the Chinese 
community endured during that time, thus understanding the reason why they wanted 
to build a memorial to commemorate the massacre victims after the war.  Furthermore, 
it also discusses briefly the $50 million payment that the Chinese gave to the Japanese 
after the British surrendered.  We will see in subsequent chapters that this payment 
would be a factor affecting the construction of the proposed memorial.  A third aim of 
this chapter is to show how other ethnic groups, namely the Malays and Indians of 
Singapore, were treated during the Occupation.  It will also discuss how the 
difference of treatment received by the Malays and Indians affected the Chinese.  
Another important aim of this chapter is to discuss whether the Singapore people did 
actually suffered together as a whole under the Japanese. 
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The Dilemma of the Chinese Community 
 
 
The fall of Singapore on 15 February 1942 was an event never anticipated by the 
people of Singapore.  Up until the final minutes before General Tomoyuki Yamashita 
summoned General Arthur E. Percival to his headquarters at the Ford Factory in 
Bukit Timah to sign the surrender documents, the Singapore populace was still 
optimistic that the British defense forces would somehow upset the Japanese invaders.  
Neither did they imagine that their colonial master for more than 150 years would 
abandon them to the mercy of Japanese bayonets.  But the British gave up defending 
the ‘impregnable fortress’ and handed it almost uncontested over to the Japanese.  
Days after the surrender, the Japanese carried out a mass screening operation, known 
as Sook Ching.16  This term is the Chinese translation of the Japanese term shukusei, 
which means ‘purification through purge’.17  The objective of the operation was to 
end all anti-Japanese political agitation so that peace could be preserved in the newly 
acquired island.  Instead of rounding up everyone in a diverse divided population to 
flush out anti-Japanese elements, the Sook Ching solely targeted at the Chinese.  In 
the end, the operation ended up killing thousands of innocent Chinese in both 
Singapore and Malaya. 
After the acquisition of Singapore, the ‘negativeness’ that the Japanese possessed 
towards the Chinese was made public through a declaration by General Yamashita, 
                                                 
16 Public Record Office (PRO), Kew, London: WO 235/1004, Judge Advocate General's Office, War 
Crimes Case Files, Second World War. 10 March 1947 to 8 May 1952.  Transcript of ‘Chinese 
Massacres Trial’ and Related Documents.  Henry Frei, Guns of February: Ordinary Japanese 
Soldiers' View of the Malayan Campaign and the Fall of Singapore 1941-42 (Singapore: Singapore 
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which was printed for weeks on the Syonan Shimbun after the fall of Singapore.  It 
read: 
 
Chinese in Syonan-ko have hitherto been in sympathy with the propaganda of the Chungking 
government, and majority of them supported the aforesaid government and have taken 
politically and economically the same action with Britain against Japan.  Moreover, they have 
positively participated with the British Army in forming volunteer corps and have secretly 
disturbed the military activities of the Nippon Army as guerilla corps or spies. Thus they have 
always taken anti-Japanese actions. It goes without saying that they, in spite of being an 
Eastern Race were indeed traitors to East Asia who disturbed the establishment of a Greater 
East Asia.18
 
The first demonstration of the hostility that the Japanese had for the Chinese in 
Singapore and Malaya came in the former’s dealings with looters.  After the British 
handed Singapore to the Japanese, the island was a complete mess.  Its infrastructure 
was severely damaged from the consistent bombings, and looting was widespread all 
over the island.19  Without the presence of law enforcers and tempted by starvation 
and greed, looters of all races could be seen barging into unattended shops and 
abandoned houses in broad daylight snatching whatever was in sight.20  The new 
Japanese rulers were most outraged when greeted by this lawlessness after their 
glorious ‘Dai-Nippon’ campaign.  In addition, they were equally unhappy that the 
local looters were getting more from the lootings than the Japanese soldiers.21  
Therefore, in order to stop the looting from going from bad to worse the new rulers 
opted for public executions as the solution.  In many cases when a group of looters 
were arrested by the Japanese, the Chinese were always separated from the rest to be 
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beheaded.  For instance, one incident saw fifteen coolies being caught for looting a 
dock area, and the eight Chinese coolies were separated from the rest and beheaded 
on the spot.  Their heads were then displayed on pikes at eight major road 
intersections to warn people of the consequences of looting.22  The impact of this 
horrendous display turned out to be most effective.23
 
The Sook Ching Massacre 
 
 
Three days after the fall of Singapore, a directive order to purge anti-Japanese 
elements in Singapore was issued from General Yamashita’s General Headquarters to 
the newly appointed district officers.24  Upon receiving the order, Lieutenant-General 
Nishimura Takuma and Major-General Kawamura Saburo passed it through the ranks 
and concluded that the secret police or Kempetai, headed by Lt.-Col. Oishi Masaguki, 
should carry out the inspection.25  The purge order was very straightforward.  It 
carried instructions that the first step before inspection was to summon all Chinese, 
male and female, between the age of 18 and 50, to the following areas: 
 
1. The plaza at the junction of Arab Street and Jalan Besar;   
2. The area at the south end of River Valley road; 
3. The rubber plantation at the junction of Kallang and Geylang road;  
4. Vicinity of the police station at Tanjong Pagar;   
                                                 
22 Chin, p.25.  Caffrey, pp. 210-211.  Kratoska, pp. 93-95.  Timothy Hall, Fall of Singapore (North 
Ryde: Methuen Australia, 1983), pp. 210-211.  Tsuji, p.108. 
23 Chin p.25. 
24 Before the order to screen out anti-Japanese elements within the oversea Chinese community in 
Singapore, this action was already in full swing in Malaya, particularly in cities such as Ipoh, Penang, 
and Johor Bahru, where the Chinese population was significant. 
25 Frei, pp.147-150. 
 17
5. Junction of Paya Lebar and Changi road. 26 
 
In addition, the Kempetai was also given the instruction that “anti-Japanese elements” 
meant the following: 
 
1. Persons who had been active in the China Relief Fund; 
2. Rich men who had given most generously to the Relief Fund; 
3. Adherents of Tan Kah Kee, the leader of the Nanyang National Salvation 
Movement; school masters, teachers, and lawyers; 
4. Hainanese, who, according to the Japanese, were Communists; 
5. China-born Chinese who came to Malaya after the Sino-Japanese War; 
6. Men with tattoo marks, who according to the Japanese, were all members of 
secret societies; 
7. Persons who fought for the British as volunteers against the Japanese; 
8. Government servants and men who were likely to have pro-British sympathies, 
such as Justices of Peace, members of Legislative Council; and 
9. Persons who possessed arms and tried to disturb public safety.27 
 
To deal with the suspects, the Kempetai was instructed by General Headquarters to 
‘severely punish’, which basically meant execution.28  After receiving the instruction, 
Oishi added a number of features to enhance the efficiency of the operation.  For 
                                                 
26 Ibid, p.149. 
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instance, he announced the summoning of the selected Chinese through the radio and 
posters, dispatched officers to check houses to make sure no Chinese were hiding, 
and to issue “good citizen” cards to those who passed the inspection.29
However, as soon as the screening operation began, it fell into turmoil.  The 
Kempetai, already handicapped by the unfamiliar environment and language barrier, 
had to not only control the huge crowd gathered at the checkpoint, but also to inspect 
them individually for anti-Japanese suspects.30  To make matters worse, they had to 
meet a three day deadline for accomplishing their task and were under the constant 
pressure and surveillance of their superior officers.  Although the Kempetai managed 
to have the deadline removed, the presence of superior officers did not help the 
situation.  For instance, when Col. Tsuji Masanobu, the Chief of War Operations, 
paid a personal visit to the Jalan Besar checkpoint and found that only seventy 
suspects were arrested from the crowd, he screamed at Onishi, “What are you doing?  
I intend to cut the entire population of Singapore in half!”  In another case, when Maj. 
Asaeda saw the slow pace of arrest in one of the screening centers, he unsheathed his 
sword and threatened to kill the Kempetai officers if the pace remained that way.31  
As a result, the officers had to resort to extreme measures to arrest as many suspects 
as possible to meet their superior, and that was through random selection. 
The option to randomly select the suspects was adopted by the officers from all 
five checkpoints, and this had a damning effect on the lives of thousands of Chinese 
in Singapore.  In the Jalan Besar screening center for instance, the men were told to 
parade in front of a Kempetai officer, who would then identity the person to be 
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30 Ibid, p.150. 
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detained just by looking at him or asking him what was his occupation.32  A second 
example would be the Kallang and Geylang roads checkpoint.  All the people who 
turned up for the screening were detained and transported to the Telok Kurau English 
School near Changi, where they were divided into the following categories: those 
who owned properties value at $50,000 or more, those who worked for government 
agencies, those who were working for Chinese government agencies or prominent 
Chinese companies, those who had been in Malaya for less than 5 years, school 
teachers and intellectuals, and Hainanese.  Sources have indicated that all those 
detained at this location were later executed.33
There were many methods of killing used by the Japanese but the following are 
the three best-known ones.  The first method occurred off the shores of Tanjong 
Pagar harbor, Ponggol beach, and Tanah Merah Besar beach.  The Japanese first sent 
the suspects out into the sea using boats.  The suspects with their hands and legs tied 
together were then thrown overbroad before being machine-gunned to death.34  The 
second method was carried out in remote locations of the island such as Siglap, 
Sampat Ikat Village, and Bukit Timah, where the Japanese would first force the 
suspects, who were herded together with ropes, to march deep into the jungles before 
ordering them to dig deep trenches.  They were then told to line up on the edges of 
the trenches and machine-gunned.35  The third killing method was practiced on the 
beaches of Changi.  The suspects transported to these sites were first ordered to 
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march to the shore.  With their backs facing the firing squads, they were then 
machine-gunned down.36   
The execution of Chinese was supposed to be done in complete secrecy.  In fact, 
the Japanese were so paranoid that word might leak out to the public that after the 
suspects were mowed down by the machine guns, a squad was dispatched to bayonet 
each and every single corpse to make sure they were all dead.  However, some of the 
victims were still able to escape.  Furthermore, the slaughtering was witnessed by 
quite a number of people from other ethnic communities.  The screening and killings 
of the Chinese did not take place only in Singapore.  In Malaya, the Chinese were 
also not spared.  From as early as December 1941 to April 1942, it was reported that 
Chinese in the Malayan states such as Kelantan, Penanag, Melaka, and Johor were 
also rounded up for screenings.  The suspects were arrested and taken away to remote 
areas to be executed.  The number of Chinese who were massacred in both Singapore 
and Malaya during the screening operation is unclear.  Chinese sources have put it at 
50,000, while Japanese sources maintain a figure of 5,000.37  Nonetheless, those who 
had survived the ordeal or passed the examination would continue to remain silent 
about the massacre till the end of the war. 
 
The $50 Million Extortion 
 
 
Shortly after the Sook Ching massacre, the Japanese turned to the Chinese in 
Singapore and Malaya again and demanded that they raise $50 million to pay for the 
efforts of the Japanese “liberation” and to atone for their past hostility towards the 
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Japanese.  This idea was raised by Colonel Watanabe Wataru, the executive director 
of the Military Administration of Malaya and Singapore, after he was told by Tokyo 
that his administration had to raise its own revenue in the newly acquired territories.  
To implement his order, Watanabe summoned Chinese leaders including those from 
the newly formed Overseas Chinese Association (OCA), which was the 
representative body for the Chinese community in both Singapore and Malaya during 
the Japanese Occupation, to the military headquarters.  There the leaders were given 
death threats or other intimidating techniques to force them into agreeing to make the 
payment in less than a month’s time.38
The task for collecting the funds was carried out by a committee from the OCA.  
It concluded that in order to reach the demanded sum within such a short time frame, 
the money would be collected from all Chinese individuals based on the size of their 
properties.39  For instance, Chinese whose property was valued at more than $3000 
were required to contribute 8% of that to the fund.  To prevent any cheating, the 
military administration compiled documents that stated the properties of most 
Chinese.40  It was also reported that those who falsely declared their properties were 
arrested, tortured, and even executed by the Japanese.41
The OCA committee also agreed that the sum would be split among the Malayan 
states and the Straits Settlements.  The allocation was decided as follows:   
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Table 1 Allocation for the Collection of the $50 Million Payment 
Source: Khor Eng Hee, “Public Life of Lim Boon Keng”, (Academic Exercise, Department of 
History, University of Malaya, Singapore, 1958), p.44. 
 
 
Hampered by many difficulties, the committee was unable to raise the amount by the 
deadline.  Even though an extension was later given, the collection still fell short of 
target.  In fact, the committee was only able to raise around $30 million.  It had to 
borrow the rest from the Yokohama Special Bank.  The $50 million payment was 
finally presented to General Yamashita by Lim Boon Keng on 25 June 1942 during a 
solemn ceremony.42
 
The Malay Community 
 
 
Compared to the Chinese, the Malays in Malaya and Singapore were given better 
treatment by the Japanese.  One distinct example was the way that the Japanese 
showed respect to the sultans of the Malayan states.  Yoji Akashi in Japanese 
Military Adminstration in Malaya – Its Formation and Evolution in Reference to 
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Sultans, the Islamic Religion, and the Moslem-Malays, 1941 – 1945 (1969) points out 
that because the Japanese understood the important role of the sultans as the social 
and religious leader of the Malay community, they found it essential to keep them as 
they were so that they could be utilized to restore public order and win support from 
the Malay community after the acquisition of Malaya and Singapore.43  Akashi stated 
that the Japanese were hopeful that if they could re-educate the sultans as subjects 
loyal to the Japanese Emperor, they could in turn be used as an example for the 
Malay people to swear their loyalty to Japan.  Although the sultans were later stripped 
of their political privileges such as their titles and lands, the Japanese took the trouble 
to compensate their loss with a hefty payment.  For instance, the Sultan of Johore was 
paid 48,000 yen, the Sultan of Kelantan 12,000 yen, the Sultan of Tregganu 10,000 
yen, the Sultan of Kedah 30,000 yen, the Sultan of Perak 40,000 yen, and the Sultan 
of Pahang 14,000 yen.44
The Japanese also appeared to be respectful on the customs and religious beliefs 
of the Malay community.45  This was mainly because they were hoping that this 
could also win the “hearts and minds” of the Malays.  Before the invasion of Malaya 
and Singapore began, the Japanese Army took time to educate its soldiers on 
respecting the custom and religious beliefs of the Malays.  For instance, the Japanese 
soldiers were taught not to use their left hand to offer things to the Malays, as it was 
impolite in the Malay culture, and to remove their shoes before entering Malay 
mosques.  They were even taught how to identify Malays who had gone for their 
pilgrimage in Mecca and other Muslims customs such as why Malays did not eat pork 
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and that the religious holiday of the Malays was Friday not Sunday.  In addition, the 
soldiers were also warned not to offend the customs and religious beliefs of the 
Malays.  They were told that: 
 
In general the natives think of their own special customs and habits as things of the 
greatest importance and value.  If you interfere in those customs, no matter how 
kindly your intention, you will not be thanked.  On the contrary, you will incur 
resentment.  It is essential to refrain from well-meant expressions of your own-




The aim of not offending the Malays’ religion was also recognized by Japanese War 
Minister, Tojo Hideki.  In a speech given by him during a conference of executive 
administrators of the Japanese military government on 14 July 1942, he instructed the 
Military Administration of Malaya and Singapore to “use extreme circumspection” 
not to impose Buddhism or other Japanese religious, customs, and beliefs on the 
native population of Malaya and Singapore.47  During the fasting month of the 
Muslims or Hari Raya Puasa, the Military Administration was issued a directive to 
pay all Muslim employees in advance together with a bonus.  It was also told to issue 
notes of condolence to the families of Malays who were killed during the war.48  
Other incidents that displayed the Japanese tolerance of the Malays included 
sponsoring a conference for Muslims from Malaya and Sumatra in April 1943 and the 
lifting of the ban of the Council of Chief Ulama, which was the main organization 
responsible for the Malay religion and customs, in April 1944.49  Furthermore, 
between September and October 1944, the Japanese also set up religious councils in 
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other Malayan states.  In December 1944, the Japanese also convened a conference of 
Islamic leaders to discuss issues concerning Muslims.50
Despite these doings, the Japanese did not fully win the support from the Malays.  
One very important explanation, as pointed out by Abu Talib Ahmad in Malay – 
Muslims, Islam and the Rising Sun: 1941-1945 (2003), was related to the Sook Ching 
massacre.  Abu Talib explained that although the Malays were not victims of the 
massacre, by witnessing and hearing how merciless the Japanese carried out the 
killings it left a negative impression.51  The images were so disturbing that it was 
typical to find Malays scrambling into the jungles when they learned that Japanese 
soldiers were entering their villages.  In other cases, some of them would climb up 
tress to avoid contact with the Japanese, while others hid in specially constructed 
hiding places inside or under their houses.52  The “atmosphere of terror” that the 
Japanese created for the Malay community was made worse when the villages learned 
that the Japanese were always prepared to punish any person that made the slightest 
mistake in front of them with several dreadful treatments such as the “Tokyo slap” 
and the “water treatment”.53  But generally, in comparison to the Chinese, the Malays 
were spared from their mistakes by the Japanese.  For instance, when the Japanese 
found out that one of its Malay collaborators, the Kesatuan Melayu Muda (KMM) or 
Malay Youth Organization, was becoming too ambitious with its plans to push for an 
independent Malaya, and was even reportedly working with the Malayan People’s 
Anti Japanese Party (MPAJA), an underground communist-dominated Chinese 
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organization that carried out anti-Japanese activities, the Japanese did not persecute 
the KMM leaders.  Instead, they only disbanded the party and reassigned the leaders 
to work with the propaganda department of the Japanese Military Administration in 
Malaya and the newly established Malay Volunteer Army or Giyugun. 54  There were 
no reports of any arrests, tortures, or massacres of any KMM leaders.  Well known 
for brutality the leniency that the Japanese showed the Malay leaders was indeed 
unprecedented.   
However, this did not prevent the Japanese from requiring the Malays to donate 
funds.  In 1943, after the Japanese called for the formation a Malay association to 
represent all Malays in Singapore and Malaya, all Malays were told to contribute a 
small sum of money to the association.  It was claimed that the proceedings would be 
given to the Malay Relief Fund and the Wounded Soldiers’ Home in Tokyo.55  The 
money was not collected through extortion, however, but rather through contribution.  
For instance, it was reported that every Malay household in the Selangor state of 
Malaya was required to contribute only $1 to the fund.  All in all, the Malays received 
far better treatment from the Japanese as compared to the Chinese during the 
Occupation. 
After the Japanese surrendered and before the British returned, there were a 
number of ethnic clashes between Chinese and Malays.  Partly, it was caused by the 
misconception that because the Malays were given better treatment and had worked 
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with the Japanese, they should be considered Japanese collaborators.56  The Chinese 
who headed the attacks on Malay communities were mostly from the MPAJA, which 
came out from hiding and took control of Malaya and Singapore before the return of 
the British.  These clashes took place in the Malayan states, and they normally 
resulted in a retaliation attack from the Malays on Chinese communities.  The 
violence between the Chinese and Malays continued even after the British returned 
and took over the administrative duties of Malaya and Singapore from the MPAJA in 
September 1945.  It finally escalated to the Padang Lebar massacre where 35 women 
and children as well as five men were killed by armed Malays on 6 November 
1945.57  The massacre sent shockwave across Malaya and Singapore.  Furthermore, it 
also resulted in even more deadly attacks from Chinese on Malay communities and 
vice versa.58  The conflicts only receded from March 1946 after numerous 
reconciliation efforts – such as using the Sultans to restrain the Malays from attacking 
Chinese –taken by British, Malay, and Chinese leaders started to yield results.59
 
The Indian Community 
 
 
The Indians in Singapore and Malaya, like the Malays, were given better 
treatment than the Chinese by the Japanese during the Occupation.  One reason, as 
pointed by Jan Pluvier in Southeast Asia from Colonialism to Independence (1974), 
was because the relationship between the Japanese and Indians was very unique, as 
both the nationalistically motivated Indians in Malaya and Singapore and the 
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Japanese shared a common an enemy at that time, Great Britain.60  The Japanese 
were fighting against the British and were planning to invade the Indian sub-continent, 
while the nationalistic Indians were intent on wresting India’s independence from the 
British.  As a matter of fact, even before the invasion of Malaya and Singapore, the 
Japanese were already working with the nationalistic Indians in the British colonies 
through an intelligence organization known as the Fujiwara Kikan or F. Kikan.61  
However, it has to be noted that this co-operation was only between nationalistic 
Indians and not the Indian community as a whole.  A significant number of Indians 
remained loyal to the British during the colonial and invasion period. 
After the surrender of Singapore, the Japanese tried to expand the co-operative 
circle of Indians by inviting Indian Prisoners-of-war (POWs) to join the fight against 
the British.  In a speech that was given to them on 17 February 1942 by Major 
Fujiwara, the Indian POWs were told that they would be considered as friends of the 
Japanese and not prisoners if they joined the newly formed Indian National Army 
(INA) to fight for India’s independence.62  The number of Indian POWs who joined 
the INA was, however, uncertain.  Mohan Singh, one of the leaders of the INA 
claimed that 42,000 joined while 13,000 remained as POWs.  But according to British 
sources, only 20,000 joined the INA, while 45,000 did not.63  However, one thing 
was sure and that the INA was marred by leadership problems and friction with the 
Japanese.  Its leadership was constantly in disagreement with the Japanese for 
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interfering in their plans for a free India.  Eventually, it led to the arrest and 
imprisonment of the leaders of the INA at the end of 1942.  Nonetheless, the arrests 
only hit a small number of people from the leadership and there were no massacres 
similar to the Sook Ching.  In 1943, however, the Japanese patched up with the INA 
after appointing a new leadership led by the charismatic Subhas Chandra Bose.  On 
21 October 1943, the Japanese further mended their ties with the INA by approving 
the formation of a Provisional Government of Free India (Azad Hind), which 
declared war against Britain and the United States three days later.  These measures 
were fruitful, as it led to a significant increase of Indian support for the INA.64
As for the Indian civilians, the Japanese were eager to win their co-operation as 
well.  Together with the nationalistic Indian leaders, an Indian Independence League 
(IIL) was formed and the Indian civilians were encouraged to join.  Although large 
number of Indians became members of the IIL, as pointed out by Paul Kratoska in 
The Japanese Occupation of Malaya (1998), it was mostly out of fear of the Japanese.  
Quoted from an interview that he conducted with K.R. Menon, a wartime journalist 
and a member of the IIL, Kratoska wrote on why most Indians joined the ILL: 
 
…they had to come and they would be issued the passes to go anywhere they liked, 
you know…Without these passes they cannot go anywhere.  So that made them 
come there and they all became members of the Indian Independence League.  And 
whenever a Japanese saw an Indian, they immediately asked, “Are you a member of 
the Indian Independence League?”  If they are not, they’ll get slapped…So to avoid 
the slaps they immediately became members.  So that was the League.65
 
However, it had to be noted that although the Indians were afraid of the Japanese, 
they were not constantly harassed by them.  Furthermore, there were no mass 
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screenings of the Indian community for anti-Japanese elements.  In other words, the 
Indians were left pretty much to their own devices.  But still, this did not mean they 
were given true freedom or special privileges, as after all they were still subjects of 
the Japanese.  In fact, after the formation of the Azad Hind, the Indian civilians, 
particularly the wealthier ones, were called upon to contribute funds were based on 
their property values.  Having witnessed how the Chinese were exhorted for $50 
million, the wealthy Indians feared for their wealth and tried to evade the contribution 
drive by converting their properties into cash so that they could appeared to be 
“property-less”.66  However, the amount that was taken from the Indians was 
considerably smaller than that taken from the Chinese. 
After the Japanese surrendered the Chinese and Indians did not develop any 
hatred between them despite the latter having been treated better and working with 
the Japanese during the Occupation.  There were reports that some Sikh watchmen 
were executed by the MPAJA, but generally the relations between the Chinese and 
Indians were good.67  In fact, it was pointed out by P. Ramasamy that many Indians 
from various classes joined communist-dominated trade unions.68  Many INA 
returnees also joined the Malayan Communist Party (MCP).  This was welcomed by 
MCP leaders as they saw the returnees, especially those who held leadership roles in 
the INA as fit to provide the leadership for labor organizations to attract the support 
of the Indian masses.69  Ramasamy explained that the development of such a 
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relationship between the Chinese, particularly supporters of the MCP, and Indians 
after the Japanese surrendered was because both of the groups had a common goal 
and that was to expel foreign imperialism from Malaya and Singapore.  As a result, 
this allowed them to work together preventing the rise of ethnic clashes.70
 
Victims of the Japanese Occupation  
 
Although the Malays and Indians were not singled out by the Japanese, they 
together with the Chinese, were all victims of the Japanese Occupation in the sense 
that they were all affected by the war and problems created by the Occupation.  For 
instance, during the invasion of Singapore, Chinese, Malay, and Indian regiments 
fought together side by side to repel the advance of the Japanese troops.  Many 
soldiers were killed in the process, including a whole Malay regiment in the Battle of 
Pasir Panjang.71  As for the civilians, many of them, regardless of which ethnic group 
they belonged to, were killed by the air bombardment carried out by the Japanese. 
After the fall of Singapore, the people continued to suffer from many 
occupational problems, particularly food shortage.  This problem was most prominent 
in Singapore because it is an island with very limited food production.  It did not 
produce any rice, which was an essential component of a typical person’s diet in 
Singapore during that time.  The commodity was imported from neighboring 
countries, particularly Thailand.  The Occupation, however, brought many difficulties 
to the importation of rice into Singapore because the Japanese allocated most of the 
rice supply to their own military needs.  For instance, by the end of 1944, a household 
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in Singapore was getting only 1 kati (1 kati = 1 1/3 pounds) of rice per month, while a 
Japanese household was given 19 katis.   
Even when rice was imported into Singapore, the Japanese only released it 
through rationing.  To make matters worse, the rationing varied from time to time and 
diminished throughout the Occupation.  For instance, from March through November 
1942, each person was rationed 20 katis per month.  By the end of 1943, it was cut 
down to 12 katis for male, 9 for female, and 10 for children per month.  In 1944, rice 
rationing was further reduced to 8 katis for male, 6 for female, and 4 for children.  By 
the end of 1944, each household was only getting 1 kati of rice.  To substitute rice, 
many household tried to grow root crops such as Tapioca and Sweet Potato. 
Although the food shortage problem did not result in famine, it left many people 
malnourished.  This was one of the factors that contributed to the high mortality rates 
in Singapore during the occupation.  When the number of deaths peaked in 1944, it 
was also at the time when the food rationing, particularly rice, was at its lowest.   
The total mortality rates for both male and female from all ethnic groups stood at 
29,833 and 21,936 in 1942 and 1943 respectively before peaking to 42,751 in 1944.  
These death figures were significant higher compared to the pre-war period which 
was at an average of 15,000 per year.  Moreover, when the figures were broken down 
according to ethnic groups, all of them registered a significant increase in the number 
of deaths.  For instance, in 1940, the total number of deaths within the Malay 
community was 1,965, but during the occupation, it increased to an average 6,206 
deaths per year.  The increase of deaths could also be observed within the Chinese 
community.  In 1940, the total death figure was 5,503.  But during the occupation, it 
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increased to an average 15,912 per year.  As for the Indian community, the average 
number of deaths during the occupation period was 3,743 per year, but in 1940, it was 
only just 895. 
Food shortage was the only problem raised here.  But throughout the occupation, 
people from all ethnic groups in Singapore had to endure many other problems such 
as disease, health, housing shortages, and financial difficulties.  They also lived in 
constant fear from the Kempetai.  In the end, the people of Singapore were victimized 
as a whole by the Japanese.  But it was unfortunate that the Chinese were singled-out 





In this chapter, we have seen how the Chinese were singled out for special treated 
by the Japanese through the Sook Ching massacre and the $50 million extortion.  The 
mass screening operation resulted in the Chinese living in fear and uncertainty under 
the Japanese.  It had also brought thousands of Chinese lives to an end, scaring the 
community with broken families.  To make matter worse, shortly after the massacre, 
the Chinese were then forced to ‘donate’ $50 million to the Japanese Military 
Administration.  Therefore, after enduring such an ordeal under the Japanese, it is of 
no surprise that the end of the occupation in August 1945 brought some relief to the 
Chinese community in Singapore and Malaya.  However, what the Chinese had been 
through could not be forgotten by just lowering the Japanese flag.  It was probable 
that they wanted a higher form of consolation, as after all they were victimized in two 
ways during the Occupation. 
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As for the other ethnic groups, namely the Malays and the Indians, they were 
treated much better during the occupation as compared to the Chinese.  Of course, 
they were instances where both the Malays and Indians were punished by the 
Japanese, but again compared to the Chinese, the punishment that they received was 
less severe.  After the Japanese surrendered, the difference of treatment received by 
the Malays resulted in the development of numerous clashes between the Chinese and 
Malays.  This did not happen between the Chinese and Indians.   
The people of Singapore regardless of which ethnic groups they belonged to, 
however, suffered as a whole during the Japanese Occupation.  The problems caused 
by the occupation made life very difficult, and for some impossible.  These problems, 
particularly food shortages, could be seen as factors contributing to the high mortality 
rates across all ethnic groups.  For instance, in 1944, when the death rate was highest 
in all ethnic groups, rice rationing was at its lowest.  In the end, members of the 
























The Japanese occupation of Singapore came to an abrupt end after the Japanese 
surrendered unconditionally on 14 August 1945.  In less than a month, the British 
returned to Singapore, and once again the island was a British colony.  Although this 
event was highly anticipated by the Singapore Chinese community as well as their 
ethnic counterparts, there was no room for celebration.  All of them had to deal with 
the numerous postwar problems caused by the occupation.  However, unlike their 
ethnic counterparts, the Chinese had a number of particular postwar problems to deal 
with.   
As early as late September 1945, one of these concerns was aired by Major-
General Feng Yien, a representative dispatched by the Nationalist Government of 
China to evaluate the conditions of the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia after the 
war.  During a meeting with the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce (SCCC), 
the General urged the chamber to conduct a “thorough investigation” on monetary 
damages and missing Chinese or Chinese killed by the Japanese in Singapore, so as to 
allow the Chinese government to appropriately respond to the needs of the Overseas 
Chinese.72
As General Feng’s announcement makes clear, the Chinese community in 
Singapore during the postwar period had to address two sets of problems.  The first 
was dealing with the repatriation of stolen money, while the second was getting some 
measure of justice and commemoration for the large number of Chinese civilian 
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casualties.  The Occupation had resulted in two types of victims: namely victims of 
extortion and victims of extermination.  The first group of victims was created by the 
Sook Ching massacre, and the second by the Japanese through the $50 million 
payment.  Though the Japanese had targeted elites in both instances, these two groups 
of victims were not necessarily the same people. 
This chapter shows how groups within the Chinese community tried to find a 
sense of resolution for the two sets of victims.  It will also analyze whether they were 
successful in achieving the task.  Furthermore, the chapter will identify the 
constituencies and people from the Chinese community that took on both 
responsibilities.  It will discuss how well the Chinese handled the task of finding a 
sense of resolution for each set of victims caused by the Occupation.  The Civilian 
War Memorial was an eventual outcome of these maneuverings. 
 
Tan Kah-Kee and the Fund Committees 
 
 
Tan Kah-Kee and his fund committees, namely the Singapore China Relief Fund 
Committee (SCRFC) and the South Seas China Relief Fund Union (SCRFU), were 
the first from the Chinese community that took up the task of compiling the 
information requested by General Feng Yien.73  In so doing, they could also be 
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identified as the first group from the Singapore Chinese community which sought to 
find a resolution for the two sets of victims.  Although the fund committees only dealt 
with the problems for a short period of time, they were able to gather quite a lot of 
information.  All in all, the fund committees handled both the problems faced by the 
two set of victims with equal priority. 
In September 1945, Tan Kah-Kee, a prominent and respected Chinese 
businessman who was famous for his numerous social welfare and anti-Japanese 
activities during the prewar period, returned to Singapore and saw the horrendous 
situation the Chinese community in Singapore was in both financially and 
psychologically.74  In response to that, Tan agreed with the idea that investigations be 
carried out as soon as possible to assess the financial losses of the Chinese caused by 
the Japanese administration and to find the count of missing persons or persons killed 
by the Japanese.75  Monetary reparation could then be demanded from the Japanese, 
and vital information could be collected from the public to aid the process of 
persecuting the individuals responsible for the atrocities committed.76  To accomplish 
these tasks, Tan assigned both the SCRFC and the SCRFU, which he chaired, to carry 
out the necessary investigations in October 1945.77  One possibility as to why Tan 
used the SCRFC and SCRFU to carry out these responsibilities was that they were 
                                                                                                                                           
medical supplies, and recruiting overseas Chinese volunteers to help China’s war effort (Yong, pp.213-
218). 
74 Before the British surrendered, Tan knew that his anti-Japanese activities had made him the most 
wanted person by the Japanese.  So he fled to Java   After Java was taken by the Japanese later in 1942, 
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was not spared from the ordeal, as his residence was looted and damaged, while his third son and 
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75 Sin Chew Jit Poh, 18 October 1945.  Yong, p.302. Tan, Kah-Kee, Nan Qiao Hui Yi [南侨回忆录], (
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76 Yong, p. 302. 
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already deeply involved with many pre-war activities in Singapore, and therefore, 
were best prepared.  The two committees were very successful in these pre-war fund-
raising activities.  Furthermore, their executive members were mostly prominent 
people from the Chinese pang community and had close connection with the British 
government.  For instance, the SCRFU had worked closely with the British when it 
carried out “anti-Japanese” activities during the war.  Therefore, the networking that 
these committees provided was complete and elaborate.  This provided an edge for 
the committees to carry out the investigations. 
The outcome of the investigation was reported back to Tan in January 1946 and 
later submitted to the Chinese Nationalist government.78  In the report for property 
damages caused during the occupation of Singapore, the fund committees stated that 
the total amount of losses of both private and business Chinese properties caused 
during the occupation stood at 270,822,000 in banana currency79, which was about 
M$67,628,200.80  However, the committees pointed out that the reported amount was 
not essentially accurate, as a lot of business owners were not willing to share their 
business transactions during the occupation.81  Furthermore, the report also did not 
state whether this figure included the $50 million payment made by the Chinese 
community during the Occupation.   
As for the report for missing persons or persons killed during the mass-screening 
operation and thereafter, the fund committees admitted that they were unable to give 
an accurate tally, but they still managed to offer an approximate count of 7,000 to 
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8,000.  As with the result of property damages, the committees admitted that they 
were unsure about the accuracy of the figure even though it was based primarily on 
the information provided by government agencies, civilian accounts, and Japanese 
records.82  The committees suggested that it was necessary to implement actions to 
encourage the Chinese community to come forward to share more information so that 
a more accurate count could be compiled.83
After receiving the report from his fund committees, Tan Kah-Kee took his 
investigation a step further by proposing for the first time the idea for constructing a 
memorial to commemorate the Chinese victims killed by the Japanese during Sook 
Ching massacre as well as during the Occupation.84  It was stated that Tan wanted the 
memorial to be erected on the top of the hill in Bukit Batok on the site where a 
Japanese war memorial once stood. 85  Furthermore, he believed that the memorial 
should be for the Chinese only.86  The explanation for such a move was twofold.  
Firstly, Tan felt that the memorial could serve as a testimony for the Chinese as to the 
horrendous ordeal that they endured under the Japanese occupation.  During a 
meeting with the fund committees, Tan Kah-Kee and his counterparts stated that the 
Chinese were the only ethnic group that had suffered tremendously both financially 
and psychologically as a result of the Japanese occupation, therefore it was nothing 
but appropriate that a memorial for the massacred Chinese be constructed.87
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The second reason why Tan Kah-Kee wanted the memorial to be restricted to the 
Chinese was connected to the traditions of the Chinese death ritual.  In a letter of 
1946 to Brigadier Patrick McKerron, the Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer of the 
British Military Administration, Tan wrote that the Chinese required at least four 
annual ceremonies to commemorate the dead, namely the Sook Ching anniversary, 
Ching Ming, the Hungry Ghost Festival, and Winter Solstice.  It was highly possible 
that clashes might occur between the Chinese and the rest of the ethnic groups on 
how the commemoration activities for the memorial should be carried out.  Therefore, 
Tan noted that it could be better if a memorial for just the Chinese could be erected.88  
However, the British were not impressed with Tan’s explanation, as they wanted the 
memorial to have a multi-ethnic dimension.  As a result, the construction of the 
memorial was suspended.89
From what we have seen above, the fund committees and Tan Kah-Kee achieved 
a lot in assessing the two sets of problems – monetary damages caused by the war and 
the memorialization of massacre victims – that the Singapore Chinese faced during 
the immediate months after the end of the Occupation.  Their role has been more or 
less overlooked by subsequent historical works, which suggest it was the Singapore 
Chinese Massacred Appeal Committee (SCMAC)90 (which we shall look into later) 
that first addressed the issues.  Nonetheless, Tan Kah-Kee and his fund committees 
would become the last working organization that focused earnestly on both the 
problem of repatriating monetary and the accounting the dead during the immediate 
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postwar years.  After the responsibilities of the fund committees were taken over by 
the Appeal Committee, the task of finding resolution to the problems would be treated 
with different priorities, and it would eventually divide the Chinese community into 
two constituencies. 
 
The Singapore Chinese Massacred Appeal Committee 
 
 
The SCRFC and SCRFU ceased their function of investigating the situation of the 
Singapore Chinese after the SCMAC took over that responsibility.  In Tan Kah-Kee: 
The Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend (1987), the author, Yong Ching-Fatt 
explained why the SCMAC was set up to take over the fund committees in these 
matter was because of Tan Kah-Kee’s return to China, which effectively dissolved 
the SCRFC and the SCRFU.91   
The SCMAC was formed on 2 June 1946.  It was headed by Tay Koh Yat, a 
wealthy and influential Chinese businessman who was also the Chairman of a pro-
Kuomintang Chinese newspaper, Chuang Shing Jit Poh.92  Other members of the 
committee were mostly made up of prominent businessmen or SCCC members.  For 
instance, Chuang Hui-Tsuan, the General Affairs Officer, was the owner of the Ma 
Hua Printing Press and an ex-member of Force 136, set up by the British to carry out 
reconnaissance activities during the Occupation. He was also the Vice Director of the 
labor group of the SCRFC and assisted his sister-in-law in setting up Nanyang Girls’ 
School.  Furthermore, he was also very active in many clan associations such as the 
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Hokkien and Chuang Clan Association.93  The Assistant General Affairs Officer was 
Ng Aik Huan, the Manager of Asia Life Insurance at that time and a close friend of 
Tan Kah-Kee.  Ng was also one of the founders of the Chinese newspaper, Nan Chiau 
Jit Poh.  Before the war, he was a commission agent of European and American 
liquor brands and active and influential member in the Hokkien pang community.94
Since the SCMAC was formed as a replacement for the fund committees, their 
agendas remained more or less the same:  to seek war damages from the Japanese and 
to count and commemorate the Chinese killed during the occupation.95  It has to be 
noted, however, that even though the agenda of the SCMAC remained the same as 
that of the fund committees, the way they were prioritized was different.  Instead of 
focusing on both agendas with similar interest and importance, the SCMAC gave 
more attention to the issue of repatriating monetary damages from the Japanese.  One 
explanation for this development was due to the membership of the SCMAC, as it 
was mostly made up of businessman or other elites from the Chinese community.  
This gave the SCMAC a more “business” and “elitist” mindset.  In other words, it 
would be more interested in seeking monetary reparations and voicing its “anti-
Japanese” sentiment rather than helping surviving relatives to come to terms with the 
loss of their loved ones. 
 
Seeking War Damages from the Japanese 
 
 
The SCMAC began its demand for monetary damages from the Japanese in May 
1947, when it announced that the amount to be demanded would not be the sum 
                                                 
93 Visscher, p.108. 
94 Yong, p.314.  Visscher, p.99. 
95 Shu and Chua, pp.81. 
 43
calculated and submitted to the Chinese consulate by Tan’s fund committees.  Instead, 
it would be a new figure of M$50 million set by the SCMAC.  In a meeting held by 
the committee on 12 May 1947, it explained that this sum was the appropriate amount 
to be demanded because it was what the Japanese had extorted from the Chinese 
community during the Japanese occupation.96
During this meeting as well as subsequent ones, the SCMAC not only continued 
to stress its obligation to “return” the M$50 million to the Chinese community, it also 
sketched out plans on how to allocate the money if the demand were to be successful.  
For example, the SCMAC wanted to use part of the money to help orphans or 
families who had lost their breadwinners.  Furthermore, the committee also stated its 
intention to use the remuneration to help the British government in its financial relief 
programs for war torn families.97  Besides this, the meetings also saw the committee 
devising methods on how to reclaim the M$50 million, and in general, the strategy 
was to gain the attention of the War Damage Claims Commission (WDCC) on this 
issue.98  One example was that the SCMAC planned to use the ‘people power’ to 
press the British.  The Committee believed that if the Chinese communities were to 
come together, it could ultimately force the British authorities to prioritize the M$50 
million repayment.  The SCMAC was successful in implementing this strategy.  In 
fact, it received strong response from the Chinese community in both Malaya and 
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Singapore.  Various Chinese organizations in Malaya even started a registration to 
account each person’s “donated” amount.99   
The SCMAC’s first attempt to convince the WDCC to include the $50 million as 
part of its damage claims from the Japanese was carried out when Chuang Hui-Tsuan, 
its General Affairs Officer, was dispatched to meet with Richard Graham, chairman 
of the WDCC on 20 May 1947.  Unfortunately, Graham revealed to Chuang that it 
was highly unlikely that the Damage Commission would consider the possibility of 
including the M$50 million in its claim registration.  Graham also added that the 
commission would not take responsibility for assessing the numbers of missing 
persons or persons killed by the Japanese.100  However, the Chairman did give an 
encouraging sign to Chuang in the meeting by stating that the British representatives 
would discuss the extortion issue with the Japanese during the Peace Treaty 
Conference in 1951.  Still, this piece of news was not well-received by the SCMAC, 
as three months after Chuang’s meeting with Graham, the committee tried again to 
court the British authorities to put the $50 million on its war claims list.  This time, 
the SCMAC approached Brigadier Patrick McKerron, the Deputy Chief Civil Affairs 
Officer, through a petition emphasizing and proving the point that the M$50 million 
was exhorted by the Japanese military, and therefore, it was justified to claim it back 
from the Japanese government.101  However, this, as well as the earlier strategies, 
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failed as the British totally ignored the SCMAC’s demands when they released their 
final draft on war damage claims. 102
In its final draft , the Commission did not include the M$50 million claim in the 
their section on Japanese reparations or “Seizure Claims”.  The WDCC decided not to 
seek any monetary reparation \ from the Japanese government.  Instead, the 
Commission only pressed for Japanese property and equipment assets in Malaya and 
Singapore as reparation.103  The British decision not to entertain the SCMAC’s 
demand or seek monetary reparation from the Japanese government was due to the 
changing political landscape in East Asia during that time.   
After the Japanese were defeated by the Allied forces, the Americans initially 
decided that Japan should be democratized but rendered militarily harmless..  In 1949, 
things began to change, however, as the Americans adopted a “reverse course” policy 
in dealing with a post-war Japan.  This transformation was partly conditioned by the 
“loss” of China to communism in 1949.  As a result, the Americans found the need 
for a new ally in East Asia that could help contain the spread of communism, and 
Japan was identified as the country.  To begin the process, the first step was to revive 
its economy.  It was thus natural that the British should be discouraged from seeking 
monetary war reparation from Japan as it might create financial difficulties for the 
revitalization of the country’s economy.  As a close ally of the Americans and also 
anxious to contain the spread of communism, the British complied with the 
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Americans’ request by deciding to abandon their claim for monetary reparation from 
the Japanese.104
The SCMAC as well as the Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya were 
greatly upset with what the WDCC had presented and demanded the British 
authorities revisit the M$50 million issue.  The committee with its supporters went as 
far as to demand the British authorities send local Chinese and not just British 
representatives to the Peace Treaty Conference in 1951.105  However, all was in vain, 
as the British concluded the peace treaty with the Japanese in San Francisco in 
September 1951 not only without mentioning the Chinese claims, but also 
abandoning their own rights to seek monetary compensation.106  The British, instead, 
accepted compensation in the form of Japanese assets such as machinery and ships, 
which amounted to around M$60 million.107
The outcome of the conference did not impress the Chinese community.  For 
instance, the Chinese newspaper Sin Chew Jit Poh commented that the replacement 
of monetary compensation with Japanese assets was nothing but “a piece of hair of 
nine oxen dropped in the ocean” and could never be considered as avenging the 
atrocities committed during the Occupation.108  This was also supported by The 
Straits Times which wrote that the failure of the British to reclaim any monetary 
compensation from the Japanese revealed that it had totally ignored public opinion.109
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Failure to Construct the Memorial 
 
 
After the conference the SCMAC continued to pursue the reparation claim 
through the SCCC.  In the period from August to September 1951, the Committee 
requested that the SCCC force the British government to reinstate the reparation 
claim.  It also suggested that the M$50 million be reclaimed by way of getting a share 
out of the disposed Japanese assets.  However, the SCMAC’s request was turned 
down by the SCCC, as it felt that the chance of success was minimal given that the 
British had already concluded the treaty.  Furthermore, the SCCC also felt that even if 
a result could be gained, it would be an “utter waste of time” as nothing of high value 
could be gained, for the British had already agreed that reparations would only come 
in the form of equipments and not money.110
It was during this turbulent time that the SCMAC announced that it would begin 
the construction of a memorial to commemorate massacred Chinese on a hilltop off 
Thomson Road.111  In the announcement, Chuang Hui-Tsuan, the General Affairs 
Officer, stated that the committee had located the massacre sites in Siglap and Bedok 
and that exhumation work would begin shortly in conjunction with the memorial 
construction.112  It has to be noted, however, that the construction of such a memorial 
was not a new concern at this point.  As mentioned earlier, before the formation of the 
SCMAC in June 1946, the memorial issue had already been visited and dealt with to a 
certain extent by Tan Kah-Kee and his fund committees.  It was only suspended when 
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the British authorities did not agree with Tan’s proposal that the memorial be 
restricted to Chinese victims, as they wanted it to be a multi-ethnic.   
In April 1948, however, the British gave their approval for the construction of a 
memorial for Chinese victims.  The proposed site where the memorial would be built 
was originally at Bukit Batok but was later changed to a hilltop off Thomson Road.113  
However, strangely enough, the SCMAC suspended the construction of the memorial 
after it acquired British approval.  The initial delay could be explained by a road 
construction project that was going on in the allocated area along Thomson Road, 
which might have disrupted the task of constructing the memorial.114  However, after 
the completion of the road construction in November 1952, the SCMAC continued to 
suspend construction, and only vague information pertaining to the planning of the 
memorial was reported thereafter.  It was not until 1958 when the SCMAC gave an 
official update on the memorial project.   At that time, Chuang Hui-Tsuan issued a 
contradictory and confusing declaration that the SCMAC had been unable to locate 
the massacre sites and demanded that a visiting Japanese dignitary in 1958, Ogata 
Shinichi (the Director of the Higher Education and Science Bureau in the Japanese 
Ministry of Education who also served as a police chief during the Japanese 
Occupation), give them the necessary information to locate these sites, so that the 
committee could exhume the remains of the massacre victims.115  This process was 
seen as a vital requirement for the construction of the memorial, as the SCMAC was 
planning to build the memorial together with a cemetery garden that would hold the 
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remains of the massacre victims.116  The SCMAC, unable to obtain anything from 
Ogata, however, continued to freeze the memorial project.  It was not until 1962 
when the issue was visited again.  Therefore, it is essential to find an explanation on 
why the SCMAC was unable to accomplish these tasks. 
In Shu Yun-Tsiao’s and Chua Ser-Koon’s Malayan Chinese Resistance to Japan 
(1984) and Kevin Blackurn’s article, “The Collective of the Sook Ching Massacre 
and the Creation of the War Memorial of Singapore” (2000), they explained that the 
reason why the SCMAC failed to accomplish the task of constructing the memorial 
was because it was unable to locate the massacre sites117  It was reported in Da Zhan 
Yu Nan Qiao, however, that as early as 1946 the places where the massacre had taken 
place had already been identified.118  When Tan’s fund committees reported its 
findings on the number of people missing or massacred by the Japanese in February 
1946, they also released a number of list that stated where the massacres had taken 
place.  Altogether, there were three lists based on government, civilian, and Japanese 
sources.  The following is part of the list that was complied from civilian sources: 
 
Location Number of Victims
Blakan Mati 182
Changi ("300 acre") 250
Changi Spit Beach 69
East Coast Road 723
Tanah Merah Besar Beach 242
 
Table 2 Massacre Locations and Number of Victims Compiled from Civilian Sources 
Source: Da Zhan Yu Nan Qiao: Ma Lai Ya Zhi Bu, p.68.
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This was not the only time when the massacre locations had been pinpointed.  During 
the Nishimura trial in 1947, the issue was similarly raised when the charges were read 
out to the accused and also when the witnesses gave their statements.119  Locations 
such as Tanah Merah, Telok Kurau, and Ponggol were constantly referred to by the 
court as well as the witnesses as the major killing sites during the course of the trial.  
As a result, it was highly unlikely that the SCMAC was unable to locate the massacre 
sites with such available information.120  Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, even the 
committee itself had declared in September 1951 that it had located the massacre sites 
at Bedok and Siglap (near East Coast Road) and the construction of the memorial 
would commence shortly after.  It was reported that Chuang Hui-Tsuan even toured 
the area with two men who had witnessed the Sook Ching massacre at the area.121
Hara Fujio offered another perspective on why the SCMAC was unable to 
construct the memorial.  Fujio believed that the problem lay in the resumption of ties 
between Japan and Singapore during the 1950s.  He explained that at that time, 
though a majority of the people in both Malaya and Singapore were still against the 
idea of allowing Japanese businesses to return, some influential Chinese merchants 
from the SCCC saw it as a business opportunity.  Fujio reasoned that these merchants 
must have somehow influenced the SCMAC to not to purse the memorial 
construction, as it might damage the progress of the restoration of Singapore-Japan 
relations thus affecting the merchants’ business interest.122  Although the perspective 
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given by Fujio makes better sense in explaining the lack of action from the Appeal 
Committee, it would be wrong to accept it without further examination. 
It was highly unlikely for instance, that a group of merchants, no matter how 
influential they might be, could stop the construction of a memorial of such high 
importance to the Chinese community.  In fact, when the discussion of the issue was 
revived in 1962, it would be leaders from the SCCC that would spearhead it.  
Furthermore, they had also strongly demanded that the Japanese repay the $50 
million extorted from the Chinese community.  Such an about-face at this moment 
seems unlikely. 
Another reason why Fujio’s argument should be questioned is because significant 
Japanese investment did not come to Singapore until late 1957.  At that time, a 
concern was raised in a meeting between then Chief Minister of Singapore Lim Yew 
Hock and the visiting Japanese Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke that investment might 
conflict with local interest.123  Even then, the Japanese investment was not really a 
major concern until after 1961 when the PAP came to power and decided to 
industrialize Singapore with the help of Japanese companies. 
After reviewing what has been written to explain the failure of the SCMAC to 
proceed with the memorial, the question still remains unresolved.  I think the 
explanation for the failure of the Committee in dealing with the matter of finding a 
resolution to the dead Chinese is simply because they were not greatly interested in 
this matter.  As I stated earlier, although the Appeal Committee replaced Tan Kah-
Kee’s fund committees, the way the former prioritized agendas was different from the 
latter.  The Appeal Committee did not view the issue of accounting and 
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commemorating the war victims as centrally as repatriating the $50 million from the 
Japanese.   
One evidence of this comes from the Nishimura War Trial in early 1947.  The 
Nishimura trial was a war crime trial carried out by the British Military Court in 
Singapore from 10 March to 2 April 1947.  All seven accused from the trial were 
leading figures in the Imperial Japanese Army and were charged by the court with: 
“Committing a war crime at Singapore Island between the 18th February and 3rd 
March, the accused…being all responsible for the lives and safety of civilian 
inhabitants, were, in violation of the laws and usages of war, together concerned in 
the massacre of Chinese civilian residents of Singapore Island…”124  The majority of 
the 38 witnesses called by the court were Chinese, and most of them were survivors 
from the massacres.  The testimony that they gave included when and where the 
massacres were carried out.  Furthermore, it also consisted of gruesome descriptions 
of how the Japanese detained and executed victims. 
An important issue that was raised in the trial was identifying who and what was 
responsible for the massacre of the Chinese.  According to the defendants, it was the 
principle of ‘Bushido’, or in other words, the need to comply with military orders that 
had led to the tragic event.  The defendants explained that when an order was given to 
a Japanese soldier from his superior, it was unimaginable that he would question it, as 
obedience was a value strictly observed in the Japanese Military.  As a result, the 
defendants continued, the person responsible for the massacre was ultimately the 
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commander of the 25th army, General Yamashita.125  However, the defendants’ 
argument was countered by the prosecution, and ultimately rejected by the court, on 
the ground that all levels of command were responsible for the atrocity.126
After a little more than three weeks of hearings, the British military court 
announced its verdict on 2 April 1942.  Kawamura Saburo and Oishi Masayuki were 
sentenced to be hanged, while the rest were given life imprisonment.127  
Unsurprisingly, the court’s verdict left the Chinese community, especially the 
families of the massacre victims, highly dissatisfied.  In Nanyang Siang Pau, the 
dissatisfaction was portrayed by a comic strip that showed a balance that was 
lopsided by Japanese being hanged by the neck against a cage full of human skulls.128  
The SCMAC, speaking for the victims’ families, announced unanimously on 5 April 
that the life imprisonment sentences given to five of the seven accused were ‘too 
lenient’.  It further added that the only way to appease the souls of the massacred 
Chinese, as well as the victims’ families, was to not only “execute all the seven 
Japanese concerned in the massacre”, but also that the executions should be held in 
public for everyone to witness.129  In addition, the committee also called the British to 
expand the trial to other Japanese who took part in the mass-screening operation.130  
However, the calls for a retrial with heavy sentences or other propositions given by 
the SCMAC fell on deaf ears, as the British confirmed the given sentences on 14 June 
1947.  Responding to the confirmation announcement, Tay Koh Yat, President of the 
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SCMAC, told reporters that he and his committee would remain unsatisfied with the 
sentences unless all seven accused were hanged.  But Tay did not state whether he 
would pursue the matter further.  Instead he suggested that the authorities should 
allowed ten of his committee members to witness the hanging of Kawamura and 
Oishi.131  The British agreed to Tay’s proposition and allowed six of his members to 
attend.132  After witnessing the execution 26 June 1947, Tay again stressed his 
dissatisfaction over the whole episode by stating that “the overseas Chinese were far 
from satisfied with the executions”.133  However, there was little that he and his 
committee could do to convince the British of the need for a retrial or more trials 
concerning the massacre, and the whole matter was dropped from the committee 
agenda. 
The response from the SCMAC in regards to the verdicts seems to indicate a real 
interest in seeking justice for the massacre.  Why then did the Committee not seem to 
be interested in pursuing the matter by pushing on to construct the memorial?  The 
SCMAC involvement with the trial came at a time when it was still negotiating with 
the British on the reparation issue.  In other words, the SCMAC was still working on 
something that its members were interested in achieving, and that was getting the 
M$50 million from the Japanese.  When the SCMAC failed to achieve what they 
wanted after the British concluded the San Francisco Treaty in 1951 denouncing all 
reparation claims from the Japanese, its members quickly lost interest with the task of 
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finding a resolution for the relatives of the dead Chinese through the construction of a 
memorial. 
One way to illustrate how disinterested the SCMAC was in regards to finding a 
resolution for the dead Chinese and their relatives is by noticing how poorly it 
handled the registration of names of missing persons or persons killed.134  The name 
collection was started by the SCMAC with the help of the SCCC in early 1950 before 
the San Francisco Treaty was concluded.  The purpose was to have the list displayed 
on a memorial which was supposed to be built in St Andrew’s Cathedral.  However, 
nothing pertaining to this matter was mentioned again after the collection deadline 
passed on 15 February 1953.  As a matter of fact, I have personally made a trip to the 
cathedral and was told that there was no such memorial.  Furthermore, even Chuang 
Hui-Tsuan, the General Affairs Officer of the SCMAC, admitted in 1967 that the 
name collection was not successful because the records were “eaten by termites”.135
Another substantial indication that the SCMAC was no longer interested in 
addressing the commemoration issue was the half-hearted manner in which the 
members participated in the affairs of the committee after 1951.  Except for Chuang, 
the SCMAC’s members seemed to be missing in anti-Japanese campaigns carried out 
by the committee in the 1950s.  Compared to how the SCMAC reacted to the verdict 
of the Nishimura trial and how it campaigned for the M$50 million repayment, this 
was very uncharacteristic.  For instance, in 1952, when the SCMAC announced that it 
would partly fund the construction of the Lim Bo Seng memorial, which cost around 
HK$85,000, at the tenth anniversary of his death, Chuang Hui-Tsuan was the only 
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representative from the SCMAC to attend the ground-breaking ceremony.136  
Furthermore, during the ceremony, Chuang did not mention or give any update to the 
construction of the Sook Ching memorial.  He also failed to state whether the 
SCMAC had started to exhume the Sook Ching mass graves that he claimed to have 
located at Siglap in 1951.137  
Furthermore, when Ogata Shinichi (the Director of the Higher Education and 
Science Bureau in the Japanese Ministry of Education who also served as a police 
chief during the Japanese Occupation) visited Singapore in 1958, a protest was 
carried out in the name of the SCMAC at the airport.  However, Chuang Hui-Tsuan 
was the only member from the SCMAC there to lead the protest.  He was with a 
group of Chinese holding banners that carried “anti-Japanese” slogans and protesting 
against Ogata, demanding that he reveal the locations of the massacre sites.  Chuang 
accused Ogata of knowing where the massacres were carried out because he served in 
the Japanese Military police during the Occupation, and claimed he was hiding the 
information.  According to Kevin Blackburn, his method of protest embarrassed the 
Japanese more than it provided any help in locating the mass graves.138  Nonetheless, 
Chuang was the only representative from the SCMAC at the protest, and he failed to 
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gain anything from it.  Moreover, Chuang did not mention anything at the time about 
the construction of the memorial.139
Finally, when the SCCC took over the responsibilities of the SCMAC in 1962, 
Chuang was yet again the only member from the committee voicing his 
dissatisfaction.  He wrote a strongly-worded letter in 1967 to the SCCC accusing it of 
robbing his committee of its responsibilities.  He also indicted in the letter that the 
SCCC was putting up an act all along to appease the Chinese community by claiming 
to be interested in the construction of the memorial, and would even the memorial to 
honor the improving ties between Singapore and Japan.  The rest of the SCMAC 
remained strangely quiet.  Even the President of the SCMAC did not make any 
comments to any of the leading newspapers of Singapore at that time. 
 
Commemorations Carried Out by Scholars and Relatives of the Sook Ching Victims 
 
 
During the post-war years in Singapore, there were groups of people from the 
Chinese community that were interested to commemorate the Sook Ching victims.  
These groups were independent from any of the organizations discussed above and 
were mostly led by scholars and the victims’ relatives.  They focused primarily on 
finding the names of missing Chinese or Chinese killed by the Japanese during the 
occupation and commemorating the souls of the dead.  In other words, they were 
concerned with commemorating the victims of the war rather than repatriating 
monetary losses caused by the Occupation.  As a result, these groups of people could 
collectively be seen as the third constituency that studied the situation of the 
Singapore Chinese during the postwar period. 
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The collection of the names of Chinese war victims were led by scholars and it 
came as early as November 1945.  It was initiated by the Singapore Overseas Chinese 
Publishers when it printed 10,000 investigation forms and distributed them to the 
general public together with the third issue of its bi-monthly magazine, Hua Qiao 
Shen Huo or Mirror of Life.  Unfortunately, the call from the publisher was met with 
little enthusiasm, as it was reported that only one-fourth of them were sent back.140  
Less than a year later, the Shing Zhou Cha Yang Li Chi Sia picked up where the 
Singapore Oversea Chinese Publishers left off by releasing a book entitled, A Record 
on the Chinese of Cha Yang Origin Martyred during the Japanese Occupation.  The 
book, which aimed at showing the negative effects of war through the presentation of 
personal accounts of the occupation, dedicated one of its chapters to the listing of 
names of individual who were killed during the Japanese occupation.  The list, which 
was a little more than six hundred names long, also included a brief description of 
each individual’s character.141  From then to the early 1950s, the process of listing the 
names of war victims was repeated by numerous Malayan and Singaporean 
publications such as A Memorial Record of the Martyred Teachers and Students, A 
Memory of the Victims for the Fifth Annual, A History of the Chinese Victims of Muar, 
and A History of the Glorious Chinese Victims, and the lengths of the name lists 
presented in these books ranged from as low as fifty to as high as several hundred.142  
It was not until 1955 that a “most fully recorded” name list based on the findings 
from past works was published.  The task was undertaken by Hsu Yun-Tsiao, who 
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was the Honorary Editor of the Journal of the South Seas Society, and with the 
inclusion of victims from both Malaya and Singapore, the name list grew to more 
than seven thousand and fifty names.143  The list was later used by Ke Bing Rong 
when the author published, The Survey of the Chinese Victims in Malaya and 
Singapore during the Japanese Occupation in 2004.144   
The commemoration for the dead was carried out by relatives of the Sook Ching 
victims.  They were motivated by customary beliefs, particularly the requirement to 
carry out death rituals for the dead.  As pointed out by Patricia Lim, one of the 
biggest dilemmas faced by the Chinese in Singapore after the war was the task of 
appeasing the souls of their dead relatives.145  This matter was especially important 
because most of the dead that the Chinese were dealing with had died violently.  
Accordingly, for cases of death caused in such a manner, the Chinese death tradition 
denotes that because the soul of the victim was released suddenly into an unfamiliar 
surrounding and was therefore lost, it was unable to make its journey to Hell to 
complete the cycle of reincarnation.  As a result, the soul was condemned to the fate 
of being a wandering hungry ghost for all eternity.146   
The living relatives of the condemned soul were now liable to be held responsible 
by the living as well as the dead for not performing the proper duties of filial piety, 
which was to ensure that their ancestral soul would be recognized, remembered, and 
guided to a proper reincarnation.  Furthermore, the failure of the living relatives to act 
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would also mean that they were jeopardizing future generations, as the latter might 
not be blessed by the wandering ancestor.147  Therefore, to prevent these from 
happening, the Chinese had to do something to appease their dead relatives.  This is 
why locating the massacre sites became of such importance for them, as only then a 
proper death ceremony could be held on these grounds to save the souls of the dead 
from becoming hungry ghosts.  One such case was in July 1948 when The Straits 
Times reported that on the killing site of Siglap, a three day ceremony to redeem the 
hungry ghosts from eternal condemnation was organized by the Hoon Siang Keng 
temple in Changi and thousands of relatives of the dead.148  It was claimed that 
during the event, the High Priestess Miaw Chin was able to invite the souls of the 
massacred to attend the ceremony and be saved.  Furthermore, there was even a part 
in the ceremony that saw the Priestess becoming a medium for the souls to converse 
with their relatives.  Through this unconventional way of communicating, the souls 
were reported to have told their relatives how they were killed.149  In another case, a 
small cenotaph was constructed.  This time it was on the massacre site of Punggol and 
was organized by non-affiliated Chinese groups.150  Patricia Lim had stated in her 
work that such a structure could also serve as a tool for the relatives of the dead to 
pay homage.  She explained that a memorial was largely viewed as a symbolic grave 
for the dead, and therefore allowed the relatives to perform the correct ceremony to 
“save” the souls from eternal condemnation.151
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In Malaya, there were also numerous memorials of this kind erected by Chinese 
groups.  In places such as Johor, Melaka, Selangor, Penang, and Perak, it was 
common to see tombs or small memorials being constructed by Chinese Kampong152 
folks to commemorate the massacred.153  These tombs and memorials were normally 
dedicated to a group of victims, but there were some exceptional cases when they 
were dedicated to a single individual.  Furthermore, they were mostly constructed 
during the period of the late 1940s and 1950s.154
In the end, these rituals carried out by the Chinese showed that even though the 
commemoration of the Sook Ching victims was put on hold after the SCMAC 
abandoned the memorial project, there were commemorations carried by relatives of 
the Sook Ching victims.  Although these commemorations were not carried out in a 
large scale manner nor resulted in a permanent memorial, it showed that some things 
were done to remember the dead.  Moreover, the commemorations further 
contradicted the SCMAC’s argument that it had to delay the memorial project 
because it could not locate the mass graves.  This was because the death rituals that 
were conducted by the victims’ relatives had to be carried out on the actual sites 





In this chapter, we have seen how organizations such as Tan Kah Kee’s fund 
committees and the SCMAC as well as groups not affiliated with either one of the 
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two groups had all tried to address some of the major problems faced by the Chinese 
community in Singapore during the postwar period.  It was identified that the 
problems could be classified into two categories.  One category dealt with the 
monetary issue and the other with the dead.  Tan’s fund committees were the first and 
the last organizations during that time that treated both problems with similar energy.  
They were quite successful in their work, and in less than half a year, the committees 
submitted the first report that included an estimated amount of war damages and war 
deaths.  The committees even went as far as proposing the construction of a civilian 
war memorial for the Chinese victims.   
However, when the responsibilities of the fund committees in this field were 
taken over by the SCMAC in June 1946, the two problems were separated and 
differently prioritized.  As it turned out, the newly formed SCMAC was more 
interested in dealing with the repatriation of war damages.  In fact, it campaigned 
quite furiously for the repatriation only to be ignored by the British, who had the 
ultimate say regarding the reparation claim.  As for addressing the dead, the SCMAC, 
except for its General Affairs Officer, Chuang Hui-Tsuan, was not really interested.  
As a result, it led to a delay in the construction of the memorial to commemorate the 
dead Chinese.   
It would be unfair to say that the issue of addressing the dead was totally ignored 
after that, as some scholars and victims’ relatives decided to take on the responsibility 
of commemoration.  The scholars published names of the victims in books, while the 
victims’ relatives carried out activities such as holding private ceremonies at the 
massacre sites. 
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In conclusion, although the two problems were addressed and were even given an 
encouraging start by the fund committees, nothing major was accomplished.  Firstly, 
the organizations were unable to get any monetary reparations from the Japanese 
despite putting in so much work and attention.  And secondly, even though the issue 
of the dead was addressed, the commemoration of the dead was done on a rather 










































In the previous chapters, I have pointed out that the Japanese Occupation had resulted 
in two types of victims in the Chinese community, namely victims of extermination 
and victims of extortion.  After the end of the Occupation and right up to the late 
1950s, there had been a number of attempts to help the two types of victims find a 
sense of resolution to their post-Occupation adversities.  Due to a number of 
circumstances, however, none of these attempts were successful.   
In the early 1960s, the challenge to addressing these problems was once again 
taken up.  This time it was led by the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce 
(SCCC) and the newly-formed Singapore government led by the People’s Action 
Party (PAP).  Though it was a new attempt, the methods were somewhat similar to 
what were proposed formerly, that is constructing a memorial to commemorate the 
massacred victims and reclaiming wartime extortion through the demand of monetary 
compensation from the Japanese.  The only difference is that the SCCC referred to 
the latter issue as the ‘blood-debt’.  The aim of this chapter is to discuss why the 
SCCC revisited these issues after they were abandoned for more than 20 years.  In 
other words, it explores why and what were the motives behind the SCCC’s decision 
to readdress the memorial and ‘blood-debt’ issues, and the PAP’s reaction to the 
issues when they were brought up by the SCCC.  This is crucial because without the 
full support of the PAP government, it was highly unlikely that a resolution of the 




Revival of the ‘Blood-debt’ and Memorial Issues 
 
It was on 19 February 1962 that the issue of building the memorial and settling 
the ‘blood-debt’ was revived.  On that day, a Sook Ching massacre site was unearthed 
in Siglap by workers from a sand-washing project.155  The SCCC dispatched a three-
man working group headed by Ng Aik Huan, Chairman of the SCCC’s General 
Affairs Committee, to investigate the site as well as to find more massacre sites.  In 
the days after the Siglap discovery, Ng and his team discovered other massacre sites 
located in parts of Singapore such as Changi 10 milestone, Bedok, Bukit Timah, East 
Coast 7 ½ milestone, and Yio Chu Kang.156
It was claimed by the Chamber that the Siglap discovery came as a complete 
surprise and the location of other mass graves could not have happened if not for the 
information provided by witnesses of the Sook Ching massacres.  This was stated by 
Ng Aik Huan as he spoke to reporters after the Changi discovery on 23 February 
1962.  He said: 
 
I have received a lot of information from massacre survivors on many different 
locations of where my compatriots were atrociously massacred by the Japanese.  If 
these locations are real, I will send my men to go there to investigate and to dig.157
 
 
As seen in the previous chapter, however, many of the locations of the massacre 
sites had already been identified by Tan Kah-Kee and his fund committees (the 
SCRFC and SCRFU) and were even published in a book called Da Zhan Yu Nan 
Qiao: Ma Lai Ya Zhi Bu (1946).  The Nishimura war trial in 1947 also identified 
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some massacre sites.158  Strangely, the Chamber did not mention or refer to any of 
this existing information.  It insisted that the discoveries were made based on 
survivors’ accounts.  Nonetheless, by early March, 1962, more than a dozen mass 
graves were located by Ng’s team.159
Responding to these discoveries, Ko Teck Kin, President of the SCCC together 
with his chamber committee, announced at its monthly general meeting that it would 
immediately set up a 15-man Disposal of Remains Committee (DRC), which was 
headed by Ng Aik Huan, to “shoulder full responsibility” for the whole issue, which 
included both the responsibilities of locating, exhuming, reburying, and 
commemorating the massacre victims through the construction of a memorial, and the 
demand for monetary compensation for the atrocities or what the Chamber referred to 
as the ‘blood-debt’.  However, the Chamber made it clear that it would not be 
pursuing the demand for the ‘blood-debt’.  Instead, it requested the PAP government 
to take up the issue.160   
At this point, it is necessary to discuss the term ‘blood-debt’.  This phrase, which 
combines the Chinese words, xue (blood) and zai (debt), implied that the monetary 
compensation that the Chamber sought for the victims of extortion during the 
Japanese Occupation had now integrated the matter of killings or xue as well.  In 
other words, by using the term ‘blood-debt’, the SCCC gave the compensation claim 
an extra dimension as it now included not just the extortion victims, but more 
importantly, the relatives of the victims.  The Chamber wanted the Japanese to pay 
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the debt for the massacre that they had committed in the form of compensating the 
victims’ relatives.  This character of the compensation claim was very different when 
the matter was first addressed by Tan Kah-Kee and his fund committees as well as the 
SCMAC during the period from 1945 to the early 1950s.  The compensation claim 
was originally referred to using the Chinese term, pei chang or compensation, and it 
was primarily intended for the extorted victims.  The term ‘blood-debt’ did not appear 
in the record until August 1958 when Chuang Hui-Tsuan from the SCMAC led a 
protest at the Singapore airport during the brief stop-over of Ogata Shinichi (a 
Japanese police chief during the Japanese Occupation and the Director of the Higher 
Education and Science Bureau in the post-war Japanese Ministry of Education) 
demanding the Japanese government to repay the Sook Ching ‘blood-debt’.161  As 
pointed out by Kevin Blackburn, the term ‘blood-debt’ that was used by Chuang at 
that time was not referring to monetary compensation but the victims of the Sook 
Ching.  Quoting from an editorial from Nanfang Evening Post, Kevin Blackburn 
wrote: 
 
The ‘blood-debt’ of the past can no longer be reckoned and cleared…we only hope 
that this director of the Bureau of Higher Education in Tokyo can relate to his people 
the atrocities of the Japanese militarists and the resentment of the Singapore, so that 
the Japanese will understand and repent.162
 
 
When the SCCC used the term ‘blood-debt’, it was meant to encapsulate 
memories of the monetary extortion and mass killings in a single description, 
while simultaneously suggesting the correction penalty for both crimes: 
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payment of a sum of cash.   From the 1960s onwards, the term ‘blood-debt’ 
was frequently used not only by the Chamber but also the Chinese press.   
Perhaps a reason why the Chamber used the term along with the extra 
dimensions was due to the Japanese government’s reaction to its 
compensation demand.  When the Chamber demanded the Japanese 
government to resolve the ‘blood-debt’ in March, 1962, it was flatly turned 
down.  The Japanese government stated that the compensation claim was 
already settled through the ratification of the San Francisco Treaty in 1951.  
They further added that they had no reason to address the matter because the 
Singapore government had not lodged any demand.163  Undoubtedly, the 
Japanese response was not well-received by the SCCC.  During the 
Chamber’s monthly general meeting, Ko Teck Kin, President of the SCCC, 
berated the Japanese government.  He said: 
 
The demand of the SCCC for the Japanese government to compensate is 
just and reasonable.  It must succeed and failure is not an option!  The 
Japanese government thought that it can use the San Francisco Treaty as an 
excuse not to address the problem, but in fact, the wartime massacre carried 
out by the Japanese is a crime that has nothing to do with the treaty.  
Furthermore, the treaty does not even compensate the many families for 
their loss of properties.  They were not given even a single cent.164     
 
 
In the speech, Ko signaled that the ‘blood-debt’ that his Chamber was seeking 
was not only reparation for war damages, but a monetary condolence for the 
Sook Ching victims’ relatives.  With this extra dimension, Ko believed that it 
would give the Chamber’s ‘blood-debt’ demand more credibility, and could 
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help weaken the Japanese claims that the matter was already settled by the 
San Francisco Treaty.  
The move taken by the SCCC to readdress the ‘blood-debt’ as well as the 
memorial issues received strong approval within the Chinese community.  
This can be seen in an editorial article published by Sin Chew Jit Poh, a 
leading Chinese newspaper in Singapore during that time, on 3 March 1962.  
It praised the actions taken by the SCCC in response to the issues: 
 
Mr. Ko Teck Kin, President of the SCCC, pointed out that on during the Chamber’s 
monthly general meeting on 1 March 1962 that if his Chamber decided to ignore the 
issues, which had been ignored for more than 20 years, they would never be settled.  
Therefore, the Chamber’s chivalrous response to the issues and its willingness to 
take up the responsibilities to settle them deserves the full support and admiration of 
the people of Singapore.165  
 
    
The article went on to urge the PAP government to take proper actions to help the 
SCCC to settle the issues and demanded the Japanese government cooperate to pay 
the ‘blood-debt’.  It wrote: 
 
Under all kinds of circumstances, settling the issues is one responsibility that no one 
can evade.  The Singapore government should unconditionally offer its assistance to 
help the DRC with its responsibilities of locating more mass graves and exhuming 
and reburying the remains…so that the step of appeasing the dead and consoling the 
victims’ relatives can be carried out more smoothly…As for the compensation issue, 
the Japanese Foreign Ministry announced two days ago that it has been settled 
through the San Francisco Treaty in 1951.  But in truth, the British did not include 
the matter of demanding compensation for the massacre.  Foreign affairs are under 
British control, but the sensitivity of the issue is such that if they received the 
backing of the Singapore government, the British and the Japanese governments 
would no doubt response to the compensation issue.166    
 
    
A similar response was also seen in an editorial from Nanyang Siang Pau, another 
influential Singapore Chinese newspaper of that time.  It also wrote that the 




Chamber’s actions should receive praise from the public because they had the 
intention to settle the memorial issue “once and for all”, thus appeasing the dead and 
consoling the survivors and victims’ relatives.167  On the demand for compensation, 
the article stated that it supported the Chamber’s plan to claim it through the PAP 
government by means of peaceful negotiations with the Japanese government.  
However, it voiced its resentment over the Japanese maintaining that the matter was 
already settled by the San Francisco Treaty of 1951.  The article said: 
 
The Japanese Foreign Ministry announced that its government believed that the 
compensation claim was already settled after the signing of the San Francisco 
Treaty…In addition, the Foreign Ministry also said that the Singapore government 
has not officially contacted the Japanese government in regards to the matter. From 
what the Japanese announced, it seems, firstly, that the Japanese government is using 
the treaty as an excuse to exempt itself from the massacres that it had committed here.  
Secondly, it also mentioned the fact that the key factor in reclaiming the 
compensation was the involvement of the Singapore government.  If the Singapore 
government is willing to contact the Japanese government on the compensation issue, 
the Japanese government would have to acknowledge the issue.168      
 
 
Throughout the month of March 1962, the DRC and the SCCC continued to carry 
out its responsibilities by releasing statements and reminders relevant to its agendas in 
both the Chinese and English press.  Discussions such as how and where the remains 
should be disposed or kept, or where the war memorial should be constructed are 
some of the examples.  Other important press releases included the constant 
prompting of the Committee and Chamber as well as the PAP government not to 
ignore the ‘blood-debt’ issue.   
The discussion of the issues soon caught the attention of leaders of opposition 
political parties.  For instance, Ong Eng Guan, Chairman of the United People’s Party 
(UPP) and Lee Siew Choh from the Barisan Sosialis (BS) both expressed their 
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support through the press for what the Chamber was pursuing and demanded the PAP 
Government not “shrink” from its responsibilities since it was elected by the people 
of Singapore.169   
On 14 March 1962, the memorial and the ‘blood-debt’ issues were brought to the 
floor of the Legislative Assembly when Tee Kim Leng, Assemblyman for the BS, and 
Lim Yew Hock, leader of the Singapore People’s Alliance, confronted Prime Minister 
Lee on the subject.  Tee questioned whether the government had taken any steps in 
response to the “mass graves” discoveries made by the SCCC.  He also wanted to 
know what policy the Government had adopted in regards to the demand of war 
reparation from the Japanese government.170  The following is an excerpt taken from 
the debate:171
 
Mr. Tee Kim Leng (In Mandarin): Mr. Speaker, Sir, if the Japanese Government refuses 
to compensate for the reasonable request (the war reparation), then what steps will the 
Government take in the matter? 
 
The Prime Minister: Mr. Speaker, Sir, I need only to point out that foreign affairs is in 
the hands of the British until independence through merger [with Malaysia].  I am quite 
sure that the Barisan Sosialis now understands how stupid the proposal was that the next 
constitutional step for Singapore was full internal self-government with foreign… 
 
Mr. Speaker: Order. I am afraid that answer is completely out of order.  I think that 
question is hypothetical anyway, and I must disallow it. 
 
The Prime Minister: Mr. Speaker, Sir, may I just go on?  I was on the point of going to 
the meat of the matter. 
 
Mr. Speaker: I have disallowed the supplementary question as being hypothetical. 
 
Tun Lim Yew Hock: A supplementary question. 
 
Mr. Speaker: Tun Lim. 
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Tun Lim Yew Hock: The Minister of Finance was recently in Tokyo.  He was there in 
all anxiety to foster good relationship with the Japanese Government and Japanese 
industrialists.  May I ask the Prime Minister whether he did make use of the opportunity 
just to sound the Japanese Government about the cry of the people of Singapore when 
those bones were exhumed? 
 
The Prime Minister: I do not wish to prejudice private conversations on this matter, but 
I would like to say that the Japanese officials who where in contact with our officials who 
happened to have been in Singapore previously fully appreciated the feelings on this 
matter.  I think they may be more than prepared to make some atonement for the 
atrocities that had been committed.        
 
However, in Lee Kuan Yew’s memoirs, it proved to be otherwise, as he stated 
that he had personally discussed the issue with the Japanese Prime Minister during his 
visit to Japan.  Therefore, there was a strong indication that the PAP government was 
not really interested in the task of reclaiming money from the Japanese. 
Although it was claimed by Ko Teck Kin and his chamber members that 
politicization of the memorial and the ‘blood-debt’ issues was not an outcome they 
wanted, it seemingly gave the Chamber room to pursue the matter even further.172  
Shortly after, the Chamber applied for the license needed for the exhumation of the 
remains from the Ministry of Health.  Unfortunately, this would lead to a delay in 
work until July, 1962.  The Government was questioned by Tee King Leng and Ong 
Chang San on 29 June during a debate session of the Legislative Assembly over the 
delay.  The following is an excerpt from the debate:173
 
Mr. Tee Kim Leng asked the Prime Minister if he will state the reasons for not yet 
approving the applications of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce to exhume the 
mass graves of victims of the massacres in the last war by the Japanese army. 
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The Prime Minister: Sir, the applications of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce to 
exhume the remains of the victims of massacres by the Japanese in the last war was 
generally approved on the 6th of June.  However, as explained to the Chairman and 
representatives of the Chamber who saw me yesterday, there were certain technical 
matters which they will have to clear before the license can be issued. 
 
Mr. Ong Chang Sam (In Mandarin): Mr. Speaker, Sir, the Prime Minister, says that 
because of some technical matters, the license is now being held up for the time 
being.  Can the Prime Minister tell this House what these technical matters are? 
 
The Prime Minister: I have said that there were certain technical matters.  I have 
informed the Chamber of Commerce of them.  They are having a meeting and they 
will be communicating with my Secretary and I do not think it is of any importance 
to this Assembly at this stage to delve into these technical details.  It will not help 
matters. 
 
Mr. Tee Kim Leng (In Mandarin): Mr. Speakers, Sir, can the Prime Minister tell 
this House when the license will be granted? 
 
The Prime Minister: Sir, from time to time, I try my best to be a prophet and in this 
particular case all I can say is that I see no difficulty so long as the parties concerned 
can reach agreement on certain technical matters which have to be agreed to.      
 
While the SCCC was waiting for the Government’s approval for its exhumation 
license, it received a visit from Rev. Gyptsu Sato, a wartime Japanese Air Force 
Major, who was leading a peace mission around the world, in May 1962.  Together 
with his delegation and the officials of the SCCC, Rev. Sato visited the Siglap mass 
grave site and paid respect to the massacre victims in a death house in Upper 
Serangoon Road where some of the exhumed remains were kept.  At the end of his 
visit, Sato appealed to the Singapore people to forget the past and “rally round the 
world peace movement”.  He also suggested the formation of a Singapore-Japanese 
People’s Association to promote friendly social ties between the two countries.  
Furthermore, he also wanted to initiate a special fund committee among Japanese 
people to help the Singapore people and the Chamber to build a memorial to 
commemorate the massacre victims.174
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The Government’s Reaction on the Revival of the Issues 
 
 
On 19 July 1962, the Chamber received the PAP government’s approval to 
exhume the massacre sites.175  However, as soon as it received the good news, the 
Chamber was forced to delay its exhumation project for another week.  The delay was 
not caused by the government, but the SCMAC.  In a letter to the PAP government, 
Chuang Hui-Tsuan, the General Affair Officer of the SCMAC, stated that his 
committee instead of the SCCC should be given the exhumation task.  Chuang 
explained that this was because the Appeal Committee had always been involved in 
the issue ever since it was formed in 1947.176  In response to Chuang’s letter, the PAP 
government stated that it would give the Appeal Committee the license only if it was 
able to produce M$100,000 by 25 July.177  Chuang was unable to do so and the 
license was finally given to the Chamber by the government.178  It has to be noted, 
however, that the approval did not come without conditions.  As a matter of fact, 
three were laid out by the PAP government as follows179: 
 
1. The exhumation and reburial of the remains of the [massacre] victims will 
be undertaken by the [SCCC]; a common grave will be built at 15 ½ 
[milestone] Chua Chu Kang Road; the site for erecting a monument will 
be selected after the consultation between the Government and the 
[SCCC].180 
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2. The expense for exhumation and reburial which will be about M$100,000 
will be borne solely by the undertaking organization and no public 
donations should be solicited. 
3. Claim for compensation from Japan is a matter between the British 
Government and the Japanese Government.  But should any compensation 
be received, irrespective of the amount, such compensation will be used 
by the Singapore Government for public welfare purposes and will not be 
paid to any organization or individual. 
 
From the conditions that we have seen above, there was no doubt that although the 
PAP government had started to acknowledge the issues, they were still quite reluctant 
to engage it even though they would have full control of the compensation.  In fact, 
there was a sense of resentment.  For instance, if we looked at the mandate that the 
government gave to the SCCC on the expense of the exhumation and memorial 
project, one senses a feeling of reluctance and even resentment in the government’s 
refusal to allow the Chamber to obtain the needed amount through public donation.  
Furthermore, on the claim of compensation, the PAP government clearly indicated 
that it was not responsible for the issue at all.  This again showed that the government 
was not yet as invested as the Chamber in addressing the issue.  In addition, although 
the government approved the Chamber’s proposal to build a memorial for the Chinese 
victims, as we will see later, the site that was given was a relatively remote piece of 
wasteland.  So, why did the PAP government have such a strong sense of 
resentfulness towards the SCCC over the memorial and ‘blood-debt’ issues?   
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One reason was the “Chineseness” of the issues.  As we have seen, since both the 
memorial and ‘blood-debt’ issues were directly related to the experiences that the 
Chinese endured during the Japanese Occupation, it made them very much a Chinese 
problem.  During that time, however, the PAP government could not afford to address 
issues of such nature.  This was because it was working with the Malaysian 
government, which was led by Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, to allow 
Singapore to join the Malaysian Federation.  Abdul Rahman, who was Malay, was 
not very fond of the idea.  He was concerned that if Singapore, which has a Chinese 
majority in its population, were to join the Federation, it would make the Chinese, 
instead of the Malays, the largest ethnic group.181  In 1960, the total number of 
Malays in the Federation was 3.1 million, while the Chinese was 2.3 million.  If 
Singapore were to join, it would increase the number of Chinese to 3.6 million.  This 
would outnumber the Malays as their new figure would only be 3.4 million.182  With 
the Chinese as the majority group, it would, in turn, jeopardized the Malay’s 
domination over Malaysian politics, as there would be more Chinese than Malay 
voters.183   
During that time, the PAP government could not afford to not merge with the 
Federation.  This was because not only could the merger benefit Singapore 
economically as it opened up a bigger common market with the Federation, thus 
attracting more foreign investors, but it also could ultimately end the communist 
threat in Singapore.  The communist problem was getting from bad to worse in 
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Singapore as the PAP government was coming under constant threat from the 
influence of the BS.184  The PAP government, however, saw merger as the solution, 
as the Malaysian government was an anti-communist government and would be more 
than happy to introduce steps to dissolve the communist threat. 
To convince the Malayan Prime Minister that the real intention behind 
Singapore’s desire to join the Federation was not a challenge to the Malay’s 
domination, the PAP government took a number of steps to dispel the fear.  For 
instance, it agreed that Singapore citizens would not automatically became Malaysian 
citizens after the merger.  It also agreed that it would have a smaller representation 
than Singapore’s population warranted in the Malaysian Parliament.  The most 
convincing step, however, came from the political developments in Singapore in 
April 1961 when the PAP lost its majority in the Singapore Parliament.185  With this 
loss, the unpleasant prospect of Singapore being controlled by the communist was 
slowly becoming a reality.  This was a real concern for Abdul Rahman, whose 
government was anti-communist.  To prevent Singapore from becoming a communist 
state, he reluctantly agreed with the merger.  Abdul Rahman brought in the Borneo 
states of Sabah and Sarawak to solve the demographic problems of the merger, as 
both states would provide the necessary Malay voters to outnumber the Chinese.186  
However, Abdul Rahman continued to remain suspicious of the PAP government.   
Therefore, when the SCCC readdressed the memorial and ‘blood-debt’ issues, it 
came at a time when the PAP government could not afford to engage on issues that 
would make itself appear to favor the problems of the Chinese community, as it 
                                                 
184 The conflict between the PAP and BS would be discussed in detail in the following chapter. 
185 Lau, pp.11-17.  Turnbull, p.272. 
186 Ibid. 
 78
would cause serious repercussions across the causeway.  If the PAP government 
chose to engage in these issues, it could send the wrong message to Tungku Abdul 
Rahman that it was promoting Chinese chauvinism, and this could once again throw 
the merger into doubt. 
A second reason why the PAP government was reluctant to engage the memorial 
and ‘blood-debt’ issues was because it was following a multi-ethnic policy during that 
time.  When the PAP came into power in 1959, one of its main policies was to create 
a multi-ethnic society.  It wanted the country’s citizens to be identified by their 
individuality rather than their ethnic identity.  In other words, the PAP wanted 
Singapore to become a “meritocratic” society that warranted “merit and knowledge” 
rather than ethic-identity and religion as the key social symbols and judgment.187  
This desire was also clearly written out by Prime Minister Lee in his memoir: 
 
Singapore [was] to become a multi-racial society of equal citizens, where 
opportunities are equal and a person’s contribution is recognized and rewarded based 
on merit regardless of race, language, culture, or religion…Each time we are rated as 
the best airline in Asia, the No.1 airport, the No.1 container port, it reminds 
Singaporeans what a cohesive meritocratic multiracial society can achieve, better 
than if we were a Chinese-dominated one and lacked solidarity…188
 
 
Lee and his counterparts wanted to create such a society because they knew that 
Singapore was a pluralistic society.  Therefore if they were to introduce any policies 
that would result in “an imbalance between the interests of the majority and the 
minority communities”, there was a higher possibility to create hostility and racial 
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conflict thus jeopardizing the stability of the country.189  Furthermore, it could also 
induce the Malaysian government to think that the PAP was a “Chinese” party and 
had the intention to only promote Chinese interests.  This could be disastrous as it 
could throw the merger into serious doubt. 
Nonetheless, ever since the PAP came into power, it had been very consistent in 
promoting multi-ethnic policies.  One example was the establishment of the Malay 
Affairs Bureau within the party.  It was a sub-committee that specifically dealt with 
the problems that the Malays were facing in the country.  Furthermore, many Malay 
leaders were also appointed to positions in the government as well as to the party’s 
leadership.  Other steps to promote multi-ethnicity and “meritocracy” within the state 
included the educational policies of the PAP.  The party believed that a common 
identity could be fostered in school education by teaching nation-building concepts 
and skills.  Instead of continuing the division of the educational system between the 
English and Chinese schools, the government encouraged one unified educational 
system that used one common language, which was English.190  The PAP was hoping 
that by taking all these steps, the Malay community could be rightly represented and 
dealt with by the government.  It also wanted to help the party to shed its “Chinese 
chauvinism” identity, as most of its founding members were Chinese.191  Also, the 
promotion of multi-ethnicity could be a display of confidence for Abdul Rahman and 
the Malaysian government besides proving further that the Singapore government 
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was in favor of building a multi-ethnic not a Chinese society, thus further reassuring 
them that it was not intending to wrest the control of the Malaysian government from 
the Malays for the Chinese.  Therefore, when the SCCC brought out the memorial 
and ‘blood-debt’ issues, the PAP government was not willing to address them as it 
did not want its supporters or the Malaysian government to think that it was choosing 
to only favor the Chinese. 
A third reason why the PAP government was not interested with the issues was 
because of the SCCC’s political intentions when it readdressed them.  During that 
time, the SCCC’s political influence in Singapore was winding down due to the 
changing political landscape of Singapore.  Instead of appearing as the representative 
body of the Chinese community of Singapore as it did during the colonial period, the 
Chamber was becoming more than a fringe within the political scene.  To make 
matters worse, the SCCC was also losing its economical clout in Singapore, as the 
PAP government was advocating an industrial program to industrialize Singapore 
instead of following the colonial entreport economy model, which was more 
beneficial to the interests of the Chamber.  As a result, the SCCC saw the 
readdressing of the memorial and ‘blood-debt’ issues as an opportunity to regain its 
political and economical influences by stirring up anti-Japanese sentiment within the 
Chinese community.  But before going into this perspective in detail, we must look at 
how the Chamber reacted to the burial and memorial site given by the PAP 
government. 
After receiving approval from the PAP government, the Chamber dispatched Ng 
Aik Huan and three other members from the DRC on 30 July to inspect the site given 
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by the Government for the reburial and the construction of the memorial.  Ng and his 
team were not satisfied with what they found.  Not only was the terrain too low and 
badly flooded, accessibility was also a major problem.  As a result, Ng and his team 
concluded that the site was unsuitable as burial ground.192  Two days later, the 
Chamber expressed their dissatisfaction to the PAP government and requested a new 
site.193  An investigation that was to last for three months was launched by the 
government to look into the matter.  The result was inconclusive and the decision to 
relocate the reburial site was suspended.194   
Although there was a disruption over the reburial ground issue and the site of the 
memorial, the exhumation work that had resumed on 9 August under the supervision 
of the Ministry of Health was not affected.  As a matter of fact, shortly after the work 
was resumed, another mass grave was discovered along King’s Road.195  The digging 
would continue until October 1966 and by then, a total of more than 100 sites were 
discovered.  The remains that were exhumed were enough to fill more than 600 
funeral urns.196  Along with the remains, personal items such as spectacles and 
dentures belonging to the victims were also unearthed.  As pointed out by Huang 
Jianli and Hong Lysa, these items were transferred to the SCCC and kept in the Sun 
Yat Sen Villa in Singapore after the Civilian War Memorial was opened in February 
1967.197
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To return to our earlier question: why did the SCCC revive the memorial and 
‘blood-debt’ issues after it was abandoned for more than 20 years?  Past work that has 
discussed this problem identified that the reason as the Chamber’s sudden discovery 
of  a mass grave that was related to the Sook Ching in Siglap.  However, was it really 
the discovery in Siglap that led the Chamber to campaign so seriously for both issues? 
I will examine the question in some detail in the next section. 
 
Why Were the Issues Readdressed? 
 
 
The Chamber’s own publication argued that the reason why the Chamber 
campaigned for the memorial and the ‘blood-debt’ issues after the February, 1962 
discovery was because it wanted them settled once and for all.  Furthermore, it also 
wanted to build the memorial for future generations to remember the massacred 
victims forever.  For instance, in Memorial to the Civilian Victims of the Japanese 
Occupation Record of Donations (1969), it wrote: 
 
Some time in February 1962, remains of civilian victims of the Japanese Occupation 
were discovered in many places in Singapore such as the 7th milestone Siglap, 
Changi, and the hill behind the Nanyang Girls School.  As it was unbearable to see 
that the remains were exposed and scattered about the places, a sub-committee 
known as the Disposal of Remains Committee was set up at the Chamber’s 
Management Committee held on 28th February 1962.198
 
In Kevin Blackburn’s article, “The Collective Memory of the Sook Ching 
Massacre and the Creation of the Civilian War Memorial” (2000), it was argued that 
the motivation behind the Chamber’s attempt to press for financial compensation for 
the ‘blood-debt’ was to “avenge the grievance” suffered by the Sook Ching victims.  
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Quoting from the Chinese press, Blackburn explained that because in the past there 
had been incidents where the aggressor nations were made to compensate for their 
atrocities during the Second World War, the Chinese saw justification for their 
attempt to seek compensation from the Japanese.  Blackburn also pointed out that 
what gave the Chinese even more ground to press for compensation was that Japan 
had already made compensation to a number of countries it had occupied during the 
war. 199  For instance, in 1956, the Philippines was given US$550 million and a loan 
of US$250 million; in 1958, Indonesia received a compensation of US$223 million 
and a loan of US$400 million; in 1959, South Vietnam was compensated US$39 
million and a loan of US$7.5 million; and in 1962, Burma was given an indemnity of 
US$140 million and a loan of US$30 million.200
Although these arguments are good, they should be questioned further.  If the 
Chamber were really planning to reclaim compensation from the Japanese, why did it 
not enlist support from the Singapore government from the beginning?  To examine 
the intention of the SCCC on the issues, I will analyze the Chambers’ actions from 
two additional perspectives.  One is political and has been presented by Sikko 
Visscher, while the other, an economical perspective, is my own. 
 
Sikko Visscher’s Argument 
 
 
In Sikko Visscher’s unpublished Ph. D dissertation for Vrijie University, Business, 
Ethnicity, and State: the Representational Relationship of the Singapore Chinese 
Chamber of Commerce and the State, 1945-1997 (2002), it was argued that the reason 
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why the Chamber revived and campaigned for the memorial and the ‘blood-debt’ 
issues was because it wanted to display its strength as the representative of the 
Chinese community and a political force to be reckoned with.201  After the PAP won 
the 1959 general election, it was given the privilege of leading the state with complete 
autonomy (except for Foreign affairs) by the British, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew 
and his PAP party went all out to consolidate its leadership.  To achieve consolidation, 
one of the aims of the PAP was to create a political environment in which the party 
was the only one authority making decisions on how the country was governed.  
Alternative power bases having an influence over society had to be kept in check and 
subsequently contained.202  The SCCC, which had been such a force, was soon 
“marginalized by the nascent state”.  Moreover, the PAP also wanted to develop the 
country with methods that would relinquish any ties with traditional politics such as 
communal leaders representing communities.203  Lee and his closest collaborators 
such as Goh Keng Swee were Western-educated and strongly emphasized knowledge 
and merit.204  As advocates of this idea, the PAP felt it was necessary to prevent the 
SCCC from regaining its role as spokesman for a larger Chinese community.  During 
the meeting with the Chinese Union of Journalists on 1st September 1959, Lee Kuan 
Yew made his intention of politically marginalizing the SCCC from communal 
politics clearly by saying: 
 
The term “Singapore Chinese” contains an element of chauvinism.  In Singapore 
today there are still many organizations, guilds, and schools using the term 
“Singapore Chinese” or “Overseas Chinese”.  The organizations registered under 
such names imply that they will protect the interests of the Chinese, and that other 
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races are barred from joining them.  Such terms are detrimental to racial unity.  If 
every race adopts this close-door policy and forms small cliques or associations to 
protect their own racial interests, then it is difficult to talk of establishing a nation.205
 
 
However, Ko Teck Kin, President of the SCCC at that time was not willing to 
allow the Chamber to be excluded by the state.  This was characteristic of Ko, as he 
himself was an ambitious leader trying to seek an active political role for the 
Chamber so that it could continue to be a prominent organization for the Chinese 
community.  Furthermore, before Ko became the president, he was well-known for 
getting involved with the Chamber’s campaigns on citizenship, Chinese education, 
and the general election of 1955.206  Therefore, with such an ambitious leader at their 
helm, the revival of the memorial and the ‘blood-debt’ issues by the SCCC in 1962 
could be viewed as an attempt by the Chamber to break out from the containment set 
up by Lee’s government.  It was to show the Government and the people that the 
Chamber was a force to be reckoned with.  By choosing to readdress the ‘blood-debt’ 
issue, the Chamber would be credited with an important community initiative: 
helping the Chinese to solve an emotional and a sensitive issue that had been 
forgotten for almost a decade.  The Chamber could also now challenge the 
Government over how it should be handled.  If it was to overlook the matter, the 
Government could suffer serious repercussions, as it would be ignoring an issue 
important of emotional importance to the Chinese.  If the Government were to 
recognize and address an issue raise by the Chamber, however, it would hand the 
Chamber the respect and recognition that it was seeking. 
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Visscher’s argument is convincing.  If a reader was to look at how the SCCC was 
formed, how it consolidated its leadership within the Chinese community, and how it 
lost this leadership due to the changing political landscape in Singapore during the 
1950s, one could shed even more light on the issue.  From the time the SCCC was 
formed in 1906, it was independent from all other Chinese associations that served 
the purpose of bringing the divided bang leaders to work together.  Moreover, it had 
always seen itself as  addressing and safeguarding the social and economical interests 
of the overseas Chinese in Singapore.207  
For instance, during the pre-war period, the Chamber had constructed a number of 
quality Chinese schools such as the Nanyang Girls School and the Chinese High 
School, which stills stand today as among the most prestigious schools in 
Singapore.208  In the 1950s, when the value and credibility of Chinese education was 
constantly challenged by the changing political landscape of Singapore, the Chamber 
defied circumstances by establishing Nanyang University.209  Besides that, the 
Chamber had also tried to raise the awareness of the Chinese community by starting 
the Nanyang Siang Pau in 1923 and the Sin Chew Jit Poh in 1929.  The newspapers 
would report the development of important events in Singapore as well as in China, 
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including the essential things that were discussed during the meetings of the 
SCCC.210  Today, the two newspapers remain in circulation and are among the oldest 
in Singapore. 
In addition, because most of the members and leaders of the SCCC were 
prominent Chinese merchants or businessmen, the Chamber was able to greatly 
contribute economically to the Chinese community in Singapore and the colony itself.  
During the first three decades of the century, most of the leaders such as Liau Chia-
heng, Tan Kah-Kee, Aw Boon-haw, Lee Kong-Chian, and Tan Lark-Hye of the 
SCCC had established banks, enterprises, and industries which had a large impact on 
the Chinese community.  For instance, Tan Kah-Kee’s rubber firm, Khiam Aik, had 
provided jobs for more than 32,000 people, while Aw Boon-haw used the wealth 
generated from his Tiger-Balm enterprise and newspaper firms to construct and 
maintain hospitals, schools, and homes within the community and beyond.211  In 
other cases, Liau Chia-Heng’s Sze Hai Tong Bank and Lee Kong-Chian’s Overseas 
Chinese Banking Corporation (OCBC) had provided the much needed financial aid 
for other Chinese businessmen in Singapore.212  Today, most of these pre-war 
companies and banks such as Tiger-Balm and OCBC continue to contribute 
significantly to the Singapore economy.  After the war, the organizers continued to 
use their economical abilities to assert a leadership role within the Chinese 
community. 
However, during the postwar period, especially during the 1950s, the SCCC 
began to lose its reputation within the Chinese community.  When the British returned 
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to Singapore after the end of the Occupation, it no longer held the intention of holding 
onto Singapore forever.  Instead, the British began to prepare the country for self-
government.  They wanted the people in Singapore to work gradually towards 
internal self-government and to foster a feeling of common loyalty towards the island 
as a permanent home.213  As a result, the SCCC was given two seats in the 
Legislative Assembly in 1947 when a civil government was formed under the pretext 
that it would be represented by people from all sectors of Singapore society.  This 
was, however, a short-lived victory for the Chamber, as in 1953, the seats in the 
Legislative Assembly given to the SCCC were removed through the introduction of 
the Rendel Constitution.214   
To make matters worse, the Chamber also soon found its reputation as the official 
representative of the Chinese community in Singapore – one it had maintained since 
it was formed in 1907 – being challenged by the emergence of mass politics and 
political parties.  Facilitated by the new Rendel Constitution, the introduction of mass 
politics and political parties changed the way in which the interests of the people were 
officially represented within the state.215  No longer would the people be represented 
by communal bodies created during the pre-war period.  Instead, political parties such 
as the Labor Front, led by David Marshall, and the PAP, led by Lee Kuan Yew, 
would be given that responsibility.  Furthermore, parties had to stand before a much 
larger number of franchised voters.  To make things more complicated for the 
Chamber, these leaders from the new mass parties usually campaigned intensively to 
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win the votes from the people from all ethnic groups by setting up public rallies and 
debates, giving speeches over the radio, handling out leaflets, pamphlets and 
handbills, putting up posters in the streets, addressing the public on vans, and so 
forth.216  In many cases, these campaigns were so effective that they were even able 
to erode the powerbases of the SCCC.  For instance, Lee Kuan Yew was able to use 
his Hakka dialect identity to win over the Hakka Clan Association from the SCCC.217
Although the SCCC attempted to adapt to the changes, it was unsuccessful.  In the 
1955 general election, the Chamber tried to ensure its place in the Assembly by 
sponsoring the Democratic Party (DP) and fielding candidates for all the seats 
available.  The DP revealed a platform in the Nanyang Siang Pau on 27 February 
1955 stressing independence and improving the conditions and welfare of the people.  
The platform also included a number of special communal agendas such as fighting 
for citizenship for the China-born Chinese and equal treatment for Chinese schools 
from the Government.  These agendas were very popular issues among the Chinese 
during that time, and everyone was anticipating that the DP would gain in the election.  
However, in the end, much to everyone’s surprise, the DP suffered a humiliating 
defeat, as it was only able to win two among all the contested seats. 
The crushing defeat of the DP raised great concern within the SCCC.  It tried to 
regroup and regain its reputation by electing Ko Teck Kin as president of the 
Chamber in 1958.  But one thing was certain: the Chamber would not be able to win 
back its reputation by contesting in elections.  Instead, it began looking for other 
alternative methods.  Unfortunately, before Ko could guide the Chamber to make any 
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significant progress, the Chamber suffered a setback when the PAP won the 1959 
general election.  As discussed earlier, with the arrival of the PAP, the Chamber was 
driven into the background.  In order to remain visible, the SCCC decided to 
readdress the ‘blood-debt’ and memorial issues. 
 However, relying on Visccher’s political argument alone is insufficient to explain 
why the SCCC kindled the ‘blood-debt’ and the memorial issues when it did (and 
why this issue was chosen over all other alternatives).  The revival of the two issues 
came at a time when Japanese investment was growing rapidly in Singapore.  
Furthermore, the SCCC itself was an organization made up of prominent Chinese 
businessmen.  Therefore, I believe that there were some economic motives as well 
behind the revival of the ‘blood-debt’ and memorial movements.  Furthermore, I also 
judge that it was because of this economic issue that the PAP government reacted so 
negatively when it addressed the SCCC’s plans to construct a memorial to 
commemorate the massacred Chinese and to reclaim the $50 million payment in July 
1962. 
 
The Economic Motives of the SCCC 
 
 
The economic motives behind the ‘blood-debt’ and memorial issues involved the 
SCCC’s attempt to foster anti-Japanese sentiment among the Chinese population of 
Singapore so that it could in turn force the PAP government to halt the steady growth 
of Japanese investment during that time.  The reason why the SCCC wanted the 
Government to slow down Japanese investment was the belief that it would inflict 
serious consequences on the economic interests of the Chamber members.  To discuss 
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this in greater detail, I will address three areas: the economic policy of the 
Government at that time, Chinese economic interests, and the influx of Japanese 
companies. 
The growth of Japanese companies in Singapore was largely attributed to the PAP 
government’s adoption of a new approach to develop the economy of Singapore in 
1961.  Singapore had inherited an economic plan created by the British in the colonial 
days.  However, the old practice of relying on entrepot trade, which was associated 
with activities such as importing and re-exporting raw materials like rubber, tin, 
timber, and spices, were creating problems for the PAP government, as it not only 
prevented the economy from growing and developing in desired directions, but was 
also unable to provide enough jobs for the growing population.  The result was a high 
unemployment rate and widespread poverty in Singapore.218  This was pointed out by 
Lee in his memoirs when he wrote:  
 
Things were so bad that when a local manufacturer planned to expand his cotton-
spinning textile mill to include weaving and finishing, it was big news because it 
would increase the labor force by 300.  We were desperate for jobs.219
 
 
The new economic plan that Prime Minister Lee and Finance Minister Goh Keng 
Swee adopted would steer Singapore away from its reliance on entrepot trade and 
encourage rapid economic development through industrialization.  The PAP 
government believed that the solution to tackle the high unemployment rate and 
poverty was to provide jobs and increase state revenues. All these could only be 
realized by industrializing the economy.  To develop the blueprint for this plan, the 
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Government invited a United Nations Technical Assistance Board team led by Dr. 
Albert Winsemius, a Dutch industrialist in October 1960.220  At the end of the 
mission, Winsemius recommended to the PAP government that if it were to 
industrialize Singapore, it would have to expand and develop its manufacturing sector.  
In order to achieve that, he advised that the PAP government to set up measures that 
could attract foreign companies to make direct investments in Singapore and promote 
joint ventures between local manufactures and these companies.  Winsemius also 
added that the PAP government should intervene on certain levels in the details of 
development, and not to leave the matter solely to local businessmen and investors.221  
Basing on what Winsemius reported, the PAP government set up the Economic 
Development Board (EDB) in August 1961 to head the industrialization project that 
would become the Five-Year Development Plan.222  The EDB was provided with a 
budget of M$100 million to help the development of new industries.  It was also 
given the task of developing the Jurong Industrial Site by providing it with sufficient 
industrial infrastructure to attract foreign companies.  Furthermore, the EDB would 
also try to make the prospect of investing in Singapore even more attractive by 
initiating a number of incentives in the form of “tax holidays” for new industries, 
discounted taxation rate for export-oriented manufactures, coupled with short-term 
regulated tariffs on importation.223
Since the Winsemius report also advised the PAP government to encourage joint 
ventures between local and foreign companies, the government called on the local 
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Chinese businessmen in the SCCC to participate in the industrialization of the 
country.224  This was clearly seen in the speech given by Goh Keng Swee in March 
1962 to the SCCC.  He said that, “We must not be too dependent on overseas 
manufacturers to establish industries here.  Our own capitalists should make a 
contribution and the government will give them every assistance to embark on new 
industries”.225  However this was not the first time Goh had encouraged the SCCC to 
take part in the industrialization project.  Earlier in March 1960, Goh had already told 
the local businessmen in the SCCC that: “If you do not avail yourself of this 
opportunity, then you cannot blame the government if we ask people from abroad to 
start on these ventures and receive the reward from the government.  But we wish, as 
far as possible, to give preference to local businessmen, whenever they are willing to 
move into these ventures”.226  It seems, however, that Goh’s request was ignored by 
the SCCC. 
The reason why the businessmen in the SCCC were not interested was because 
they were not convinced that they would benefit from the new economic plan adopted 
by the PAP government to industrialize Singapore.  Instead, these businessmen 
wanted Singapore to follow the old practice of encouraging entrepot trade.  This was 
because the entrepot trade had always been the economic direction of the SCCC, as 
most of its past and present leaders and members were local traders that had made 
their fortunes through regional trading of products such as rubber and rice.  
Furthermore, because of entrepot trade, the SCCC had gained a dominant hold on the 
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Singapore economy.  Therefore, if the Chamber chose to follow and adopt what Goh 
Keng Swee had suggested, it would be giving up its economic influence.  As a matter 
of fact, after the PAP won the general election, the first thing that Ko Teck Kin 
consulted the new government was about the removing of trade obstacles with 
regional markets so that free trade could be resumed.227  The idea of advocating an 
economic plan that would focus on industrialization (and protectionism) rather than 
entrepot trade was clearly not in the Chamber’s agenda. 
As a result, the Chinese businessmen in the SCCC soon found their businesses 
being challenged by the influx of foreign companies, especially after the introduction 
of the EDB.  To make matters worse, the PAP government had chosen the Japanese 
as the main foreign investors for the country’s industrialization plans.  The reason 
why the PAP government made this decision was explained by Prime Minister Lee.  
He said that Japan was the country that could provide the “cheapest of technical and 
managerial skills” compared to the rest of the world.228  Furthermore, the PAP 
government was also impressed with Japan’s pattern of industrial organization.229  
Either way, this meant that the Chamber would be losing its economic clout to the 
Japanese, who were the traditional arch-rivals of local Chinese businessmen.   
In Japan and Singapore in the World Economy (1999), authors Shimizu Hiroshi 
and Hirakawa Hitoshi both pointed out that as of July 1963, there were 53 Japanese 
manufacturing companies operating in Singapore.230  These companies could be 
classified into five categories.  First, heavy industrial companies such as Maruzen 
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Sekiyu (oil-refining), Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Ltd (ship-building and 
ship repairing), and Kawasaki Seitetsu (steel manufacturing).  Second, building 
materials industries such as Onda Cement (cement production), Nippon paint and 
Kansai Paint (paint manufacturing).  Third, electrical equipment and appliances 
industries such as Furukawa Denko (electric wire) and Yuasa Denchi and Airo Boeki 
(electrical parts).  Fourth, small consumer industries such as Bridgestone Tire (tires 
and tubes), Mitsui Seito (sugar-refining), Toyo Rayon and Teijin (textiles) and Kao 
Sekken (shampoo and washing powder).  The finally category was made up of 
construction companies such as Kajima Kensetsu and Mizuno Gumi.231   
These companies, as pioneer industries in Singapore, were heavily subsidized by 
the PAP government and this gave them an edge in productivity compared to the 
unsubsidized Chinese companies.  Furthermore, because of the new economic plan, 
the Japanese companies were also given priority to undertake numerous development 
projects such as housing construction and to sell their consumer products in the 
markets of Malaya and Singapore.232  Moreover, the change of economic direction 
from entrepot trade to industrialization deepened the problems for the local Chinese 
businessman.  It was almost impossible that the local trading companies could 
compete against the Japanese companies within the new economic environment.233
Therefore, facing a crisis to hold on to its economic stronghold from the onslaught 
of the Japanese, the SCCC decided to bring out the memorial and the ‘blood-debt’ 
issues in early 1962 to stir up anti-Japanese sentiment among the Chinese population.  
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The Chamber hoped that by doing so, it would disrupt the confidence of the Japanese 
investors, thus making them hesitate to enter Singapore.   
How successful was the Chamber in staging this act?  I would say not very, 
although the Chamber tried to make the issues even bigger by inviting other ethnic 
communities to participate.  Japanese investment in Singapore continued to grow 
even after the issues were readdressed.  This was mainly because the PAP 
government did not give in to the threats of the SCCC.  As we have seen earlier, 
when the PAP government finally gave its official approval to the plans of the SCCC 
in July 1962, it slapped the Chamber with strict conditions.  For instance, if the 
Chamber was able to reclaim the $50 million, it would not be given to the Chamber 
but instead to the government for public welfare purposes.  In addition, as we will see 
in the following chapter, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew skillfully guided his 
government through the turbulence of events without hurting the confidence of 
Japanese investors.  One example is that whenever Lee Kuan Yew addressed the 
problem, he did not fail to remind the people that Japan was a very important partner 
in Singapore’s industrialization program.  I will visit these points in the following 





The readdressing of the ‘blood-debt’ and memorial issues by the SCCC in 
February 1962 came coincidently 20 years after the fall of Singapore.  It triggered 
quite a reaction from the Chinese community with Chinese newspapers following 
every step taken by the Chamber during their exhumation work on the massacre sites 
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as well as the endless meetings that it held on the issue.  However, the Singapore 
government led by the PAP and Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew was not at all 
impressed, especially with calls to reclaim the $50 million from the Japanese 
government.  Although it finally gave its approval on the Chamber’s works in July 
1962, it came with strict and uncompromising conditions.   
To understand why there was such reluctance on the PAP government’s part over 
the issues, even though it had already triggered a big reaction from the Chinese 
community, this chapter argued that it was because of the merger with Malaysia and 
the government’s multi-ethnic policy.  The chapter also explained that the 
government’s attitude was also caused by the motives behind SCCC’s actions.  By 
looking back at the political history of the SCCC and the economic development of 
Singapore during that time, this chapter argued that the reasons the SCCC 
readdressed the issues were because they wanted to regain political prestige and to 
fend off economic threats brought by the Japanese investors.  As for the Singapore 
government, they saw these moves as challenges and therefore retaliated.  How the 



















After the ‘blood-debt’ and memorial issues were readdressed in February 1962 by the 
SCCC, the task to solve them remained difficult.  Firstly, as pointed out in the 
previous chapter, the PAP government was reluctant to address both issues, as it was 
concerned that it might affect the Singapore-Japan relations.  Secondly, the task to 
build a memorial and a cemetery park to commemorate the dead was halted after the 
Chamber found the site given to them by the PAP government unsuitable.  However, 
just as it seemed that the issues would once again be delayed, the SCCC raised the 
stake by inviting leaders from other ethnic communities in Singapore to participate in 
the campaign.  This significant move changed the issues from being a Chinese to a 
multi-ethnic one.  Furthermore, it also attracted an even bigger reaction from the 
Singapore public on the issues.  But more importantly, it was able to convince the 
PAP government to engage with the issues more sincerely.  However, despite this 
development, the interests of the SCCC and Singapore government in regard to the 
‘blood-debt’ and memorial issues remained to differ from each other. 
The aim of this chapter addresses whether the SCCC and the PAP were successful, 
despite having a conflict of interest between them, in finding the resolution to the 
‘blood-debt’ and memorial issues.  It also tries to show that although the PAP 
government had changed its attitude to work more closely with the SCCC, it was not 
exactly giving its full support.  Was the government intending to use the issues for its 
own political agendas?  Furthermore, this chapter will also study how the ‘blood-
debt’ and memorial issues became multi-ethnic and the impact it had.  In addition, it 
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will also discuss whether the materialization of the Civilian War Memorial should be 
viewed as a form of closure for the massacre victims or the PAP government. 
 
The Issues Rages On 
 
 
The discussion of the ‘blood-debt’ resumed once again on 5 March 1963 when the 
SCCC sent a nine-man delegation to meet the Japanese Consulate-General in 
Singapore, Hiroto Tanaka, to discuss how the negotiation for the settlement of the 
‘blood-debt’ was progressing between the Singapore and Japanese governments.  The 
outcome of the meeting was inconclusive, but Tanaka assured the Chamber that the 
Japanese government was “looking seriously” into the matter and had already begun 
negotiation with the PAP government.234   
Shortly after the Chamber’s meeting with Tanaka, the memorial issue also 
restarted when the same delegation held another meeting with Prime Minister Lee 
Kuan Yew on the subject of relocating the burial and memorial site at Chua Chu 
Kang to a more suitable location.235  During the meeting, Lee agreed to allocate a 
4.5ha piece of land along Beach Road in downtown Singapore for the memorial and 
gave his approval to the SCCC for holding a design competition for it.236  Lee also 
commented on the ‘blood-debt’ issue by expressing his hope that it would be settled 
by June, 1963.  The meeting also saw Lee Thiam, one of the representatives of the 
delegation, announcing that the Chamber had decided not to rebury the excavated 
remains as planned earlier but to have them cremated.  He further added that the 
memorial would be funded by the people’s money.  He said:  
                                                 
234 Sin Chew Jit Poh, 6 March 1963.  Nanyang Siang Pau, 6 March 1963. 
235 Nanyang Siang Pau, 10, 14 March 1963.  Sin Chew Jit Poh, 14 March 1963. 
236 The Straits Time, 20 March 1963. 
 100
 
The memorial will be built from the Singapore people’s money not from the money 
received from Japan”.  If any money were to be obtained from them, it would be 
used for benevolent purposes.237   
 
Although Lee Thiam did not elaborate on this, it could mean that the compensation 
money would be use to benefit the citizens of Singapore. 
 
The Issues Became Multi-Ethnic and Materialization of the Memorial 
 
 
Towards the end of March, 1963, the Chamber started planning to raise funds for 
the construction of the memorial by making several public announcements in various 
Chinese newspapers.238  It estimated that M$500,000 was needed for the entire 
project.  The government, however, agreed to pay half of the cost.239   
On 9 April 1963, the SCCC extended the memorial project to other ethnic groups 
in Singapore when it established the Memorial Fund Committee (MFC) to oversee the 
responsibility for fund raising.  The MFC included representatives from other ethnic 
groups.  A.H. Allwie and Ja’afar Shahid were both appointed to represent the Malay 
community, while the Indian community was represented through the selection of 
D.T. Assomull and P.T. Nathan.  The Eurasian community was also included when 
Theo Leijssus joined the Committee.240   
The inclusion of other ethnic groups in the discussion of the issue should not 
come as a surprise because by March, 1963, the SCCC started to add a multi-ethnic 
dimension into the memorial and ‘blood-debt’ issues.  It stopped referring to the 
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victims as “Chinese” but the “Singapore people”.  Furthermore, the Chamber had also 
stopped connecting the memorial with the Sook Ching massacre.  Instead it was 
replaced by the “experience of the Japanese Occupation”.  In addition, the Chamber 
also started to claim the ‘blood-debt’ under the banner of the “Singapore people” not 
the Chinese community. 241  These changes could also be observed in Chinese 
newspapers, as they also started to shed the idea that the memorial and the 
compensation claim was only for the Chinese who were massacred by the Japanese 
during the Occupation.  For instance, an editorial article in Nanyang Siang Pau wrote: 
 
Tens of thousands of innocent civilians were massacred by the Japanese troops after 
the fall of Singapore.  This wanton killing is different from the civilians killed in the 
course of actual fighting between two belligerent armies.  Therefore, the Singapore 
people have the right to claim compensation from Japan for the ‘blood-debt’…the 
claim for compensation from Japan is made not for the sake of any individual, but 
for the interest of Singapore as a whole.  Japan has obstructed Singapore’s progress 
[through its war campaign], it must now try to atone for its actions.242
 
 
It was also claimed in a magazine published by the SCCC that the construction of the 
memorial was delayed because the working committee for the memorial decided to 
change the methods of burial to one that would suit both cremated and non-cremated 
practices.243
Even so it was still very obvious that the issues were still a “Chinese” problem 
because the committee was still heavily represented by Chinese.  More significantly, 
the victims of the ‘blood-debt’ and the massacre were after all Chinese.  As pointed 
out in the first chapter, the Chinese were the only ethnic group that was singled-out 
by the Japanese and subjected to an atrocious experience.  As for the Malays and 
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Indians, they were given more respect by the Japanese.  Therefore, it was 
unsurprising to see a different level of reaction from other ethnic communities in 
Singapore towards the ‘blood-debt’ and memorial issues after they turned multi-
ethnic.  The Chinese being the real victims of the issues were the ones that gave its 
strongest support for both the ‘blood-debt’ and the memorial movement.  They were 
also ready to lash out at the Japanese government.  As for the rest, namely the Malays 
and the Indians, their reactions were less enthusiastic.  They also appeared to be more 
accommodating towards the Japanese.  As I will be pointing out shortly, the mix 
reactions from the Malays and Indians as compared to the Chinese would be very 
different when the latter group called for the ‘blood-debt’ rally in August, 1963. 
So, why then did the Chamber take the trouble to change the memorial and the 
‘blood-debt’ issues into a multi-ethnic one?  The Chamber explained that it was 
because the people from other ethnic groups were also victims of the Japanese 
Occupation.244  This reason is not without support.  Although it is true that the 
Chinese community were singled-out by the Japanese for the worst treatment, the 
Occupation did bring immense hardships to the Malays and Indians.  As highlighted 
in the first chapter, the Occupation brought many problems such as food shortage to 
the people, and that contributed to an increased number of deaths in the overall 
population.  The ethnic groups all witnessed an increase in the death rate in their 
communities.  By the end of the Occupation, tens of thousands of people were 
dead.245
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The Chamber’s intention was contradicted by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, 
however, when he wrote in his memoir stating that the change was made by the 
SCCC’s President Ko Teck Kin because he understood that if the Chamber were to 
pursue the matters as a “Chinese” issue, it would fail to gain the attention of the PAP 
government.  He wrote: 
He knew that the PAP government would be unhappy as long as it was 
purely a Chinese issue, so he persuaded the chambers of commerce of the 
Malay, Indian, Eurasian, and Ceylonese communities to join in.246
 
Still, the “multi-ethnic” strategy spelt success for the Chamber, as Prime Minister Lee 
agreed to allocate a better piece of land located in downtown Singapore for the 
memorial.  Another success was that the Chamber began to witness an increased of 
participation of the PAP government in the issues. 
One way to explain the change of attitude was because of the development of that 
time – the merger with Malaysia and the multi-ethnic policy of the PAP.  When the 
SCCC made the issues multi-ethnic, it was unsurprising to see that the PAP 
government, especially Lee Kuan Yew, to change its attitude and increased its 
participation on them.  The PAP government believed that if it engaged these issues 
under a multi-ethnic banner, it could be use to further convince the Malaysian 
government that it was not a party for the Chinese but for all ethnic groups.  In turn, 
this could use to dispel the suspicion in the Malaysian government and convince them 
that the real intention of the PAP was not to wrest the control of the Malaysian 
government from the Malays and hand it over to the Chinese.  Furthermore, the PAP 
government also felt that by the multi-ethnicity of the issues could be used to foster 
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even stronger harmony among the different ethnic groups of Singapore.  In fact, the 
government applied this “multi-ethnic” approach in regards to the design and 
significance of the Civilian War Memorial. 
The design of the Civilian War Memorial that stands today was very different 
from the one that was originally proposed.  The original design did not have any of 
the multi-ethnic characteristics that it has today, which is the four high soaring pillars 
that symbolizes the different ethnic groups of Singapore – the Chinese, Malays, 
Indians, and other minorities – who had suffered together during the Occupation.   
When the original design was revealed on 31 May 1963, its designers, Swan and 
McClaren, proposed a memorial that featured two inverse arches rising to a point with 
a total of twelve water fountains at the front.247  This design was accepted by both the 
PAP government and the SCCC.  In fact, construction of the memorial began on 15 
June 1963.248  However, in September, 1965, the design of the Civilian War 
Memorial was changed.  The architecture firm was commissioned again to come out 
with a new design that would carry multi-ethnic symbolism.249  In the end, it 
produced the design that featured the four pillars.250   
During the unveiling ceremony of the Civilian War Memorial on 15 February 
1967, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew reminded the people that although this piece of 
monument was a dedication to the victims of the Japanese Occupation, it also carried 
a multi-ethnic significance behind it.  He said: 
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This piece of concrete commemorates an experience which, in spite of its horrors, 
served as catalyst in building a nation out of the young and unestablished community 
of diverse immigrants.  It told us that we share a common destiny.  And it is thought 




By establishing such a relationship for the memorial, Lee Kuan Yew completed the 
evolution of the memorial from being a Chinese to a multi-ethnic dedication.  When 
the memorial issue was first discussed by Tan Kah-Kee and his fund committees 
shortly after the end of the Japanese Occupation, they intended to dedicate it to the 
Chinese victims.  This did not materialize, however, as it became a memorial for the 
victims from all ethnic communities in Singapore.   
The unveiling ceremony of the Civilian War Memorial was attended by leaders 
from different ethnic communities and representatives from various associations.  
Religious leaders from different religious groups such as Islam, Buddhism, 
Christianity, Hinduism, and Sikhism were also present at the ceremony.  They even 
conducted a joint prayer ceremony for the victims.252  Although the memorial issue 
was finally resolved at this point, the ‘blood-debt’ was still very much a problem.  In 
the following section, we will see how Lee Kuan Yew suggested the ‘blood-debt’ 
should be settled. 
 
Lee Kuan Yew’s Recommendation to Settle the ‘Blood-Debt’ 
 
 
On 21 April 1963, the MFC met at the Victoria Theater with more than 1000 
representatives from 609 societies to raise the funds needed for the construction of the 
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memorial.  It was an eventful meeting and it was claimed that more than M$100,000 
was raised on that day itself.253  However, the highlight of the meeting was Prime 
Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s presence and the delivering of his first recorded speech in 
regards to the memorial and ‘blood-debt’ issues.  In his speech, he emphasized the 
point that the memorial would be for the “many tens of thousands of people of all 
races who died” during the Japanese Occupation.  Furthermore, Lee also explained 
why the PAP government had decided to allow the Chamber to build the memorial 
using public donations by stating: 
 
We could have built this memorial without public contributions.  But I agree with 
[the Chamber’s] committee that the memorial will have more meaning and give 
more satisfaction to the thousands of people who have been so deeply hurt during the 
Japanese Occupation if the people themselves contribute towards the memorial.254     
 
 
In the speech, the Prime Minister also touched on the ‘blood-debt’.  He assured 
the PAP government as the representative of the people would denounce the Japanese 
claim that it had been settled by the Treaty of San Francisco.  Lee said: 
 
Legally, it may be argued that the Treaty of San Francisco has settled everything and 
that all things should be the past and forgotten.  But this was settled by a colonial 
government that did not represent us and never understood the depth of our feeling at 
the atrocities and humiliation an occupying invader inflicted on us then a subject 
people…It is this feeling that we as a government representative of the people now 
seek to resolve peacefully and quietly.255  
 
 
Prime Minister Lee also told the people that his government has notified the Japanese 
government and they were all working together to resolve the issue.  He said: 
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It was my duty to make know the depth of the feelings of the people to the Japanese 
government.  This I have done.  They have assured me that they are genuinely sorry 
for what happened, and that they are prepared to make a gesture of atonement.  They 
have made a certain proposal.  The Singapore government has put forward another 
proposal.256   
 
 
But the most significant part of the speech was when Lee reminded the people at the 
meeting on how important the Japanese were to Singapore’s development.  He said: 
 
Meanwhile, we must be patient, and above all, we must be realistic.  You know that 
in our industrialization program the participation of Japanese industries in the 
development of our Jurong industrial complex would help.  They have sent several 
missions to Singapore to survey the prospects.  Already several enterprises, including 
an oil refinery, have been set up.  The amount of trade, technical co-operation and 
industrial development that they could take part in Singapore and the rest of 
Malaysia would be out of all proportion to any gesture of atonement they can make.  
For that reason I understand the views of the representatives who have organized this 
meeting that a parsimonious gesture would be worse than nothing.  The Japanese are 
hard-headed businessmen.  And because they are hard-headed businessmen, I think 
they understand that in the long run it is worth their while to make a magnanimous 
gesture of contribution.257
 
This comment is very important because it shows what the Prime Minister had in 
mind on how the ‘blood-debt’ should be resolved.  By taking the industrial 
development of Singapore into consideration, Prime Minister Lee believed that it was 
necessary not to offend the Japanese using the ‘blood-debt’, as it could affect the 
Japanese investment in Singapore.  Unlike others, Lee saw the willingness of 
Japanese investment coming into Singapore as the atonement for their wartime 
atrocities. 
The Singapore Chinese community did not agree with Lee’s proposal.  They were 
not prepared to accept the idea that the benefits of Japanese investment could also be 
seen as a form of atonement.  After the meeting, its demand for the Japanese to pay 
the ‘blood-debt’ became even more significant.  The Chinese believed that no matter 




what, it was an obligation for the Japanese government to pay for the atrocities they 
committed.  This attitude was shown in an editorial article from Sin Chew Jit Poh.  It 
stated: 
 
From what Prime Minister Lee and Mr. Ko Teck Kin have said [during the MFC 
meeting on 21 April 1963], it is not only a moral obligation on the part of the 
Japanese government to pay for the losses sustained by the people of Singapore 
[during the Occupation], but it is also an obligation between state and state, and 
people and people, that must be fulfilled.  We earnestly hope that the Japanese 
government would give attention to the unprecedented meeting held in Singapore 
yesterday.  Were the atrocities and humiliation inflicted on the people of Singapore 
not the worst in the Southeast Asian region?  How could Singapore be the only 
country to which no gesture of atonement is made?  War is cruel, but if no attempt is 
made by the Japanese to undo the damages they had inflicted on the people of 
Singapore, how are they going to face the ultimate judgment of humanity and history?  
 
 
A similar attitude was also displayed by a Nanyang Siang Pau editorial article.  The 
paper even commented on the Japanese investment in Singapore.  It wrote: 
 
We are not jealous of Japan’s wealth, but the $50 million tribute extracted from our 
innocent people under the threat of the bayonet should in all fairness be returned to 
the people of Singapore.  Now that the SCCC has taken the lead with the support of 
the people, the government should take courage and negotiate with Japan.  After all, 
Japan’s statesmen are versatile and its businessmen are shrewd.  They should know 
that the friendship between Japan and Singapore is more precious than anything 
else.258  
 
Despite the reaction from the Chinese community, Prime Minister Lee continued 
to stress the importance of Japanese investment to Singapore’s industrialization.  
During the “Breaking of the Sod” ceremony for the construction of the Civilian War 
Memorial in June, 1963, Lee said:  
 
This ceremony, dedicating this ground to the memory of those of all races and 
religion who died in Japanese-occupied Singapore, is part of the process of making 
the past less unbearable, enemies though the Japanese may have been.  But today 
they can contribute to our industrial growth for, of industrial countries, they are the 
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ones with the lowest cost in managerial skills, technical know-how and industrial 
equipments.259
 
It is clear that Prime Minister Lee still wanted to maintain good relations with the 
Japanese despite the outcry from the Chinese community.  The industrialization of 
Singapore was a priority for him and his government.  Much to the disappointment of 
the PAP government, however, the Chinese community failed to agree what the PAP 
government had in mind and continued to build up its resentment and dissatisfaction 
with the Japanese government. 
 
Reactions from the Japanese and the ’Blood Debt’ Mass Rally Call 
 
 
Witnessing the hostilities building up among the Singapore Chinese, the Japanese 
government did try to do something to appease them.  An early step was to reassure 
the Singapore people that they were working on the issue with the Singapore 
government.  For example, on 23 April 1963 the Japanese spokesman for the 
Japanese Foreign Ministry released a statement stating that the Japanese and 
Singapore governments were working very hard to find ways and means to make a 
“gesture of atonement” to the people.260  On 4 July 1963, the Japanese government 
seemingly gave the discussion of the settlement of the ‘blood-debt’ a boost when the 
Japanese Consul-General, Hiroto Tanaka, after returning from his annual meeting 
with the Japanese government in Tokyo, announced that he had been “fully briefed” 
by his government on the method to settle the issue.  Although he declined to disclose 
the nature of the settlement, the newspaper speculated that it might be the 
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establishment of a M$200 million hospital.  In the announcement, Tanaka also added 
that he was “prepared” to meet the representatives from the SCCC, though the final 
settlement would be reached between the governments.   
The sincerity of the Japanese to settle the issue appeared questionable, however, 
as soon as Tanaka pointed out that the Japanese government had the rights not to 
oblige itself to the ‘blood-debt’.  He explained that this was because the Japanese 
government had already legally settled the issue through the San Francisco Treaty of 
1951.  Tanaka also added that the on-going discussion for the settlement was only for 
the sake of “giving a gesture of atonement to Singapore”.261  To make matters worse, 
that was not the only time the Japanese government displayed such insincerity.  In 
fact, on many occasions, the Japanese Consul-General and other Japanese 
representatives did not fail to highlight this point – San Francisco Treaty – whenever 
they started discussing for the settlement of the ‘blood-debt’.262
Unsurprisingly, the lack of sincerity that the Japanese had in addressing the 
‘blood-debt’ fueled even stronger anti-Japanese feelings within the Chinese 
community.  As a matter of fact, it became so strong that it spread to the Chinese in 
Malaya.  On 31 July 1963, it was reported that when four Japanese destroyers were 
about to dock at Penang harbor, anti-Japanese posters, depicting pictures of a wartime 
beheading scene and carrying messages demanding the Japanese to pay back the 
‘blood-debt’ that they owed to the people, were posted in Penang’s Chinatown.263  
Furthermore, on 3 August 1963, when the Japanese crew from the destroyers tried to 
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perform a Judo show for the Penangnites, they were jeered and even stoned by the 
crowd.  In the end, the Japanese were forced to call off the show.264
In Singapore, the SCCC condemned the Japanese response to the ‘blood-debt’ 
issue.  It continued to hold numerous discussions and meetings that focused on the 
demand for compensation.  During a meeting between Ko Teck Kin and Hiroto 
Tanaka, Ko warned the Consul-General that if the demands were not met “one could 
not tell how the Chinese would react”.265  The Japanese government, however, was 
not convinced and continued to stress the point that the issue had been settled by the 
San Francisco Treaty.  The response irritated the SCCC even more.  The breaking 
point finally came on 9 August 1963 when the Japanese government repeated its 
strange sincerity by first announcing that it would be paying the ‘blood-debt’ through 
the establishment of a number of medical and science and technology projects, before 
adding that legally the Japanese government should not be paying the compensation, 
as it was already settled in 1951 by the San Francisco Treaty.266
In response, Ko Teck Kin criticized the Japanese and claimed their response as 
“utter nonsense”.  He also stipulated that if the Japanese were planning to pay the 
‘blood-debt’ by setting up medical and other projects, the total cost must be at least 
M$50 million.  Ko also demanded the Japanese government to present the atonement 
“in terms of dollars and cents” because the projects “might turn out to be ridiculously 
small, [and] its acceptance might make the Singapore people the laughing stock of the 
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entire world”.  To force the Japanese government to comply with the SCCC’s 
proposal, Ko announced that his Chamber would organize a mass rally of 100,000 
people from all ethnic groups on the Padang on 25 August “to press for a reasonable 
settlement” on the ‘blood-debt’ issue and “to report on the insincerity of the Japanese 
government in settling Singapore’s demand for compensation”.267
 
Reactions from the Chinese and Other Ethnic Groups 
 
 
The SCCC’s action of calling for a ‘blood-debt’ mass rally won great admiration 
and support from the Chinese community.  The Chinese, through the editorials in 
Chinese newspapers, continued to display their dislike for the Japanese and became 
even more hostile.  Nanyang Siang Pau wrote: 
 
If “an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth” is taken as the basis of social 
intercourse, the ‘blood-debt’ owed by Japan for the atrocities perpetrated by its 
troops on the Chinese during the Japanese Occupation has to be paid in blood.  
However, the Chinese are a magnanimous people whose moral code precludes such a 
measure.  If only Japan makes a monetary payment of atonement to show their 
repentance, this debt, which could not really be repaid, will be regarded as settled.  
Unfortunately, it is regrettable that such peace-making intention is ignored by the 
Japanese. 268     
 
The intense hostility of the Chinese was also obvious in another editorial article in 
Sin Chew Jit Poh.  This time, however, it was directed on locals who were planning 
to go against the mass rally.  The editorial warned that whoever tried to “sabotage” 
the rally, he or she would be a “traitor to and a public enemy of the people of 
Singapore”.269  Furthermore, the article also attacked an English newspaper that 
suggested that the holding of the mass rally was not “practical” and could not have 
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possibly brought the ‘blood-debt’ to a close by stating that it was “posing a 
challenge” to the people of Singapore.270
Support for the SCCC’s move also came from across the causeway when the 
Associated Chinese Chamber of Commerce of Malaya (ACCC) decided to pledge its 
full support for the SCCC’s quest to settle the ‘blood-debt’ and the organization of the 
mass rally.  The ACCC also agreed to bring the ‘blood-debt’ over to Malaya by 
announcing that it would file a demand with the Japanese government for 
compensation over the massacre of innocent victims in Malaya during the Japanese 
Occupation, the lost of lives through the construction of the Death Railway in Siam, 
and the money that the Japanese army had extorted from the people of Malaya.  In 
addition, the ACCC also decided that the ‘blood-debt’ issue in Malaya would not be a 
Chinese concern but a multi-ethnic one.271
Although the whole matter seemed to be dominated by the Chinese, the ‘blood-
debt’ and the mass rally call also triggered some reaction and participation from the 
other ethnic communities.  The first reaction that came from the other ethnic 
communities occurred most strongly from within the Chamber when the 
representatives from other ethnic groups voiced their support for the Chamber’s move.  
For instance, Theo Leijssius, the Eurasian representative, stated that the Chamber’s 
M$50 million demand was “just and fair”.  He also assured the Chamber that the 
Eurasian community, though numbering at only 10,000, would give its “whole-
hearted” support to the Chamber’s mass rally call.  The Malay representative, Jaffar 
bin Shahid urged his and other ethnic communities to stand together as “one race of 
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the same blood” until a satisfaction settlement could be make for the ‘blood-debt’ 
issue.  Finally, D. T. Assomull and N.T. Nathan, the Chamber’s Indian 
representatives, and A.K. Issac, secretary of the Indian Chamber of Commerce, all 
believed that the dignity of the Singapore people could only be restored if the ‘blood-
debt’ was settled.272   
In the editorials of Malay and Indian newspapers, support for the SCCC’s ‘blood-
debt’ movement was also obvious.  In the Malay newspaper, Utusan Melayu, for 
example, the editorial pointed out that the ‘blood-debt’ movement was also a Malay 
issue.  This was because the Malay community like the Chinese had also suffered 
during the Japanese Occupation.273  In the Indian newspaper, Tamil Nesan, its 
editorial sided with the SCCC’s call for a compensation that must be at least M$50 
million.  It even attacked the Japanese government’s claim that the compensation was 
already settled by the San Francisco Treaty in 1951 by stating that what the SCCC 
was demanding for was an atonement for the massacre and not war reparation.274
However, one thing that made the public opinion from the other ethnic groups 
distinct from the Chinese editorials and the reaction of the SCCC was that they all 
agreed with Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s recommendation on how the issue 
should be resolved. They pointed out the importance of the Singapore-Japan 
economic relations and emphasized the need for the continuation of Japanese 
participation of the industrialization of Singapore.  In Utusan Melayu, an editorial 
article urged the parties involved in the ‘blood-debt’ discussion “not to turn this 
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matter into an issue that will cause political tension and affect the economic situation 
of Singapore”.275   
This perspective was also echoed in an editorial article in Tamil Nesan.  Despite 
demanding the Japanese government to comply with the SCCC’s demands, it stated 
that this should be done to prevent jeopardizing the “bright future for Japanese trade 
enterprises in both Malaya and Singapore and the growth of the present cordial and 
harmonious relations between the two countries”.276
Stressing the importance of Singapore-Japan economic relations could also be 
seen in the speech given by A.H. Allwie, the Malay representative in MFC, during the 
‘blood-debt’ mass rally in August, 1963.  He said: 
 
We are not here [in the rally] to clash with the Japanese.  We are not here to hate the 
Japanese.  We still welcome and respect them.  But the ‘blood-debt’ we are seeking 
from them is fair and just.  This is because it is a fact that the Japanese killed many 
innocent civilians during the Occupation.  Therefore, it is our right to demand for the 
‘blood-debt’.  We are the representative of the people, therefore, it is our 
responsibility to seek for the compensation for the loss of the people…However, 
with the guidance of the government, we can solve this matter peacefully and even 
foster better relations with the Japanese.277
 
 
In the speech, we can again see how different the Malays approached the ‘blood-debt’ 
issue.  Although they agreed that the Japanese must pay the ‘blood-debt’, the Malays 
never failed to stress the importance of maintaining good relations with the Japanese. 
 
The ‘Blood-Debt’ Mass Rally     
 
 
The mass rally of 25 August 1963 was held at the Padang with a massive crowd 
of more than 120,000 people.  Although it was claimed by leading Chinese 
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newspapers that the crowd was made up of members from all ethnic communities, the 
truth was that the majority was Chinese and that the other ethnic communities were 
only represented at the official level by their communities’ leaders affiliated with the 
SCCC.278   
Nonetheless, the rally was considered one of the biggest ever held in Singapore 
history.  It began at 7:15 pm and was initiated by five strikes to the drums.  The 
crowd then stood to attention and observed a three-minute silence for the massacre 
victims.  During the rally, Ko Teck Kin, President of the SCCC, gave a condemning 
speech on the Japanese.  He said: 
 
The rally tonight is a battle between justice and evil!  The massive crowd we have 
tonight showed that the Japanese government had failed completely to please us with 
their response!  The Japanese thought that they could threaten us with their 
investments and tried to evade any negotiations to settle the ‘blood-debt’.  Well, let 
us stand up together and tell the Japanese to stop dreaming!  It is a fact that the 
Japanese killed many innocent civilians during the Occupation period.  Therefore, 
there is no such thing that they do not have to pay the ‘blood-debt’.  If we could not 
get it back this time, our next generation would continue to seek for it!  If the 
Japanese government did not pay us the ‘blood-debt’, the Japanese here should pack 
their bags and go home.  The people of Singapore will not fall [without them].  If the 
Japanese government did not pay us, they will fall [instead]!279  
 
   
The mass rally or Ko Teck Kin’s threats, however, did not really threaten the 
Japanese government.  A day after the rally, the Japanese government issued a 
statement that it would not be interested in dealing with any organizations on the 
‘blood-debt’ as long as they resorted to such methods.280  It also stated that this 
matter was already settled by the San Francisco Treaty, and therefore, should not be 
raised again.  Furthermore, the government also announced that settling any future 
compensation to Singapore was only a moral obligation and would be difficult to 
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solve before the formation of Malaysia.281  This was followed by a period of silence 
from the Japanese.   
The Chinese community was furious with Japan’s response.  One editorial article 
from Sin Chew Jit Poh wrote: 
 
The attitude of the Japanese authority towards the protest of the people of Singapore 
remains unchanged.  They must be thinking that nobody would care about 
Singapore’s problems after the formation of Malaysia because these problems would 
not be in the hands of the people of Singapore.  So at the moment, the Japanese 
thinks that they could completely ignore the problem, or in the words of the 
spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, “to allow it to cool down for some 
time”.  This is a direct insult to the people of Singapore and it also reveals the 
intention of the Japanese authorities to ignore the problem of war indemnities.282    
 
 
The hostility towards the Japanese was also displayed in another article from 
Nanyang Siang Pau.  It wrote: 
 
The Japanese troops used swords and guns to threaten the lives and the properties of 
the people of Singapore and Malaya and committed the most unforgivable atrocities.  
Now that the people of Singapore are putting up only an oral and peaceful protest, 
Japan regards us as posing a threat?  This is preposterous!  Furthermore, the Japanese 
government’s adoption of “wait and see” attitude is a complete insult to the people of 
Singapore.  What more is there to “wait and see” when the people of Singapore had 
already voiced their opinion.  Is the Japanese government waiting to act only after 
the people of Singapore have once again become hostile to them?  Or is the Japanese 
waiting to act only after the people of Singapore forced them through the measure of 
an economic sanction?  Perhaps the Japanese are waiting because those out-dated, 
so-called “expert on Chinese” Japanese statesmen are still planning and thinking that 
the present day Chinese in Singapore and Malaya are still those good-for-nothing 
people from the past whose enthusiasm will last for not more than five minutes?  As 
regards to Japanese intention to negotiate only after the situation was cooled down, it 
is utter nonsense!  Aren’t we cooled down enough after this issue was left 
unanswered for more than 20 years?  Not that the Singapore people have come to 
their limit of their patience and dignity, Japan’s comment on that we are not cool 
enough to engage is a serious case of “putting the cart before the horse”!283    
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In response to Japan’s attitude, the SCCC decided to initiate an anti-Japanese 
boycott campaign on 24 September 1963.284  The campaign was targeted towards not 
providing services on Japanese ships and planes instead of on Japanese products.  
Moreover, it lasted for only five days and did not have much impact on the Japanese, 
as all they had to do was to divert their ships and planes to Malaysia or to delay their 
ships from docking by a few days.285  Nonetheless, the campaign grabbed the 
attention of the central government in Kuala Lumpur.  This was also partly due to the 
expansion of the ‘blood-debt’ issue to Malaysia, as the Associated Chinese Chamber 
of Commerce (ACCC) deepened the issue in the Peninsula after it was able to gain 
support from the Malay and Indian Chamber of Commerce.  At this time, a new 
compensation amount was suggested.  Instead of M$50 million, the demand was 
M$160 million (M$110 million for the Malaysian states and M$50 million for 
Singapore).286  Much to the Singapore government’s delight, Tengku Abdul Rahman, 
Prime Minister of Malaysia, decided to take over the issue.  Under the pressure of the 
Tengku, the Japanese finally responded and sent a delegate to Kuala Lumpur to 
discuss the settlement of the issue.287  It was then followed by endless delays and the 
issue was once again prolonged.288  In fact, it would not be resolved until October 
1966 when the Singapore government took back the issue after Singapore’s split with 
the Federation of Malaysia to become an independent state. 
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The PAP Government and the Mass Rally 
 
Although the mass rally did not yield any results in the end, it was a very 
controversial event.  Not only did it bring out a crowd of 120,000 people, but it also 
drew the participation of the PAP government.  In fact, Prime Minister Lee Kuan 
Yew turned out personally to give the mass rally his support.  But the most eventful 
point of the rally was when the Prime Minister surprised everyone by making the 
unprecedented move of revealing his resentment towards the Japanese.  In the speech 
that he gave to the crowd, Lee showed this feeling by stating: 
 
Only once in Singapore has there been a crowd such as this on the Padang.  The last 
time it was a festive occasion on 3rd June 1959, when we took a decisive step 
forward towards freedom.  Tonight is a different occasion.  It is a solemn occasion.  
It was only after careful deliberation that the government decided last week to 
sponsor tonight’s rally.  It is a decision which could not be taken lightly.  For after 
tonight, once the resolutions have been passed and adopted, the government’s 
attitude to the Japanese government must alter.  A stand once taken cannot be 
abandoned until a satisfactory settlement [of the ‘blood-debt’] has been reached, at 
all levels, amongst the people and in the government, there must be non-cooperation, 
until a fair and just solution is found.289     
 
He even went as far as agreeing to stop the issuing of any more visas for Japanese 
businessmen participating in Singapore’s industrialization project.  He said: 
 
You all know that my colleagues and I have placed great emphasis on the rapid 
industrialization of Singapore.  It is our policy to invite the technical and industrial 
skills from the rest of the world to come to Singapore to heighten the tempo of 
industrialization.  The cheapest of technical and mechanical skills that can come to 
Southeast Asia is from Japan.  But after tonight’s meeting and the adoption of the 
resolutions of non-cooperation, no more visas will be issued for more Japanese on 
new industrial or commercial projects in Singapore.290    
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This intriguing step made by the Prime Minister meant that he decided to go against 
his own economic policy of encouraging the influx of Japanese investment to help the 
industrialization projects in Singapore. 
The step made by Lee Kuan Yew impressed the Chinese community, but the 
British were disappointed.  They saw the PAP government’s adoption of the 
“resolution of non-cooperation” against Japan as a confirmation indicating that Prime 
Minister Lee had finally gave in to the demands of the SCCC.291  This was not 
something that the British wanted.  Before the mass rally, the British were getting 
worried with the show of force made by the SCCC on the ‘blood-debt’ issue and even 
questioned Prime Minister Lee’s ability to handle the pressure.292  In fact, it was even 
reported that the British were actually interfering in the background with the ‘blood-
debt’ negotiation by encouraging the Japanese government not to yield to the 
demands given by the SCCC and to compensate only in the form of projects such as 
education and health.293
However, was Prime Minister Lee’s adoption of the “resolution of non-
cooperation”, like what the British pointed out, the result of the SCCC’s pressure?  As 
we have discussed earlier, the reason why the SCCC brought out all these outstanding 
issues was because it wanted to foster anti-Japanese sentiment among the Singapore 
people, particularly the Chinese, so that the economic relations between Singapore 
and Japan would be affected, thus bringing down the industrialization economic plan 
of the PAP government.  So with the participation of the PAP government in this 
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mass rally and by declaring a “resolution of non-cooperation” with the Japanese, was 
it indicating that the PAP government was bowing to the SCCC? 
Kevin Blackburn argued that the reason why Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew 
decided to participate in the mass rally movement was not motivated by “avenging” 
the Japanese government for not settling the ‘blood-debt’, but rather to “take over the 
movement so that he could contain and control it and make sure that his political 
enemies could not use developments of this kind to promote their own policies to 
embarrass the Prime Minister”.294  He also added that because Lee was planning on a 
snap election in September 1963, he “did not want his opponents garnering support 
from the rally”.295  Although the author did not indicate who these “political 
enemies” were, it was obvious that he was most probably referring to the United 
People’s Party (UPP) and the pro-communist Barisan Sosialis (BS), an opposition 
party that was regarded by scholars as “the most powerful opposition party in the 
history of Singapore”.296  During the mass rally, Prime Minister Lee did point out the 
threat of the Opposition.  He also said that his presence in the rally is needed to 
prevent the Opposition to exploit the situation.  He said: 
 
All of you must understand the need for restraint and discipline in our public conduct.  
After careful deliberation we have called this meeting.  We must conduct it with 
other and propriety.  I know in the middle of last week, Communist front organizers 
were planning to exploit the rally for their anti-national and anti-Malaysia activities.  
For that reason, I make no secret of the fact that we have taken all precautions 
necessary to ensure that if they do anything stupid tonight they will live to regret it.  
You all remember what happened when Mr. Marshall as Chief Minister called a 
mass rally at the old Kallang Airport in March 1956.  There was no deliberation let 
alone any preparation.  As the result, the stage symbolically and ominously collapsed 
underneath Mr. Marshall’s feet.  The Communists exploited the feelings of the 
people and the result was riots broke out and many people were injured and great 
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harm was done to Singapore.  I cannot allow the Communists to exploit this situation, 
exploit the people’s feelings on Japanese atrocities which are deeper and more 
intense than their feelings for Merdeka then in 1956.  This issue must be pursued 
with calm deliberation.  We must not allow hysteria to overwhelm our better 
judgment.  Communist exploitation for this issue will be weeded out.  Otherwise we 
will perish.297    
 
 
The “political enemies” of Lee’s PAP government were actually offshoots of the 
PAP.  For instance, the chairman of the UPP, Ong Eng Guan, was one of the founding 
members of the PAP.  Furthermore, before Lee Kuan Yew became the Prime Minister 
of Singapore, Ong was the only PAP member who held a high-ranking government 
position when he was chosen to become the first elected mayor of the City Council in 
December 1957.298  However, because of his controversial term in office, he was 
expelled from the PAP and was also forced to resign from the legislative assembly.299  
In April 1961, Ong made a return to the assembly when he contested and won back 
his seat in the Hong Lim by-election.  In June 1961, he formed the United People’s 
Party and became one of the leading Opposition figures.300  As for the BS, its 
chairman, Lee Siew Choh, and other members such as Sheng Nam Chin, Chan Sun 
Wing, Low Por Tuck, and Leong Keng Seng were all former members of the PAP.301  
Like Ong Eng Guan, they were all expelled from the party and went on to form their 
own, and in this case the BS.302  However, the developments that led to their 
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expulsion were more complicated than Ong’s case, as it involved the intra-politics of 
the PAP. 
Scholars have given a number of explanations to why these members were 
expelled from the PAP, but generally, it was caused by conflict of interests among the 
members of the PAP.  When the PAP was formed, it featured a coalition of two 
factions that uphold two very different sets of ideologies and beliefs.  One of the 
factions, led by leaders such as Lee Kuan Yew, Goh Keng Swee, and S. Rajaratnam, 
were anti-colonist English-educated socialists who wanted to develop Singapore with 
measures such as promoting industrialization through foreign investments, 
establishing a more cooperative labor force through reorganizing and unifying labor 
unions, and merging Singapore with the Federation of Malaya.303  These measures 
ran counter to the ideologies and beliefs of the future BS members, the other faction 
within the PAP, as they upheld principles that were pro-communist.  Primarily made 
up of Chinese-educated workers and trade union representatives, the left wing pro-
communists felt that when Lee Kuan Yew and his collaborators tried to push their 
agendas forward after the PAP won the 1959 general election so that the pro-
communist faction of the party could be contained and controlled.304  For instance, 
when the Lee faction tried to reorganize and unify the labor unions, it was largely 
seen by the left wing as an attempt to dominate the control of the labor unions of 
Singapore.  This was because during that time, both the Lee and the pro-communist 
factions were wrestling for the control of a number of labor unions, particularly the 
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Trade Union Congress (TUC) and the Singapore Trade Union Congress (STUC).305  
Furthermore, when the Lee faction proposed for merger with the Federation, it was 
also suspected by the left wing as a hidden agenda to “wipe out the left wing forces in 
Singapore”, as the government in Kuala Lumpur was an anti-communist 
government.306
The rupture between the Lee and the pro-communist factions finally spilled over 
in July 1951 when the latter publicly switched their allegiance from the PAP and 
supported David Marshall, Chairman of the Workers’ Party, when he contested the 
Anson by-election against a PAP candidate on the grounds of immediate 
independence without merger.  In the end, Marshall won the by-election by a small 
majority, and this alarmed the Lee faction of the PAP.  In response, Lee Kuan Yew 
called for an emergency meeting of the Legislative Assembly on 21 July 1961 to 
debate on the “motion of confidence” of the government so as to end the internal 
conflict of his party once and for all.  After more than 12 hours of debate, the PAP 
rebels were all sacked from their posts and expelled from the party.307  These 
members, whom I have stated earlier, however were able to keep their assembly seats 
and went on to form the BS on 13 August 1961. 
What made the BS the “most powerful opposition party” in Singapore was the 
amount of support it was able to garner after its split from the PAP.  As pointed by 
Dennis Bloodworth, hours after the PAP rebels were expelled, 35 of the 51 branch 
committees and 19 of the 23 paid organizing secretaries deflected to the BS.  Even 
Rajaratnam lost his constituency branch, though Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Keng Swee 
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managed to hold on to theirs.  To make matters worse, the new opposition party was 
also able to snatch many of the PAP’s active party workers and a great mass of 
supporters, and some of them were not even communist supporters.308  Furthermore, 
the BS was also able to gather a great deal of support from the grass-roots levels and 
from secondary political associations.  Support also poured in from Chinese school 
students and graduates and labor unionists.  In fact, it was reported that the BS was in 
control of more than two-thirds of the labor unions in Singapore.309  The political 
situation became so bad for the PAP that it even lost its parliamentary majority in 
July 1962 when an assemblywoman deflected to the BS.310
Despite the strong challenge from the BS, the PAP was able to hold onto power 
and the control of the government.  This was partly due to the Tengku Abdul 
Rahman’s, the Prime Minister of Malaya, approval to accept Singapore’s entry into 
the Federation of Malaysia in late 1961.311  But mostly, it was contributed by the 
execution of Operation Stone Cold by the Internal Security Council of Singapore and 
representatives from Malaysia, Singapore, and Britain on 3 February 1963 where 
more than a hundred BS, trade union, and student leaders such as Lim Chin Siong, S. 
Woodhull, Fong Swee Suan, and James Puthucheary were arrested and detained on 
the charges of acting as anti-Malaysia elements involving in a “giant communist 
conspiracy to launch an attack in Singapore in the event of the planned armed 
intervention by Indonesia in British Borneo”.312  The mass arrest effectively crippled 
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the BS.  In fact, Lee Siew Choh, chairman of the BS, even admitted that the operation 
had his party’s “hands and feet all tied up”.313  Things worsen for the BS when Lee 
Siew Choh and other leaders were arrested on 22 April 1963 when they initiated a 
violent protest against the mass arrests of Operation Stone Cold.314   
With the BS losing its leading members, Lee Kuan Yew and his counterparts were 
given some breathing space.  However, Lee was not taking any chances and certainly 
did not want the BS to seize any opportunity that could threaten the PAP’s control 
over the government.  When the SCCC called for the ‘blood-debt’ mass rally, the 
PAP government’s intelligence released reports stating that it was certain that the BS 
and its communist supporters were intending to “exploit” the mass rally for 
“furthering their aims to prevent [the formation] of Malaysia and cause political 
unrest in the state” by attending the rally “under the cloak of the [SCCC] to stir up the 
emotions of the people and to start small incidents…which they hope will lead to 
rioting and civil commotion”.315  Even Lee was sure that the BS and its supporters 
were eyeing the mass rally as an opportunity to create unrest and to threaten his 
government.  In his memoir, he wrote, “The BS and the communist saw [the ‘blood-
debt’ rally] as another opportunity to show their strength and humiliate me”.316  
Therefore, with all these developments, it was likely that part of the reason, as argued 
by Kevin Blackburn, Lee’s decision to attend the rally was that he wanted to check 
and control the crowd.  He certainly did not want any political disorder, especially 
                                                 
313 Mutalib, pp.96-97.  Lau, p.31. 
314 Mutalib, p.98.   
315 Singapore Government Press Statement, Chinese Chamber of Commerce of Mass Rally of Japanese 
Reparations, 22 August 1963.  Singapore Government Press Statement, Pro-communist Trade Unions 
and Other Anti-Malaysia Elements Preparing to Create Disturbances, 24 August 1963. 
316 Lee, The Singapore Story, p.496. 
 127
when he was planning to announce the elections in just a matter of days.  In fact, Lee 
was so afraid that the rally would led to disorder by the communists that he decided to 
deploy more than 6000 police officers and army troops around the rally site to 
suppress any form of disorders from the crowd.317
The argument put forward by Kevin Blackburn gives a good explanation as to 
why Lee Kuan Yew participated and supported the mass rally.  However, it did not 
question the Prime Minister’s decision to adopt the policy of non-cooperation against 
Japanese investment.  I believe that the reason was due to upcoming political 
developments.  As I have mentioned earlier, the PAP was planning to announce the 
general elections in a matter of days.  Therefore, it was likely that the PAP decided to 
use this opportunity to garner support from the people by arousing their emotions and 
feelings to win their votes.  In fact, this agenda was admitted by the Prime Minister.  
In his memoir, he wrote:  
 
I was not anxious to work up this issue, but the problem was not going away.  The 
[SCCC] had decided to bring the [‘blood-debt’] to a head, and as I was planning to 
hold elections just before Malaysia Day, I had to press its demand, whatever the 
consequences in terms of Japanese investment.318
 
 
It had to be noted that even at this point, the PAP was still worried about the BS.  
Despite the massive arrests of its leaders and supporters and the success of the 
government’s policies in its first term in office, the PAP still believed that the BS was 
still made up of a formidable force to challenge them during the general election.  
This fear was clearly summed up by C.M. Turnbull.  She wrote: 
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By September 1963, the four-year development plan was ahead of schedule.  The 
housing program was up to the target set, and considerable strides had been made in 
education.  Despite this, the PAP was afraid that the Singapore Alliance [party] 
would split the moderate vote and the Barisan might win outright control of the 
Assembly.  While the Barisan had suffered from the arrest of so many of its key 
officials, active party workers, and trade union and student supporters, it still had 
considerable mass appeal among workers and influential backings…319
 
Therefore, in order to win the approval from the people, Prime Minister Lee 
decided to use the non-cooperation tactic during the mass rally for his and his party’s 
political ambition.  In the Prime Minister’s mass rally speech on 25 August 1963, Lee 
skillfully manipulated the feelings of the people.  First, Lee reminded the crowd that 
his government was initially following a policy of maintaining good relations with the 
Japanese to encourage their investors to Singapore to help the country’s 
industrialization project by saying: 
 
We have given an undertaking to protect the lives and safeguard the property of all 
Japanese nationals now in Singapore.  I intend to see that that is so.  These are men 
who have come here because we have invited Japanese industrialists to help us with 
our industrialization.  If our word is always to be believed, then we must honor our 
undertaking.  This undertaking covers all present projects.  There are some countries 
in the world which made solemn undertakings and immediately and frivolously 
disavow them.  In the end nobody believes them.  Their promise becomes 
worthless.320   
 
 
Then Lee told the crowd that because of how “insensitive and unimaginative” the 
Japanese government handled the ‘blood-debt’, he and his government had to side 
with the Singapore people and forced the Japanese to comply through the adoption of 
a “non-cooperation” resolution even if it may affect the economic policy of his 
government.  He again said: 
 
It is a pity that the present Japanese Consul-General is insensitive and so prosaic in 
his approach to this issue.  I do not know why the former Consul-General was 
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recalled.  He knew more about this matter, particularly the feelings of the people on 
this issue and the perils it holds for Japan.  I hope his recall was purely coincidental 
and not a deliberate change of policy.  For if the Japanese government was to be 
insensitive and unimaginative in their approach, they stand to lose a great deal in this 
part of the world.  We realize that the rate of our industrial progress may also be 
affected.  But that cannot be helped.321  
 
By displaying such a self-sacrificing attitude for the interests of the people, Lee 
would not have any problems winning over the approval of the crowd towards 
himself and his party.  However, that was not all, he added that he and his colleagues, 
like the people, saw the ‘blood-debt’ as a very personal issue, as they all were 
surviving victims of the Japanese Occupation.  He said:  
 
Let me add that calm deliberation and cold calculation [of adopting the non-
cooperation policy against the Japanese] does not mean that my colleagues and I 
have no feelings on this issue.  Indeed, it is a highly charged issue for many of us.  
My colleague, Dr. Goh Keng Swee, was a member of the Singapore Volunteer Corps 
together with my wife’s brother.  My brother-in-law was shot and killed, but by an 
inexplicable chance of fate, Dr. Goh escaped this tragedy and continues to play his 
part in the history of Malaysia.  The Japanese Consul-General and his predecessor 
who discussed these matters with me, or indeed the Japanese Prime Minister and his 
Foreign Minister with whom I had brief discussions in Tokyo, did not know how I, 
but for a chance of fate, would have been one among those massacred in February 
1942.  As I was queuing up at Weld Road – Jalan Besar Concentration Center in 
February 1942, the scrutinizers at the gate looked at my physical size and asked me 
to join some people on a lorry, presumably to do some work for the Japanese.  
Somehow I felt that lorry was not going to carry people to work.  I asked them to let 
me go back to get my belongings which I said were left behind with my gardener 
whose kongsi was in Upper Weld Road and with whom I had put up for several days 
when we were kept in that Concentration Center.  I never returned to the exit point 
until they changed sentries and scrutinizers.  When they did, I walked out and they 
allowed me to go home.  Those who were sent into the lorry never came back.  Such 
was the blindness of their brutality.  They would never know what they did to a 
whole generation like me.322    
 
With such tactful speech, it was of no surprise that by the end of the day, Lee was 
able to win over the crowd.323  In fact, the Chinese community reacted quickly by 
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rallying behind the government’s decision to adopt the non-cooperation policy.  An 
article from Sin Chew Jit Poh wrote: 
 
As public opinion has resolved to press for the settlement of the ‘blood-debt’, our 
attitude towards Japan should be completely different.  That is to say not only 
everybody must see the objective clearly and turn sorrow and indignation into 
strength to deal with Japan until the end, but all of us must unite to launch the non-
cooperation campaign so as to show that the people of Singapore are determined and 
consistent in speech and action.  Because it is a long-term struggle to press for the 
‘blood-debt’, we must continue to extend the spirit of last night’s mass rally.324     
 
 
While another from the same newspaper gave its approval for the government’s 
intervention with the mass rally.  It wrote: 
 
After the mass rally, which was held at the City Hall Padang, we do not have the 
slightest doubt that the elected government of Singapore can ignore the feelings and 
the opinion of the people of Singapore.  Neither will the Malaysian central 
government and its people treat the people of Singapore like the old master at No.10 
Downing Street.325    
 
 
The success to win the approval of the people, especially the Chinese community, 
could be one of the factors that Lee and his PAP party surprised many by crushing the 
Opposition during the general election in September, 1963.  They won 37 out of the 
51 contested seats.  The only party that was left standing was the BS, as they won 13 
seats.  Ong Eng Guan from the UPP took the remaining one seat.326
The Prime Minister’s strategy of using the non-cooperation resolution for election 
objectives can also be observed through a number of incidents that developed after 
the election.  For example, on 24 September 1963, Lee made a statement that 
seemingly retracted what he had said during the mass rally.  Instead of pressing the 
Japanese to settle the ‘blood-debt’, Lee told the SCCC that it should be “realistic and 
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practical” on the whole matter and it “should be settled not necessarily in cash but in 
kind”.327  This statement was similar to what he had said earlier during the MFC 
fund-raising meeting in April 1963. 
A second way to see that the Prime Minister had staged the non-cooperation 
resolution was by looking at the type and total number of visas issued by the PAP 
government to the Japanese by the end of 1963.  In Shimizu Hiroshi’s and Hirakawa 
Hitoshi’s Japan and Singapore in the World Economy (1999), they argued that 
although the PAP government announced in the mass rally that it would not be 
issuing any more visas to Japanese businessmen and investors, it did not necessarily 
mean that the PAP government actually implemented the law.  Even if it did, the 
authors believed that the government used an alternative way, and that was by 
stopping the issuance of business visas but by replacing them entry with social visit 
visas.  They made this observation by studying the number of different types of visas 
being offered by the PAP government to Japanese.  The authors found out that 
although there was a decrease in the number of business visit visas, the number of 
social visit visas increased significantly from 13 in 1962 to 77 in 1963.328   
The total number of visas issued by the PAP government to Japanese also 
contradicted the non-cooperation resolution.  At the end of 1963, the total number 
remained high.  In fact, there was even an increase from a total of 139 in 1962 to 191 
in 1963.  Furthermore, a total of only eight visa applications from the Japanese were 
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rejected by the Singapore Immigration Department in 1963, and that was in 
comparison only an increase of one compared to the previous year.329   
Therefore, it is clear that Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew did not have the intention 
to settle the ‘blood-debt’ with the expense of Japanese investment.  He still believed 
that inviting Japanese investors to Singapore for its industrialization project was a 
priority.  When Singapore broke away from the Federation of Malaysia in August 
1965, the challenge to bring in Japanese investment became one of the most 
important agendas for the PAP government.  However, the PAP government probably 
knew that it was going to be difficult as the ‘blood-debt’ issue was still very much 
alive after the Malaysian government failed to solve it with the Japanese in late 1963 
and early 1964.  In fact, less than a year after Singapore’s split from Malaysia the 
SCCC made it clear that it would once again bring out the ‘blood-debt’ issue.  In a 
statement made by Chew Teng How, the Chamber’s Secretary-General, he said:  
 
The blood-debt issue has been left in abeyance because in the past three 
years the international climate had not been suitable to press further.  The 
Chamber will bring it up again when the time is suitable.330   
 
 
The ‘blood-debt’ continued to poise as a threat to Singapore-Japan relations until it 
was finally settled in October 1966. 
 
Settlement of the ‘Blood-Debt’ 
 
 
The discussion of the ‘blood-debt’ resurfaced when Japanese Foreign Minister 
Etsusaburo Shiina came to Singapore for a two-day visit to promote friendly relations 
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with Singapore on 25 October 1966.  A day later, a joint communiqué by the 
Japanese Foreign Minister and Singapore Foreign Minister Rajaratnam surprised 
everyone by announcing that the issue was settled.  It was agreed that Japan were to 
pay the “Singapore government and the people of Singapore” M$25 million in grant 
and another M$25 million in loans “on special terms”.331  The PAP government 
explained that the reason why the ‘blood-debt’ was settled at such a fast pace was 
because it wanted to “contribute constructively to the furtherance of friendly 
relations” between Japan and Singapore.332
Being excluded by the Singapore and the Japanese governments for the discussion 
of the ‘blood-debt’, the SCCC voiced its surprise and criticized the PAP government 
for agreeing on a settlement that was “far below” the Chamber’s original demand of 
M$50 million in cash.333  The SCCC also added that it was unsure whether to support 
the PAP government on recognizing the settlement.334  The Chamber’s criticism also 
drew support from an unexpected person, Chuang Hui-Tsuan, the General Affair 
Officer of the SCMAC who lost the responsibilities of exhuming the remains of the 
massacred and reclaiming the ‘blood-debt’ in 1962 to the SCCC.  He said that the 
PAP government had “no right to accept anything less than the M$50 million because 
it was the amount that was decided by the people during the ‘blood-debt’ mass rally 
in August 1963”.  Chuang even added that because the settlement of the ‘blood-debt’ 
                                                 
331 Sin Chew Jit Poh, 26 October 1966.  Nanyang Siang Pau, 26 October 1966.  The agreed M$25 
million loan was given to Singapore in two separate payments.  The first payment of M$16.67 million 
was loaned to the Singapore government by the Japanese Export and Import Bank and was used for the 
purchase of ship-building materials. 
332 The Straits Times, 26 October 1966. 
333 When E. Shiina arrived at Singapore, the SCCC invited Shiina to discuss on how the ‘blood-debt’ 
should be settled.  However, Shiina turned down the offer.  Furthermore, the settlement of the ‘blood-
debt’ was reached without the consultation of the SCCC (Sin Chew Jit Poh, 25 and 26 October 1966).  
Sin Chew Jit Poh 27 and 30 October 1966. 
334 The Straits Times, 26 and 27 October 1966. 
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was reached at a Government level without the consultation of the SCCC, it would 
not “eradicate the animosity of the people towards the Japanese on the issue”.335
Days after the settlement was announced, the SCCC continued to show its 
disagreement by holding meetings and stating to the press that it remained undecided 
whether to support the ‘blood-debt’ agreement.  In response, Prime Minister Lee 
wrote to Wee Cho Yaw, the new president of the SCCC, on 31 October 1963.  He 
harangued the Chamber to be realistic about the agreement by taking Singapore’s 
development into consideration.  He wrote: 
 
The reason why the Singapore government agreed to accept the Japanese offer was 
because we are putting priority on the industrialization of the country.  We are not 
that naïve to think that money could actually pay for the loss of the people.  We must, 
however, let bygones be bygones.  Whatever we do could change the past.  The 
compensation that the Japanese offered is a gesture of atonement.  We must accept 
this gesture to show them that we welcome them and their investments.  But we 
should not totally forgive and forget what the crimes they committed.  The survival 
of Singapore is not dependent on the $50 million payment made by the Japanese.  
We must accept, however, the payment to show the Japanese that we welcome their 
people.  If we continued to show our discontent, it might complicate matters and 
affect our country’s plan to industrialize.336    
 
In his reply to the Prime Minister, Wee Cho Yaw stated that he understood how 
important Singapore was to industrialize, but he was unhappy that the PAP 
government settled the ‘blood-debt’ without consulting the SCCC.  Wee stated in his 
letter, dated 1 November 1966: 
 
My Chamber members and I understand the government’s perspective that the 
agreement was done by taking into account the development of Singapore.  However, 
we felt that the decision was made without the consultation of the people, as we have 
promised them during the ‘blood-debt’ mass rally on 25 August 1963 that we would 
help the people to get back the ‘blood-debt’.337    
 
                                                 
335 The Straits Times, 26 October 1966. 
336 Sin Chew Jit Poh, 1 December 1966. 
337 Ibid. 
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Prime Minister Lee snapped back at Wee’s remark stating that the decision was made 
by the PAP government and it did require the participation of the SCCC.  He wrote: 
 
In regards to the decision to accept what the Japanese government offered, it is solely 
the authority of the Singapore government.  The Singapore government is elected by 
the people of Singapore.  Therefore, any decision made by the Singapore 
government is the decision of the people of Singapore.338     
 
 
In the letter, Prime Minister Lee invited Wee Cho Yaw and other Chamber members 
such as Ng Aik Huan and Lam Thiam who were heavily involved with the ‘blood-
debt’ issue to discuss on how the M$25 million grant be used.  It was agreed that the 
money would be used for public welfare purposes and not be given to any 
organizations or individuals.339  The meeting also won over the support of the 
Chamber in regards to the decision made by the Singapore government on the 
settlement of the ‘blood-debt’.  
Reacting to the sudden conclusion of the ‘blood-debt’ issue, the Chinese 
community appeared to be satisfied, as no anti-Japanese protests were reported during 
that time.  In fact, an editorial in Sin Chew Jit Poh even wrote that even though the 
M$50 million was not a huge sum, the sincerity of the Japanese to settle the issue 
should be applauded.  The editorial also stated that after receiving the payment, the 
important thing was not to continue the squabble but figure out how the money 
should be used for the people.  The following is an excerpt from the article: 
 
The Japanese government is to pay the ‘blood-debt’ by providing the government 
and the people of Singapore with a $25 million grant and another $25 million loans 
with special terms.  It is a small sum but the sincerity of the Japanese government 
and its people to resolve this outstanding problem is far more important than the 
payment itself…After accepting the $50 million payment, the primary concern now 




is to see how the government is going to use the money to compensate the victims’ 
relatives.340   
 
Looking back at how the Chinese community reacted to the ‘blood-debt’ in 1962 
and 1963, what was stated in the editorial showed a total turn in events.  Although it 
still could not reflect the reaction of the Chinese accurately, as after all, they were 
badly scarred by the Japanese Occupation, it seemed like some of the Chinese had 
developed a different reaction, which was to forgive but yet not necessarily forget 
what the Japanese had one to them.  Perhaps a reason for this change was that some 
of the Chinese finally realized the importance of the Japanese in the industrialization 
of Singapore. 
Although the ‘blood-debt’ was finally settled, the experience that the PAP 
government faced was not a pleasant one.  In order to prevent it from once more 
becoming an issue, the PAP government tried to play down its significance whenever 
it could.    Prime Minister Lee evidently did so during the unveiling ceremony of the 
Civilian War Memorial on 15 February 1967.  He said: 
 
We have come together this morning, 25 years after the Japanese capture Singapore, 
to dedicate this memorial.  We meet not to rekindle old fires of hatred, nor seek 
settlements for blood debts.  We meet to remember the men and women who were 
the hapless victims of one of the fires of history.341
 
 
Clearly, the Prime Minister was trying to contain the emotions of the people during 
the ceremony.  As the memorial was connected to the ‘blood-debt’, Lee did not want 
the people to use its unveiling as a rationalization to bring out the ‘blood-debt’ debate 
                                                 
340 Sin Chew Jit Poh, 29 October 1966. 
341 Prime Minister’s Speech at the Unveiling Ceremony of Memorial to Civilian Victims of Japanese 
Occupation on 15 February 1967, in PM’s Speeches.
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again.  He was worried of another anti-Japanese outburst, which would in turn strain 
Singapore-Japan relations. 
In another incident where the PAP government evidently tried to contain the 
feelings of the people, especially the Chinese community, was when it replaced the 
original epitaph for the Civilian War Memorial.342  The original epitaph was 
composed by Pan Shou shortly after the design of the memorial but it was changed in 
1965.  It was controversial as it not only reminded the people of the sufferings caused 
by the atrocities, but it also reasoned that the people should use the experience as a 
motivation for nation building.  It read: 
 
Tears stained with flower crimson like, 
And blood tainted with the blue ocean, 
Ye wandering souls who rise with the tide, 
Shall guard this young nation.343
 
The strong message that Pan Shou’s work reflected was something that the PAP 
government did not desire.  There was a possibility that the epitaph together with the 
memorial could be used by the people to trigger yet another wave of anti-Japanese 
sentiment.  Instead of using Pang Shou’s work, the PAP government replaced it with 
a very plain one that did not even indicate the name of Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew.  
It read: 
 
This Memorial was erected by the people of Singapore through the effects of the 
Chinese Chamber of Commerce and the assistance of the Government from funds 
                                                 
342 Hong Lysa and Huang Jianli, “Scripting Singapore’s National Heroes: Toying with Pandora’s Box”, 
New Terrian in Southeast Asia History (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2003), p.235.  Karl Hack 
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New York, N.Y.: Routledge Curzon, 2004), pp.174-175. 
343 Karl and Blackburn, p. 175.  Pan Shou, C.M. Wong (trans.) “Memorial to the Civilian Victims of 
the Japanese Occupation”, Journal of the South Seas Society, vol.39, parts 1&2 (June, 1984), pp.57-60. 
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donated by the Government and the people of Singapore.  It was unveiled on 
February 15, 1967, by the Prime Minister.344
 
 
Another possible reason why the PAP government did not use the original epitaph 
was because it did not want something permanent that could graphically show the 
people of Singapore the emotional scars of the atrocities.  The government was 
concerned that if such a strong message were to be relayed to the people, the Japanese 
might be offended, as after all, it was reported that the Japanese in Singapore were 
not very happy with the memorial and wanted it to be removed.345  Maintaining good 
relations with the Japanese was the agenda of Prime Minister Lee, especially when he 
met with Japanese diplomats.  He always tried to play down the negative impact the 
Japanese Occupation had on Singapore.  For instance, in the state banquet speech that 
Prime Minister Lee gave to the visiting Japanese Prime Minister, Sato Eisaku, in 
September 1967, he acknowledged Japan on “hastening” the end of the “age of 
European domination of Asia”.  Furthermore, Lee also asserted that he had no 
intention to be a “prisoner of the past” and judge Japan according to what they had 
done during the Japanese Occupation.  Instead, Lee asserted his hope that Japan could 
help Singapore to industrialize.  He said: 
 
We in Singapore have no inhibitions as a result of our experiences in the Second 
World War.  That chapter is closed, although not forgotten.  We have no fear that 
Japanese capital, technological skills, and management expertise will end up with us 
losing our own identity and freedom…We have welcomed your nationals 
participating in our plans to industrialize.  It has been a promising start, mutually 
profitable and holding out promise of wider fields for joint endeavor.  May your own 
distinguished presence in Singapore give impetus and gathering momentum to this 
purpose.346
 
                                                 
344 This message can be found at the Civilian War Memorial site. 
345 Shu and Chua, p.87. 
346 Speech by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew at the Banquet Given by Prime Minister of Japan, Mr. 
Yashuhiro Nakasone, on 15 October 1986, in PM’s Speeches.
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As for the SCCC, after agreeing to the settlement of the ‘blood-debt’, it appeared 
to have ended its conflict with the Japanese.  One significant move came in July, 
1969 when the Chamber rented an office on the fifth floor of its new building to a 
Japanese trading company.  This was heavily criticized by Chuang Hui-Tsuan, as he 
accused the Chamber of renting the space out to the Japanese as a token of gratitude 
after receiving a part of the ‘blood-debt’ payment from the Japanese.  The Chamber’s 
decision was also manipulated by Shiro Kanda, the manager of the Singapore office 
of the Jiji Press, as a sign of improving relationships between the Chamber and the 
Japanese.  He even suggested this warming of ties as a justification that the Civilian 
War Memorial should be demolished.347
The SCCC reacted by denouncing all these accusations.  Wee Cho Yaw, the 
President of the SCCC, publicly announced that there were no intentions to demolish 
the memorial.  He also stated that it did not receive any payment from the Japanese 
and that the compensation was given to the PAP government for public welfare 
purposes.  In regards to renting an office space to the Japanese, Wee said that they 
were given the space like other tenants without any special terms.   
The significance of the SCCC in taking the first initial step in accepting the 
Japanese, and in turn, being accused of favoring them, could be seen as the 
Chamber’s failure to achieve the fostering of anti-Japanese sentiment among the 
Singapore people by using the memorial and ‘blood-debt’ issues.  This does not mean, 
however, that the people totally accepted the outcome of the issues.  There is a chance 
that the generation that had experienced the war or the problems caused by the 
                                                 
347 Shu and Chua, p. 87. 
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Occupation would always remain bitter and question whether the ‘blood-debt’ and 
memorial issues could ever be settled.   
It is clear, however, that the settlement of the two issues were a political triumph 
for the Singapore government.  By completing the construction of the memorial, it 
was able to use it to promote the idea of multi-ethnicity and racial harmony in 
Singapore.  As for successfully settling the ‘blood-debt’, the government stirred itself 
out from potential political trouble and reached a resolution that was able to please 





This chapter chronicled the developments of the memorial and ‘blood-debt’ issues 
between the years of 1962 and 1963.  When both of the issues were revisited by the 
SCCC in February, 1962, it triggered quite a reaction from the public, particularly the 
Chinese community.  In fact, the discussion of the issues was even politicized.  I have 
argued that the reasons why the SCCC decided to engage the issues were firstly due 
to its ambition to regain its representative role within the Chinese community in 
Singapore, and secondly, the Chamber wanted to use the issues as a means to foster 
anti-Japanese sentiment so as to disrupt the steady flow of Japanese investment into 
the country. 
As the issues developed, the PAP government became involved.  At first, in 1962, 
the government appeared to be quite uncompromising and insensitive towards the 
issues by setting strict conditions with the approving of the license for the Chamber to 
proceed with the exhumation and reburial project.  However, in 1963, the 
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government’s seemed to recant on that position.  The most distinct change was that 
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew began to attend most of the events related to the two 
issues, notably the ‘blood-debt’ mass rally at the Padang on 25 August 1963.  One 
reason was that the Chamber’s decision to change the issues to a multi-ethnic one.   
Parallel to the developments of the issues, and the reaction of the SCCC and the 
PAP towards them, this chapter also discussed the public opinion during that time.  In 
1962, the strongest reaction came from undoubtedly the Chinese community, and 
they seemed to be very enthusiastic and emotional.  However, the rest of the ethnic 
communities, namely the Malays and Indians, did not really react until the two issues 
became multi-ethnic in 1963.  The observation made was that the reactions from the 
Malays and Indians were strong but not as strong as the Chinese.  Instead, they were 
actually more practical as they took into account Japanese investment in the country. 
In the years 1962 and 1963, the ‘blood-debt’ and the memorial issues were one of 
the centers of attention in the affairs of the Singapore people.  By the end of 1963, 
however, only the memorial issue was somewhat settled but the ‘blood-debt’ was not 
resolved.  It would not be until 1967 though it was done quite hastily when 
Estusaburo Shinna, the Japanese Foreign Minister, came to Singapore in October, 















This thesis has chronicled the twenty-year journey that the Civilian War Memorial 
required for its materialization.  I began by giving a historical background on how the 
major ethnic groups (namely the Chinese, Malays and Indians) in Singapore were 
treated by the Japanese during the Occupation.  The first chapter explained how the 
Chinese were singled-out by the Japanese and subjected to a horrific experience.  
Many of them were massacred during the Sook Ching operation.  They were then 
forced to pay a sum of $50 million to the Japanese Military Administration.  The 
Malays and Indians, however, were generally given better treatment by the Japanese.  
But all groups did suffer as a whole during the war.  This was not only the result of 
Japanese treatment but the many problems created by the Occupation.  These 
problems, especially food shortages, had resulted in a significant increase in overall 
mortality rates. 
The second chapter discussed how the Chinese community spearheaded the effort 
to try to build a memorial and reclaim the money exhorted from its people.  It 
identified the three constituencies that took up these responsibilities.  These were Tan 
Kah-Kee and his fund committees (the SCRFC and SCRFU), the SCMAC, and 
independent actions carried out by scholars and relatives of the Sook Ching victims.  
After Tan Kah-Kee and his fund committees initiated these efforts shortly after the 
end of the Occupation, things seemed to be progressing smoothly.  By the time the 
responsibilities were passed to the SCMAC in June 1946, the site of the memorial 
was chosen and a rough compensation figure has been calculated.  The SCMAC 
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campaigned vigorously to resolve the problems left by Tan and his fund committees.  
It pressured the British to recognize the $50 million extortion and demanded them to 
include it as part of their war compensation claim from the Japanese.  The SCMAC 
had also made progress with the construction of the memorial by choosing a new site 
at Thomson Road.  But by 1951, the SCMAC lost its interest in addressing these 
problems after it failed to claim the $50 million from the Japanese through the British.  
This was because the British concluded the San Francisco Treaty with the Japanese 
by denouncing their rights to claim any monetary compensation.  Shortly after that, 
the SCMAC also abandoned the memorial project.  It argued that this was because it 
was unable to locate any of the mass graves even though Tan Kah-Kee and his fund 
committees had identified some of the locations and the SCMAC announced that it 
had located a number of mass graves in Siglap and Bedok in late 1951. 
The second chapter also pointed out that there was a movement not affiliated with 
any Chinese organizations that assumed the responsibilities of trying to commemorate 
the Sook Ching victims.  This movement was led mostly by scholars and the massacre 
victims’ relatives and it made many contributions such as publishing the names and 
pictures of the victims in a number of books.  The victims’ relatives also carried out 
many rituals to appease the souls of the dead at the massacre sites.  Although the 
work contributed by this movement was not recognized and did not result in anything 
lasting, it showed that there was some level of commemoration carried out by regular 
people after the SCMAC abandoned the issue. 
The third chapter discussed why the SCCC readdressed the memorial and 
compensation issues in 1962.  The argument was two-fold.  First, there was a political 
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motivation.  The SCCC at that time was losing its strong influence on the Chinese 
community to the growing power of the authoritarian Singapore government led by 
the People’s Action Party (PAP).  I identified the first reason as to why the SCCC 
readdressed sensitive issues was its desire to challenge the government on who was 
the real vanguard of the Chinese community.  The second reason was the SCCC’s 
economical interests.  During the 1960s, the Singapore government adopted a change 
in its economic development strategy.  Instead of depending on entreport trade, which 
was the economic road-map for the SCCC, the Singapore government wanted to 
industrialize.  To make matter worse for the SCCC, the government was advocating 
the idea that Japanese investment was the key to Singapore’s industrialization.  
Therefore, being caught in this kind of unpleasant situation, the Chamber decided to 
highlight the memorial and ‘blood-debt’ issues to foster anti-Japanese sentiment, so 
that it could halt the increasing flow of Japanese investment into Singapore.  This 
resulted in a negative reaction from the PAP government, which could be seen in the 
way they behaved when the SCCC readdressed the issues.  One example was 
delaying approval of the SCCC’s request for a license to exhume remains from the 
mass graves.  Although in the end the government gave a piece of land to the SCCC 
for the proposed memorial and cemetery park, it was more of a wasteland and the 
Chamber was forced to postpone the memorial project until 1963.  The political 
development during that time was also a reason for such reaction from the PAP 
government.  Firstly, it was working towards merger with the Malaysian Federation, 
and secondly, it was promoting multi-ethnic policy.  As a result, the PAP government 
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could not afford to engage in issues that would make them appear as favoring the 
Chinese. 
The third chapter also introduced the term ‘blood-debt’.  This term was used to 
refer to as the compensation claim by the SCCC after it revisited the memorial and 
compensation issues in February 1962.  From then onwards, ‘blood-debt’ was used 
regularly by not only the Chamber, but also the Chinese press whenever they 
addressed the compensation issue.   
In chapter four, I highlighted the changing of attitude of the government towards 
the memorial and ‘blood-debt’ issues.  It also explored what caused the two issues to 
become multi-ethnic.  This was brought about by the SCCC.  The Chamber claimed 
that it was the people of Singapore as a whole and not just the Chinese that were 
victimized by the Japanese during the Occupation, and it was, therefore, more 
appropriate to make both the memorial and the ‘blood-debt’ a multi-ethnic issue.  
This was a significant development because by making the issues multi-ethnic, it was 
able to compliment the political direction – promoting the merger with Malaysia and 
multi-ethnicity – the PAP government was taking during that time.  As a result, the 
SCCC won the support from the government, as it allocated a new piece of land at 
downtown Singapore for the memorial in 1963.   With the memorial given a multi-
ethnic meaning, its design was also changed to carry the message.  Instead of the 
original design that featured two inverse arches rising to a pinnacle, it was changed to 
a four pillars design with each pillar symbolizing the four ethnic groups (Chinese, 
Malays, Indians, and other ethnic groups). 
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Although the government was more ready to work with the SCCC, there were still 
many conflicts between the two parties.  For instance, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew 
wanted the issues to be settled without offending the Japanese.  He suggested that the 
Japanese investments in Singapore should be seen as the gesture of atonement that the 
SCCC was seeking from the Japanese government.  The Chamber, on the other hand, 
demanded the Japanese government pay M$50 million and that there should be no 
alternatives.  The Public opinion in Singapore at that time was also in conflict.  The 
Chinese backed the SCCC’s demands whereas the Malays and Indians largely 
approved Prime Minister Lee’s suggestions.  In the end, the Japanese did not bow to 
the SCCC’s demands.  As a result, this led to the SCCC’s call for a ‘blood-debt’ mass 
rally.  Although Lee Kuan Yew turned out to support the rally, in truth, he 
manipulated the event to his political agendas, which were the 1963 elections.  
During the rally, Prime Minister Lee announced that his government would stop 
issuing visas to Japanese investors and even shared with the crowd that he was a 
survivor of the Sook Ching.  After the 1963 elections, however, Prime Minister Lee 
seemingly retracted what he said in the rally and urged the Chamber to see Japanese 
investment in Singapore as the atonement for the ‘blood-debt’.  The ‘blood-debt’ 
issue remained unresolved until 1967 when the PAP government reached an 
agreement with the Japanese government without the consultation of the SCCC.  It 
was agreed that the Japanese government would pay a total of M$50 million to the 






After the settlement of the ‘blood-debt’ and memorial issues, Singapore and Japan 
enjoyed warm and cordial relations.  Many scholars who have written on this period 
have discussed the strong economic advance of Japan into the county during the late 
1960s to the late 1970s as one the major indications of the warming of ties between 
the two countries.  For instance, by 1970, three years after the settlement of the 
‘blood-debt’, the volume of trade between Singapore and Japan had grown to over 
US$1.5 billion.  Throughout the 1970s, even when the world was affected twice by 
oil crisis, trading between Singapore and Japan continued to soar.  By the end of the 
1970s, the volume of trade between the two countries stood at more than S$8 billion, 
making Japan the leading trading partner of Singapore after the United States.348   
However, the economic relations between Singapore and Japan were not always 
smooth.  Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, there were actually a number of 
disagreements between the two countries.  It should be noted, however, they were not 
caused by the ‘blood-debt’ and memorial issues.  Instead, they were the results of the 
complexities of trading and commerce.  Taking the total trading volume between the 
two countries for instance, throughout the late the 1960s to 1980s, there was a three-
to-one imbalance of trade in Japan’s favor.349  This meant that Japan had been 
exporting their products and resources much more than importing Singapore’s.  In the 
beginning, the trade imbalance was dismissed by Lee Kuan Yew as “a passing 
phenomenon that was destined sooner or later to turn to Singapore’s advantage”.350  
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Kiichi Aichi, the Japanese Foreign Minister, also assured Singapore during his visit in 
May 1971 that there would be an eventual adjustment for the trade imbalance.351  
However, through the 1980s, the imbalance still existed.   
One conflict between the two countries that was linked tangentially to the ‘blood-
debt’ and memorial issues after 1967 was the textbook controversy in 1982 when the 
Japanese Education Ministry tried to whitewash Japan’s war-time behavior, and 
Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro made the first official visit to the 
Yasukuni Shrine in 1985.  Both of the incidents received harsh criticism from not 
only Chinese press in Malaysia and Singapore, but also local presses in other Asian 
countries that were occupied by the Japanese during the war.352  In May 1991, the 
Japanese government again triggered a wave of protests from these Asian countries 
when it decided to dispatch minesweepers from the Japanese Maritime Self Defense 
Forces to the Gulf War in Middle East.  Although the action was followed up by a 
reassurance and an apology for Japanese aggression during the Second World War 
from then Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki, and that that the dispatch did not 
mean that Japan would revive its military ambition, it was not well-received by the 
East Asian and Southeast Asian press.353
Despite these and other incidents, anti-Japanese sentiment among Singapore 
people, particularly the Chinese, has never been as strong as it was during the postwar 
years and the 1960s.  As Lawrence Olson puts it: 
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At any rate, speculation about the plight of the Japanese who were disliked could cause 
one to overlook the essential fact that Singapore…was on the move, and anti-Japanese 
sentiments were being dissolved in a golden stream of commerce and investment.354
 
 
Although it was highly unlikely that the Japanese would be forgiven totally by the 
Chinese, especially the older generation, things might be different for the younger 
generation.  During the 1990s, the militaristic image of the Japanese was erased 
significantly due to the rise of a culture exchange between Singapore and Japan.  
Known as the “J-pop craze”, young Singaporeans were obsessed with the Japanese 
pop culture.  The youngsters listened to Japanese songs, watched Japanese dramas 
and movies, engrossed themselves with Japanese comics, and some even dressed up 
like the Japanese.  But even with this phenomenon, the atrocities committed by the 
Japanese remains a part of official memory and lives on silent in the Civilian War 
Memorial.  Every year on the 15 February, a solemn ceremony is still held at the site 
to remind the people that Singapore was once “Syonan-To” and its people, 
particularly the Chinese, were victimized by the Japanese.  As Paul Kratoska summed 
it up: 
 
The consequences of malnutrition and disease, the psychological effects of constant 
surveillance and the ever present threat of torture, and the pain caused by the loss of 
friends and family members, lingered on behind the façade of renovated buildings 
and economic growth.  It is only gradually, with the passing of the generation that 
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Figure 1 The Sook Ching Operation in Singapore 
 
Picture A – Mass-screening center at Jalan Besar. 
(Source: Tan Beng Luan and Irene Quah, The Japanese Occupation 1942-1945: A  
Pictorial Record of Singapore during the War (Singapore: Times Editions, 1996), p.66) 
 
Picture B – Mass-screening center at Tanjong Pagar Police Station.  It was  
reported that people detained in this center were executed near Blakang Mati 
Island (present-day Sentosa). 











Figure 2 The $50 Million Payment 
 
Picture A – Lim Boon Keng, President of the Overseas Chinese Association  
(OCA), handing over the $50 million to General Yamashita on 27 June  
1942.  
(Source: Tan and Quah, p.92) 
 
Picture B – A copy of the check that was given to General Yamashita.  Raising the  
$50 million was a difficult task for the OCA.  In the end, it was only able  
to raise $25 million.  The rest was loaned to the association by the  
Yokohama Special Bank. 










Figure 3 Discovery of Mass Graves in Singapore 
 
Picture A – Members from the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce (SCCC)  
visiting one of the mass grave sites.  These sites were first discovered in  
remote areas such as Siglap and Bedok in late February, 1962.  The SCCC 
later assumed the responsibility of locating more graves and exhuming them. 
(Source: Feng, Zhong Han (ed.). 居安思危 : 大战前后新马史料汇编 [Eternal Vigilance: The 
Price of Freedom] (新加坡 : 亚太图书有限公司: 新加坡中华总商 [Singapore: Asiapac 
Books, SCCCI], 1999), p.305) 
 
Picture B – Workers exhuming a mass grave.  As the year progressed, more mass  
graves were located all over Singapore, including Bukit Timah, Punggol, and 










Figure 4 Exhuming the Mass Graves 
 
Picture A – Human remains unearthed from a mass grave.  Personal belongings  
such as dentures, belt buckles, and spectacles were also found with the 
remains.  
(Source: Tan and Quah, p72) 
 
Picture B – Workers exhuming a mass grave.  The remains that were dug out were  
kept in urns.  These urns were reportedly housed in temples near the sites. 









Figure 5 Original Design of the Civilian War Memorial 
 
(Source: Sin Chew Jit Poh, 31 May 1963) 
 
 
This design was submitted by the architect firm Swan and McClaren through a design 
competition for the Civilian War Memorial in April 1963.  The arcs revealed a 

















Figure 6 Construction of the Civilian War Memorial 
 
Picture A – Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew commencing the construction of the  
Civilian War Memorial in the presence of leaders from different religions. 
(Source: Feng, p.315) 
 
Picture B – Officials inspecting the construction of the memorial.  The  
construction of the memorial took more than four years to complete.  This was 
due to a number of delays such as changing the design of the memorial.  It 
was on 15 February 1967.  










Figure 7 The ‘Blood-Debt’ Mass Rally at the Padang on 25 August 1963
 
Picture A – Aerial view of the mass rally crowd at the Padang.  A total of more  
than 120,000 people turned out for the rally.  It was one of the biggest 
gatherings ever recorded in Singapore.  
(Source: Feng, p.298) 
 
Picture B – The crowd at the rally holding banners with messages demanding the  
Japanese to pay the ‘blood-debt’.  











Figure 8 Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew (first from left) Attending the ‘Blood-Debt’ 
Mass Rally on 25 August 1963 
 
(Source: Feng, p.300) 
 
 
Prime Minister Lee gave his speech using the Hokkien dialect.  He shared his Sook 
Ching experience of narrowing being executed by the Japanese.  He also told the 
crowd that because the Japanese were refusing to address the ‘blood-debt’, the 



















Figure 9 The Opening Ceremony of the Civilian War Memorial 
 
 
Picture A – The Civilian War Memorial was unveiled on 15 February 1967.  The  
opening ceremony was attended by officials from the government and the 
SCCC.  Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew (third from right) and Soon Peng Yam, 
President of the SCCC (second from right), were all present at the scene.  The 
most controversial guest was then Japanese ambassador to Singapore, Mr. 
Ueda.  
(Source: Feng p.316) 
 
Picture B – Chinese paying respect to their dead relatives that were massacred by  
the Japanese.  The burning of joss paper and incense is the Chinese ritual of 
appeasing the dead.  





Figure 10 The Civilian War Memorial 
 
(Source: Modder, p.ix) 
 
 
The Civilian War Memorial after its completion.  It features four soaring pillars that 
rise to a pinnacle.  The four pillars represent the ethnic groups in Singapore, namely 
the Chinese, Malays, Indians, and others.  Every year on 15 February, a ceremony 
will be held at the site to commemorate the victims of the Japanese Occupation. 
 
 
 
